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Despite large measured returns to completing a high school diploma, the US
has a dropout rate among the highest in the industrialized world and, while
there are many studies of dropout, we still have limited knowledge of the
process through which students dropout and the causal evidence of effective
dropout prevention strategies is sparse. This dissertation studies the decisions
students make while in high school, and how those decisions are related to
dropout, academic achievement, and health. Specifically, it focuses on the rela-
tionship between high school attendance behavior, academic achievement, and
dropout and the relationship between health care provision, teen pregnancy,
and dropout.
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on how attendance and truancy affect students’ abil-
ity to graduate from high school. I use a novel dataset of daily level student at-
tendance data for multiple cohorts of ninth graders in a Large Urban School Dis-
trict (LUSD) to follow individual students’ attendance decisions through their
high school career. Chapter 1 provides the first detailed description of the daily
patterns of high school attendance. The chapter examines how measures of at-
tendance intensity, aggregate attendance, and attendance type evolve over the
course of the school year and their relationship to student achievement. I find
that, even given a total number of absences, the number of truant absences is
the most predictive of negative educational outcomes. Truant absences become
more frequent over the course of the school year, more persistent, and students
spend longer spells outside of school. These patterns are more intense for stu-
dents in lower performing high schools and who have lower grades and test
scores. Truancy predicts dropout and low test scores as early as the first month
of high school and can serve as a valuable early warning indicator for school ad-
ministrators. These patterns also provide suggestive evidence that attendance is
an input into the education production function and insight into the dynamics
of high school disengagement before students dropout.
In Chapter 2 I model dropout as the outcome of a series of small investment
decisions, specifically the decision of a student to attend school or be truant on
a given day, rather than dropout as a one-time decision based on the patterns
of attendance detailed in Chapter 1. Students’ daily attendance decisions not
only affect their ability to graduate, but also the costs they face on future days
and the quality of the diploma they can earn. I find that, once students are
subject to the plausibly exogenous timing of an opportunity cost increase, they
are truant more frequently and the accumulation of truancies occurs at a faster
rate. A student who barely misses the school cut off age is 12% more likely to
be truant in 12th grade, and a student with existing attendance problems is up
to 69% more likely to be truant after only 3 months of increased schooling cost.
Students with higher levels of truancy each year, especially truancies late in the
school year, are less likely to return to school the following fall and if they do
return are more likely to transfer into a non-traditional diploma program. These
results help explain the persistence of the US’s high dropout rate and suggest
that policies to reduce the daily attendance costs faced by students, even late in
high school, may be most effective at dropout prevention.
Chapter 3 turns its focus away from high school attendance to high school
students’ access to health care. I, along with coauthors Michael Lovenheim and
Randall Reback, explore whether teenagers’ access to primary health care influ-
ences their fertility and educational attainment. We study how the significant
expansion of school-based health centers (SBHCs) in the United States since the
early 1990’s has affected teen birth and school dropout rates. Our results indi-
cate that school-based health centers have a negative effect on teen birth rates:
adding services equivalent to the average SBHC reduces the 15-18 year old birth
rate by 5%. The effects are largest among younger teens and among African
Americans and Hispanics. However, primary care health services do not re-
duce dropout rates by very much despite the sizable reductions in teen birth
rates.
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CHAPTER 1
HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDANCE PATTERNS AND STUDENT OUTCOMES
1.1 Introduction
The measured benefits of graduating high school compared to dropping out or
earning a GED are immense. Students who stay in school longer have higher
incomes, better health, and are less likely to be incarcerated or unemployed
(Angrist & Krueger, 1991; Cameron & Heckman, 1993; Card, 2001; Oreopou-
los, 2007; Lochner & Moretti, 2004; Muenning, 2008.) However, despite these
benefits, the graduation rate in the US remains one of the lowest in the develop-
ing world with estimates varying from 20% to 30% of all students. One of the
strongest predictors of high school graduation is school attendance. There is a
well documented relationship between student attendance and academic out-
comes beginning as early as elementary and middle school. Students who are
in school more often perform better on tests, are more likely to graduate, and
are more likely to attend college. Schools with higher rates of average atten-
dance also perform better on other school accountability measures (Barrington
and Hendricks, 1989; Lamdin, 1996; Peterson and Colangelo, 1996; Strickland,
1998; Stanca, 2006; Dobkin et al., 2010; Douglas, 2004; Marbyurger, 2006; Neil et
al, 2008).
Education policy and research has focused primarily on two aggregate mea-
sures of attendance. The first is the averaged yearly attendance rate, which is
the average percentage of registered students present each day. This number
is over 90% for the vast majority of schools (Attendance Works, 2015; Balfanz
& Byrnes, 2012). More recently the focus has expanded to the rate of chronic
1
absenteeism. Chronic absenteeism is defined as the percentage of enrolled stu-
dents at a school who miss more than a certain cutoff of school days for either
excused or unexcused absences.
While it is well established that higher aggregate attendance is correlated
with achievement, how attendance fits into the education production function
and the mechanisms through which attendance affects student achievement are
still open questions. This paper expands the attendance literature by providing
the first detailed description of the daily level attendance patterns of high school
students and the correlation between those patterns and school completion and
student achievement. Unlike previous studies of student attendance which are
limited by aggregate measures of attendance, I employ a novel detailed admin-
istrative dataset of daily level student attendance data for a Large Urban School
District (LUSD). The data provide detailed information on individual students
including whether they were in school each day and, if not, the reason they were
absent. The data contain the full high school attendance record for over 38,000
high school students and follows 5 cohorts of ninth graders until they graduate
or leave the school district.
The relationship of different types of attendance patterns and measures to
education outcomes provides insight into the role attendance plays in the edu-
cation production function and student education investment decisions. Pat-
terns of daily attendance provide a tool for economists and other education
researchers to measure school “disengagement” and other theories of grad-
ual high school dropout in a systematic way. Disengagement is the process
through which students become less connected to school and potentially even-
tually leave (Christenson et. al., 2012; Rhumberger 2004 for overviews). Dis-
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engagement is difficult to quantify because it is an abstract concept. Empir-
ical studies of the path of disengagement are dependent on the measures of
disengagement they use. Objective measures such as assignment completion,
truancy, and grades are employed, as are student survey responses to ques-
tions about how students feel about school. The disengagement literature, like
the absence literature, focuses on yearly aggregates and correlations between
attitudes measured at a single point in time and outcomes. However, disen-
gagement is a dynamic process and dropout is only one of the potential conse-
quences (Lee & Burkham, 1992; Rhumberger & Larson, 1998; Rhumberger 2003).
Within year attendance patterns potentially provide a much deeper look into the
process through which students disengage from school and the student behav-
iors that underly yearly attendance totals or student reported affinity for school.
Economists have focused substantially less on disengagement than other edu-
cation researchers, due to the measurement issues, and within-year attendance
patterns provide a path through which economists can incorporate the lessons
of disengagement theory into models of human capital development.
The goal of this paper is to describe the within year patterns of student at-
tendance and establish basic facts about the way students attend high school in
order to provide insight into the mechanisms through which attendance may
affect achievement and how attendance fits into models of human capital in-
vestment, disengagement, and the education production function. I develop
three measures of within-year absence intensity: the averaged monthly atten-
dance rate, the probability that an absence is part of a multi-day spell and the
length of the spell, and the persistence of absence which is the transition prob-
ability of absence to absence and absence to present. I examine how all three
of these measures, as well as more traditional measurements of averaged atten-
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dance and chronic absenteeism, vary over the school year and type of absence.
Truant absences are more likely to be part of multi-day spells of absence, they
have a higher rate of persistence, and spells of truant absences are longer than
spells of excused absences. I find that absences of all types are least common
in the beginning of the year and that truant absences peak in June whereas ex-
cused absences peak between December and March. Over the course of the
school year, truant absences become more common, more persistent, and are,
on average, part of longer spells of truancy.
Like the previous literature, I find that aggregate attendance is highly cor-
related with academic success. However, given a total number of absences, the
timing and type of absence also matter. Students with more truant absences
have lower grades, lower test scores, are more likely to dropout than peers with
the same number of total absences but fewer truancies. A student with a single
truant absence in September of 9th grade is 10 percentage points less likely to
continue into 10th grade in a traditional high school than a student who misses
over a month of school with excused absences. High and low achieving schools
and students also have very different patterns of absence and truancy accumu-
lation over the year. Students in low performing schools are more likely to be
truant than students at high performing schools and that gap increases over
the course of the year. However, all schools have similar patterns of excused
absences. While I can not distinguish between the causal effect of these atten-
dance patterns on student achievement from unobserved student heterogeneity,
the insight of these pattens provides valuable information to both researchers
and policy makers on how students attend high school as well as early warning
indicators for teachers and parents.
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The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the most common aggregate
measures of student attendance used in the education and policy literature in-
cluding averaged yearly attendance, chronic absenteeism, count days, and ret-
rospective survey response. I follow that discussion with a description of the
LUSD student-by-day level attendance data and discussion of how the charac-
teristics of the data provide insight into high school attendance patterns that are
impossible using aggregate attendance. In the methodology section, I discuss
how different constructions and definitions of standard aggregate attendance
measures affects the information they provide researchers. Following aggre-
gate attendance, I develop three novel measures of attendance intensity based
on the daily level data: monthly averaged attendance, the prevalence and length
of multi-day absence spells, and the persistence of absences. Finally in section
4, I present estimates of these different measures of attendance, both aggregate
and daily, discuss how the measures change over the school year, and their rela-
tionship to student achievement. I finish the section by discussing a number of
early warning factors for academic achievement that show up during the first
month of high school. I conclude the paper with a discussion of the relevance




1.2.1 Standard Measures of School Attendance
There are three common aggregate measures of yearly attendance rates used in
the education literature, accountability programs, and school funding formu-
las: averaged yearly attendance, chronic absenteeism or chronic truancy rates,
and count days. It is important for both researchers and policy makers to un-
derstand what each of these statistics measures and how they are constructed.
The daily attendance rate is the number of students attending school divided
by the number of students registered at the school each day. Averaged yearly
attendance is the average of all the daily attendance rates for the school year.
Averaged yearly attendance is a required federal accountability measure.
Recently, there has been increased policy focus on attendance and chronic
absenteeism as additional measurements of student outcomes and school qual-
ity. Unlike averaged yearly attendance, which measures how many of a school’s
students are in school on an average day, chronic absenteeism measures how
many students are absent frequently during the school year. A student is con-
sidered a chronic absentee if she misses more than a specified number of days
per year for either excused or truant absences. Researchers, policy makers,
states, and the federal government have different cutoff levels for how many
absences qualify as “chronic.” When the Department of Education launched the
Every Student, Every Day national initiative in conjunction with then President
Obama’s My Brother’s Keeper (MBK) program, they defined chronic absen-
teeism as missing 15 or more days during the school year. Under the Every
Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) chronic absenteeism, in addition to average atten-
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dance rates, has been added to the Civil Rights Data Collection requirements
but there is no specific cutoff for what qualifies as chronic absenteeism named
in the bill (US Department of Education, 2016). Many states including New Jer-
sey, Hawaii, Oregon, California, Connecticut, and Georgia already use chronic
absenteeism as a metric of school accountability or as part of their funding for-
mula (Attendance Works, 2015). Most states set the chronic absentee cutoff at
10% of the school year (17 - 20 days depending on the length of the school year)
and the 10% rule is the focus of most researchers and policy organizations (At-
tendance Works, 2015; Hough et al, 2016; Education Commission of the States,
2016; Allensworth & Easton, 2007).
An additional attendance measure is chronic truancy. Like chronic absen-
teeism, chronic truancy measures the number of students in a school who are
truant for a substantial number of days rather than the average number of stu-
dents who are truant on any one day. Truancy is any day in which a student is
required to be in school, is not in school, and does not have a legally valid ex-
cuse for their absence. Students are considered chronic truants once they pass a
certain level (cutoff) of truant absences in one year. LUSD’s state defines chronic
truancy as 3 or more truancies in a year.
A count day is a single day during the school year in which the students at-
tending that day are counted by the state in order to assess enrollment and dis-
tribute funding. As of 2012, there were 19 states that used either one or multiple
count days in order to assess enrollment and attendance and distribute funding
to schools (Lara et al, 2012). How count days measure student attendance and
enrollment depends on when the count day is during the year, and whether it
only counts students who are present on that specific day or all students who
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are enrolled as of that day. Different states have count days at different times of
the year but the vast majority choose a count day early in the school year and
about half of states with count days have multiple count days.
Researchers also use retrospective survey data to measure attendance and
the relationship between attendance and achievement. The National Education
Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS: 88) and the Education Longitudinal Study
of 2002 (ELS: 2002) both ask students retrospective questions about how often
they missed school or skipped school during a past time period (4 weeks to
5 months) and parents are asked about whether they were contacted by their
child’s school about attendance.
1.2.2 LUSD Administrative Data
The measures of attendance discussed above provide aggregate information on
different dimensions of school attendance. However, these measures of atten-
dance provide little insight into how students attend school and which patterns
of attendance are most predictive of academic achievement. Understanding stu-
dents’ patterns of attendance, specifically when they are missing school during
the year, what they are missing school for, how absences are grouped over time,
and how those patterns are correlated with student achievement is important
for developing effective policies to address absenteeism and also to understand
the role that attendance plays in the education production function.
I use extremely detailed day-by-student administrative attendance data to
document within year patterns of student attendance and their relationship to
measures of student achievement including grades, test scores, graduation, and
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dropout. Using this individual data, I am able to track how student’s attendance
behavior changes over the course of the school year, why students are missing
school, how long students are out of school at a time, and how those patterns
relate to student achievement.
LUSD provides an excellent case study of student attendance behavior. It
is among the 50 largest districts in the country and has an averaged freshman
graduation rate nearly at the mean of large districts (NCES, 2015).1 LUSD is
majority minority: 40% Hispanic, 10% Black, 27% White, and 20% Asian and,
as Figure 1 demonstrates, there is large variation in school racial composition.
This is because demographic composition of the school a student attends is de-
termined by the neighborhood catchment area in which she resides. The within
district racial and achievement diversity makes LUSD an ideal context to exam-
ine differences in attendance patterns among high and low performing schools
and their relationship to student achievement. All students in the district are
subject to the same graduation requirements and the same attendance rules and
enforcement.
This paper links six administrative datasets within the school district: the
student entrance file, student exit file, transcript information, accountability
standardized test scores, high school exit exam dates and scores, and daily level
administrative attendance records for five cohorts of 9th graders. I limit the
sample to students enrolled in 9th grade in a “traditional” or neighborhood
public high school all of which have the same attendance rules. Students are
between the ages of 13.75 and 15.5,2 are diploma bound, enter on-time during
September of their freshman year, and do not leave before the end of the first
1Ranking and dropout rate are not reported in order to protect the district’s anonymity
2This is consistent with state school entrance policy
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month.3 The sample contains over 25 million day-by-student observations for
over 38,000 individual students.
The key dataset is the Final Attendance Code Database. This administra-
tive data set includes one code per student per day while the student attends
her original public high school. The daily attendance code is assigned by the
district office. In each class, teachers mark the student absent or present and
then the district assigns an attendance code based on the reason the student is
out of class. Students who are absent from school fall into two major categories:
excused absent and truant absent. Excused absences are those for which the stu-
dent has a legally valid excuse such as an illness, religious holiday, or funeral.
Truant absences are all other absences. A student is truant if she is not in school
on a day in which she is legally required to be there and does not have a legally
valid excuse for the absence. Students are required to be in school if they are
under 18, do not have a GED or diploma, have not transferred to another school
district, and are not home schooled. Students may still be considered truant
even if their parents excuse them from class. Students are required to have doc-
umentation for illnesses lasting more than 3 days, and there are strict rules for
the amount of time that can be taken for bereavement and religious holidays.
Students who are in school can either be in school and on time (present) or in
school and late (tardy).
Overall, most students are in school most days. On an average day 85% of
students are in school and on time, 3.5% are out sick, 0.4% are out for a family
engagement of some sort, 6% are tardy, and 2% are truant absent. Most absences
from school are the result of reported illness or medical appointments. Over
3This is to eliminate students who were not actually attending the school but were registered
in it as a holdover from the previous year. It is the same sample selection process as Wedenoja
(2017)
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half, 57% of absences are for medical reasons.
The attendance data are augmented by student demographic and achieve-
ment data. Demographic data comes from LUSD’s student entrance file. The
entrance file includes all students who enter into a traditional public high school
between the years 2005 and 2009. Dropout and transfer outcomes are from the
student exit file, which contains detailed administrative exit information gener-
ally unavailable in survey datasets. It distinguishes between types of transfers
(in distinct, public in state, private in state, out of state, out of country) and types
of diplomas that students earned. Diploma types include a high school diploma
from a traditional school, a high school diploma from an alternative school, an
adult education diploma, a GED, or no diploma. Alternative schools are high
schools within LUSD that waive some of the requirements of traditional high
schools. They can have non-standard school days, online learning components,
lower credit requirements for graduation, and may waive some higher level
classes, especially in math, that are otherwise required for graduation. Alter-
native schools do not include other schools of choice within the district such as
magnet, gifted, or area specialty schools which have the same requirements as
traditional neighborhood public schools. Diplomas from alternative schools are
likely to have lower value than those from traditional public high schools due to
their reduced requirements. Furthermore, nearly half of students in the sample
who transfer to an alternative high school eventually drop out.
In addition to graduation and exit data, achievement data include students’
high school exit exam scores, yearly weighted grade point averages,4 and ac-
countability test scores in math and language arts. Students in the same grade
4The weighted GPA uses a multiplier for advanced courses and is the one the district uses to
determine if a student has passed the GPA threshold of 2.0 to graduate
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all take the same language arts test but the math test is for the specific math
class taken that year regardless of grade. The high school exit examination is
required for graduation and first attempted and usually passed in the spring of
tenth grade, 80% of 10th graders pass the exams before 11th grade but students
who fail may continue to re-take the test until they pass.
While the data are extremely detailed, they are limited by parent honesty.
Parents may lie about the reason behind their students’ absences which could
cause measurement error in the composition of absence types. While parents’
truthfulness when providing the school an excuse does not alter if a student
is in school or not, parental lying will cause error in analysis of absence type.
However, parents do not have absolute power to excuse students from school.
Parents can not give students unlimited excused absences and may only excuse
students for illness, medical appointments, bereavement, documented family
emergencies, and religious holidays. Beyond three consecutive days of “illness”
or “medical appointments” parents must provide written documentation of the
medical condition from a doctor. Students who are seriously ill also have the
option to attend school remotely. Additionally, bereavement beyond a speci-
fied number of days (based on funeral location) or an undocumented family
emergency beyond one day are labeled unexcused and truant despite a parent’s
excuse. While the reason a student is out of school is an important componenet
of my anyalysis, I also examine patterns the time students spend out of school
regardless of why they are absent. These patterns are not dependent on parents
providing schools with the true reason for their student’s absence.
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1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Measuring Chronic Absenteeism, Chronic Truancy, and
Averaged Yearly Attendance
In addition to averaged yearly attendance, chronic absenteeism and chronic tru-
ancy are increasingly popular school accountability measures. However, there
is no universal standard for how many absences or truancies a student must
have during the year before she is considered to be a chronic absentee or tru-
ant. There are two important factors in choosing a cutoff for what qualifies as
chronic absenteeism. First, there should be a meaningful difference in achieve-
ment between students below or above the chronic absentee cutoff and second,
the measure should be able to distinguish schools that have problem attendance
from those that do not. Most students miss some school during the year so if
the cutoff for chronic absenteeism is too low, schools with severe absenteeism
problems would be indistinguishable from schools with mild absenteeism If the
cutoff is set too high, then it is not a meaningful indicator of student achieve-
ment. Using the detailed LUSD data, I examine how chronic absenteeism rates
are affected by the number of absences chosen as the chronic absentee cutoff and
how well those measures distinguish low and high performing schools from
each other.5 I focus on four chronic absentee cutoffs: 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. I
do a similar exercise for chronic truancy, and examine how the chronic truancy
rate changes when 1 to 5 truancies qualify a student as a chronic truant.
In addition to these measures of chronic absenteeism and truancy, I also ex-
5high and low performing schools are schools in the bottom and top quartiles by average
test scores and graduation rate.
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amine how different definitions of averaged yearly attendance and count days
affect the calculation of student attendance and the differences in attendance
between schools. To do so I define “present” in three ways: present at all on the
day, present all day, and present and on time. I also show how the timing of
a count day affects how absenteeism is measured by comparing a count day in
September and a count day in June.
1.3.2 Measuring Within Year Patterns in Absence Composition,
Timing, and Intensity
The main focus of this paper is to document the within year patterns of student
attendance that underline the aggregate measures and provide better insight
for economists, education researchers, empiricists, and policy makers. In this
paper I focus on the patterns of attendance of 9th grade students. Attendance
is viewed to be particularly important during the first year of high school as
the transition from middle to high school is disruptive to students in terms of
peer group, school change, and more difficult classes as well as increased au-
tonomy over their choices. Studies of large urban school districts have found
that students with lower attendance in 9th grade are less likely to graduate in
four years and have lower grade point averages (Chicago: Allensworth & Eas-
ton, 2007; New Jersey: Advocates for Children of New Jersey, 2016; Baltimore:
Olson, 2014; Utah: Utah Education Policy Center, 2012). Students are likely to
establish habits of attendance during 9th grade that persist through their high
school careers.
Beyond the aggregate measures of school attendance, I examine three main
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facets of absence patterns within the school year and their interaction: type of
absences and absence excuses, the “intensity” of absences, and how type and
intensity of absence vary across demographics, schools, and time. The main
two absence types are excused absences, including sick days and certain family
obligations, and truant absences.
I construct three intensity measures for within year absences. The first is the
averaged monthly attendance rate. This is similar to the averaged yearly atten-
dance measure required for accountability and is simply the monthly average of
the daily attendance rate. The goal of this measure is to document how average
attendance changes over the course of the school year. Attendance may have
seasonal patterns due to holidays, weather, exam schedules, and teen work op-
portunities. The second is the probability that an absence is part of a multi-day
spell of absences. An absence on day t is part of a multi-day spell if the student
is also absent on day t− 1 or t+ 1. If a student is absent on a Friday and also the
following Monday but returns to school on Tuesday, the Friday and Monday
are part of a 2 day absence spell. Additionally, I document the average length
of absence spells. Finally, I construct a measure of the persistence of absence.
This is the estimated transition probability of absence to absence and absence to
present by absence type. This allows me to look at both how absences persist
but also how absence types interact with each other by measuring the transition
probability from one type of absence, such as out sick, to another, such as truant.
Using these measures of absence levels and intensity, I document how they
change over the course of the school year and the differences in these measures
between schools and demographic groups. I break the district schools into four
quartiles based on their graduation rate, average GPA, and average test scores.6
6The achievement measure chose to define the quartiles does not affect which schools are in
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1.3.3 Measuring the Relationship between Attendance Patterns
and Student Achievement
After documenting the basic patterns of student attendance measures including
aggregate attendance, and attendance intensity, I relate those patterns to mea-
sures of high school achievement. High performing students and schools, on
average, have substantially different attendance patterns compared to low per-
forming students. The measures of achievement I focus on are eventual grad-
uation, continuing from 9th to 10th grade, passing the high school exit exam,
standardized test scores in English and math, and grade point average. High
school attendance is also a non-cognitive skill outcome in its own right. The
ability to regularly attend school on time with limited supervision is a valuable
life and workplace skill that students develop in high school.
Documenting the observed relationship of attendance to measures of cog-
nitive achievement provides valuable insight into the role of attendance in the
education production function as well as insight into the mechanisms through
which policy can affect attendance and attendance can affect achievement. The
positive relationship between average attendance and student outcomes is well
documented, however, evidence on the mechanisms through which attendance
and outcomes are related is sparse. I establish novel correlations of attendance
patterns and student achievement. I provide the first documentation of the re-
lationship between absence intensity and achievement as well as the first look
at how absence accumulation patterns and timing over the school year differ
by outcome measures. High achieving schools and students have very differ-
ent attendance patterns from their lower achieving counterparts. While I can
which quartile.
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not distinguish whether this is a causal effect of the attendance patterns or
driven by unobserved student heterogeneity, documenting these patterns will
help schools direct academic interventions earlier.
1.4 How Students Attend High School
1.4.1 Average Attendance Rates
The rate of high school attendance when averaged across all students, all
schools, and all days is very high. On average, 85% of students in the sam-
ple are present and on time, 6% are tardy, 4.2% have excused absences and 2%
are truant. However, those low average rates of absence obscure substantial
variation in attendance across students within schools and across schools. Fig-
ure 2 contains histograms of total days missed for all 9th graders within each
school. Each panel is a different school. Some schools (2 and 13) have very few
students with more than two or three absences, while other schools (8, 13, and
16) have far more students in the right tail who miss large amounts of the school
year. The differences across schools in attendance are even more stark in Figure
3. Schools in the four quartiles of the academic achievement distribution do not
differ greatly in the distribution of excused absences (bottom panel). However,
students in the lowest performing schools have far more truant absences on av-
erage, and students in the 75th and 99th percentiles of the schools have over
double the number of truancies as students in the 75th and 99th percentiles of
high performing schools.
Table 1 presents versions of the standard aggregate measures of student
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attendance discussed above: chronic absenteeism, chronic truancy, averaged
yearly attendance, and count days. The table contains aggregate attendance for
all schools, and for schools in each achievement quartile. As the bottom panel
demonstrates, how the averaged yearly attendance rate is calculated matters for
comparing schools to each other and distinguishing which schools have atten-
dance problems. If attendance is measured as the percent of students who are
in school for any part of the day, low and high performing schools look very
similar with attendance rates ranging from 94% to 97%. The lowest perform-
ing schools fall only one percentage point below the district average. However,
alternative definitions of averaged yearly attendance reveal substantial differ-
ences in attendance at low and high performing schools. In the lowest perform-
ing schools (bottom quarter) only 76% of students are in school and on time
compared to 90% of students at higher achieving schools. While students at
low achieving schools are almost as likely to be in school for some of the day as
students in higher achieving schools, they are much less likely to be on time or
in school for the entire day. All quartiles of schools have similar count day at-
tendance if the count day is at the beginning of the year (97% - 98%). However,
lower performing schools have lower counts than high performing schools if the
count day is at the end of the year falling from 97% attendance to 92%, whereas
high performing schools only fall from 98% to 97%.
Schools that have similar averaged yearly attendance rates can still have
very different chronic absentee and truancy rates. The goal of incorporating
chronic absenteeism and truancy into accountability measures is to identify
schools that have students missing large percentages of school. The rate of
chronic absenteeism is the percentage of students who miss more than a cer-
tain cutoff number (or percent) of school days. Rates of chronic absenteeism
18
and truancy are sensitive to how they are defined as shown in Table 1. If the
cutoff for chronic absenteeism is set very low, 5% of the school year, students in
the bottom, low, and middle quartiles have very similar chronic absentee rates
ranging form 48% to 43%. The higher the threshold for chronic absenteeism,
the more different low and high performing schools appear. Using the com-
mon chronic absentee cutoff of missing 10% of the school year, low performing
schools have a chronic truancy rate of 24% and high performing schools have a
rate of only 11%. Because low performing schools tend to have long right tails
in the absentee distribution, the higher the cutoff for chronic absenteeism the
larger the difference between high and low performing schools appears to be.
The difference in the chronic truancy rate across school quartiles is even
more stark. Low performing schools have much higher rates of chronic truancy
compared to higher performing schools even if chronic truancy is defined as a
single truant absence. Nearly 70% of students in the bottom quartile of schools
will be truant at least one day compared to only 30% of students in the high-
est quartile of schools. 28% of students in the lowest performing schools meet
the district definition of a chronic truant by having 3 or more truant absences
compared to only 11% of students in the highest performing schools. Table 2
breaks down rates and levels of excused absence, truancy, chronic absence, and
chronic truancy as well as average days missed for individual schools. In the
school with the lowest absence rate students only miss 6 days of school per year
on average compared to 16 days on average at the school with the lowest atten-
dance rate.
Absenteeism and truancy rates also vary across demographic groups as seen
in Table 3. Black, Hispanic, and English Language Learner (ELL) students have
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the highest rates of truancy and absence missing 12 to 14 days on average com-
pared to 10 days for white students and 5 days for Asian students. Nearly one
third of Black students and over one third of Hispanic students are chronic tru-
ants and the chronic truancy rate is slightly higher for men, although they miss
the same amount of days on average as women.
1.4.2 Attendance Intensity
Table 4 contains the measures of absence intensity. Absence intensity is mea-
sured as the percent of absences in multi-day absence spells and the length of
those spells. On average, 42% of absences are part of a multi-day spell and the
average spell length, given that a spell is at least 2 days, is 3.8 days with 13%
of absences part of a spell that lasts a week or longer. Truant spells are longer
than excused absence spells at 5.7. Truant spells are also much more likely to be
a week or longer, 23% compared to 9.4% and just over half of truancies are part
of a multi-day spell.
Another way to view attendance intensity is through the day to day transi-
tion probability between present and different types of absences. The four pan-
els of Table 5 contain transition probability matrices for students in quartiles of
student performance. Across all schools and absence types it is very unusual for
students to transition from one type of absence to another, it does not appear to
be the case that students are out of school for the three sick days they are al-
lowed without documentation, and then continue to be truant absent. Only 5%
of students out sick in the lowest performing schools transition to truancy, and
only around 1% of students in higher performing schools. Transition probabili-
20
ties from and to out sick and from out on disciplinary grounds are very similar
across school performance quantiles. This is likely due in part to the strict rules
that govern how long a student can be out sick without documentation and
standardized suspension policies. However, in lower performing schools stu-
dents who are truant are much more likely to stay truant. The truant to truant
probability is 38% for low performing schools and 27% for the highest perform-
ing schools. Students in high performing schools are 17% more likely to return
to school after a truancy than students in low performing schools.
1.4.3 Yearly Patterns
Attendance levels, type, and intensity vary substantially throughout the year.
Table 6 shows that average attendance decreases over the year with the highest
levels in September (96.6%) and the lowest levels in June (93.5%). Most of this
decrease is due to an increase in truant absences from less than 1% in September
to 3.2% in June. Monthly averages of truancy increase over the school year,
whereas excused absences increase and peak in December and then gradually
decrease. The peak in excused absences in December is likely due to parents
pulling their children out of school early for winter break. In fact, the top panel
of Figure 4 shows spikes in all types of absences around winter break and then
a decline when students return in January.
Attendance intensity also varies over the school year as can be seen in Table
6. The percentage of absences and truancies that are part of a multi-day spell
are lowest in September at 37% and 41% respectively, as are the own transition
probability for truant (28%) and excused absences (25%). Total absences and ab-
21
sence intensity increase consistently over the school year with the absence rate
nearly doubling by June and the truancy rate more than tripling. The percent-
age of absences and truancies in multi-day spells also increases to 50% of total
absences and 41% of truancies. Students also become more likely to stay truant
with 54% of students staying truant up from 41%. The change in intensity of
total absences appears to be almost completely driven by truancy and both the
level and intensity of excused absences peak in the middle of the year not at
the end. Students are most likely to be out sick between December and March,
which would be consistent with flu season and the excused to excused transi-
tion probabilities are highest during those same months. Sick days also have a
weaker weekly pattern than truancies although students are most likely to be
out sick on Mondays.
The difference in transition probabilities between high and low performing
schools discussed earlier, results in high and low performing schools having
yearly attendance patterns that look very different as shown in Figure 5. Low
performing schools have a higher average level of absences as well as more in-
tense spikes as seen in the top panel of figure 5. Most of that variation is driven
by truancy (bottom panel) rather than excused absences (middle panel), the pat-
terns of which are very similar for all schools. Low performing schools not only
have higher truancy every day than higher performing schools, but they have
much more intense spikes in truancy around school breaks and the truancy rate
increases dramatically over the year relative to all other schools. One other dif-
ference between high and low performing schools is in disciplinary absences
and family emergency absences. Figure 6 shows that students in low perform-
ing schools are more likely to be out on disciplinary grounds, but the pattern
doesn’t differ dramatically from other schools. For family emergencies, low
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performing schools have much higher spikes near winter break and the end of
the year.
1.4.4 Attendance and Student Achievement
Students who are absent more often have worse academic achievement than
students who are absent less. While this is a well established fact in the litera-
ture, the relationship between the more detailed measures of attendance rates
and intensity to academic achievement has not been documented before. Figure
7 plots the relationship between total days missed freshman year and eventually
graduating with a traditional diploma (top panel) and continuing in traditional
school in 10th grade (bottom panel). Each circle in the scatter plot is a school by
number of days missed observation and is scaled in size by the number of stu-
dents in that cell. Vertical reference lines are two different measures of chronic
absenteeism: a 5% and 10% of days missed cutoff.
There is a clear negative relationship between days missed freshman year,
continuing on into 10th grade, and eventually graduating. However, while stu-
dents who miss more than 10% of days are less likely to continue school, there
is also a difference between students who miss more than 5% of days and those
who miss fewer. Table 7 contains average continuation and dropout rates by
total number of missed days. Students who miss 18-22 days of school freshman
year (about 10%) are 10% less likely to continue in traditional school than stu-
dents who miss 13-17 days and 17% less likely to continue than students who
miss fewer than 3 days. They are also much more likely to dropout. The rela-
tionship between between school days missed and continuing school is weaker
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for students who have low or no truancies; 81% of students who have fewer
than 3 truancies and miss 18-22 days of school continue in traditional school
which is just under the average of 82%. If students have no truancies, 86% of
those who miss 10% of the school year continue which is above average. The ap-
parent relationship between dropout and chronic absence appears to be driven
mostly by truants.
As Table 8 shows, measures of chronic absence and truancy do predict
whether students will continue on in traditional school for all grades. In 9th and
10th grade chronic absentee students are 11 and 9 percentage points less likely
to continue school than students who are not chronically absent, provided they
are not also chronic truants. Chronic truants who miss more than 10% of the
school year are 30 percentage points less likely to continue to 10th grade and
36 percentage points less likely to continue to 11th. Chronic absentee students
are only 2 percentage points less likely to continue to 12 grade after making it
to 11th. However for students who are also chronic truants, they are still more
than 30 percentage points less likely to continue.7
Students who continue in traditional school also have different within-year
patterns of attendance seen in Figure 8. Students who transfer into alternative
schools are more likely to be out sick early in the year than students who stay in
traditional school, they are also much more likely to have disciplinary absences.
The middle panel of Figure 8 shows that students who drop out between 9th
and 10th grade have an especially stark pattern of increasing truancy over the
course of the year compared to students who continue in any kind of school.
Measures of academic achievement and cognitive skills also differ by at-
7Students dropout and transfer between years so the students who are still in traditional
school in later grades are higher achieving than other students.
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tendance level and intensity. Figure 9 shows that students with fewer missed
days freshman year have higher GPAs and higher ELA test scores and Figure
10 shows that the pattern holds for passing the ELA and Math exit exams as
well. The daily patterns of attendance also differ by academic achievement. Stu-
dents with low GPAs have higher rates of absence, their absence rate increases
more rapidly over the year, and that increase is driven almost entirely due to
increased truancy as seen in Figure 11. Figure 12 shows that exit exam success
follows a similar pattern, students who never pass their exit exams have higher
rates of absence which increase over the year and that increase is also due al-
most entirely to truancy. Students who pass both exams the first time have a
similar pattern of excused absences but virtually no truancy.
1.4.5 Early Warning Factors
Understanding the within year patterns of high school attendance can help
identify early warning indicators for student achievement so that schools can
intervene with students early during 9th grade and prevent patterns of bad at-
tendance from becoming entrenched. September is the month with the highest
rates of attendance, lowest truancies, fewest absences in multi-day spells, short-
est average multi-day spells, and lowest absence to absence transition prob-
abilities. However, despite those positive attributes, attendance behavior in
September is correlated with attendance behavior later in the year and sub-
sequent negative outcomes. Even small attendance issues in 9th grade could
become larger problems later in high school. As such, attendance behavior in
September, specifically the number and type of absences, can provide a valuable
early warning sign for teachers and school administrators.
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Table 9 describes the relationship between absences during September of 9th
grade and outcomes later in the year and later in high school. As shown in panel
A, missing even one day of September decreases the probability of graduating,
GPA, standardized test scores, the probability of passing exit exams the first
time, and increases the probability of dropout, having a GPA below the grad-
uation cutoff of 2.0, never passing exit exams, and repeating Math. However,
whether or not that absence is excused or truant matters. The difference be-
tween full attendance and one absence virtually disappears if that absence is an
excused absence, and there are no truancies that month. Panel D shows virtually
no difference in graduation or achievement for students who have one absence
in September compared to no absences as long as that absence is excused.
A student taking a single sick day in September is not a good indicator of
negative outcomes, however a single truancy is. Panel B contains the average
achievement of students with 0-5 truancies during September of freshman year.
Students with one truancy in September compared to none are 12 percentage
points less likely to stay in traditional school the following year, more than twice
as likely to eventually dropout, have an average GPA a full grade point lower,
are substantially less likely to pass their exit exams, and have standardized test
scores in ELA and math 0.6 and .17 standard deviations lower than students
with no truancies. Nearly half of students who become chronic truants (miss 3
or more days) during their first month of high school do not continue on to 10th
grade in traditional school and less than 20% will graduate with a traditional
high school diploma.
Any level of truancy in the first month of high school is highly correlated
with negative outcomes later in the student’s career. A student who misses
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five days during September for excused absences has, on average, higher test
scores in both English and Math than a student who is truant for a single day.
The importance of even small numbers of truancies and absences in September
highlights the value of student-by-day level data in designing effective dropout
prevention policies. Schools can use these early warning indicators to target
students early in high school in an attempt to prevent patterns of bad attendance
and truancy from becoming permanent. Younger students are also more likely
to be receptive to parent involvement. The importance of truancy in September
suggests that districts should involve parents immediately upon a student’s first
truancy rather than waiting for the student to be labeled a chronic truant.
1.5 Implications For Economic and Education Research
1.5.1 The Becker Model of Human Capital Accumulation
The discussion above shows that much of the observed relationship between ab-
sence and achievement appears driven by truancy and that truancies are highly
predictive of negative educational outcomes even at low levels of total absence.
Recent expansions of the Becker human capital investment model have focused
on sequential education investment in which students make the decision, each
year, to begin another year of schooling based on their perceptions of whether
or not they will be able to finish the year (Cameron & Heckman, 1998,2001;
Cunha&Heckman 2007, 2008, 2010; Eckstein&Wolpin, 1999). The relationship
between daily level, within year attendance dynamics and achievement allows
those models to be further expanded to include within year sequential invest-
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ment decisions in addition to the between year decisions.8 It also points to the
importance of student, rather than parent, decision making as early as 9th grade
when students are only 14 to 15 years old. This is because truancy, rather than
excused absence, has a stronger link to student outcomes, and truancy is a stu-
dent decision.
In its traditional form, the Becker model relies on actors to be rational, for-
ward looking agents who are capable of making predictions about the effect of
their current education investment decisions on future outcomes. They are also
able to follow through on those decisions. This may not be a reasonable assump-
tion for young teenagers who decide whether or not to be truant. Teenagers
are less able than adults to understand the future consequences of their ac-
tions and they are hyper-sensitive to immediate rewards (Blakewell & Robbins,
2008). Progressively worsening spells of attendance are not consistent with a
standard Becker model which predicts that students should attend school all
at once because they will attend until the marginal benefits equal the marginal
costs. When a student misses a day or week of school, it increases the marginal
cost for future days because the student will have to catch up to the class or her
skills may depreciate while out of the classroom.
In addition to providing a framework of expanding the Becker model to in-
corporate within year decisions, the patterns above indicate that relaxing as-
sumptions of student rationality in the investment model may improve its abil-
ity to explain the persistently high dropout rates in the US. There have been a
number of studies of education that incorporate principles from behavioral eco-
nomics and psychology. 9 Students in this sample appear to be highly sensitive
8A version of a daily investment model is discussed in Wedenoja (2017).
9See Lavecchia et al (2014) for an overview.
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to small changes in the psychic cost of a day of school which is not consistent
with an agent maximizing lifetime expected utility. Students are most likely to
be truant on Monday when they are likely tired from the weekend and out of
the habit of getting up on time and are more likely to miss days around school
breaks potentially because they are anticipating not being in school. Levitt et al.
(2016) finds similar short term incentive effects on student effort. When students
face a financial incentive for scores on a low stakes test, they put in effort and
achieve higher scores than when they are not offered an immediate incentive.
One of the patterns observed in this data is that some students miss large
amounts of school, a month or more, and then still return to school the follow-
ing year to try again. This could be evidence of naive present biased prefer-
ences (O’Donoghue & Rabin; 1999). Gradually worsening attendance patterns
followed by a return to school the following year, as evidenced in the data, is
not consistent with exponential discounting as used in the Becker model but is
consistent with a naive present biased agent who begins the school year with
a plan of attendance and believes that her future self will follow through with
that plan. However, once the day the student plans to attend is the present, the
student will decide that the cost of school is too high and not attend despite her
original plans. She may then repeat this process the following year because she
does not recognize her own time inconsistency.
1.5.2 The Education Production Function
It is ex-ante unclear how student attendance should enter into the education
production function. It can be used as an output to a production function in
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which the inputs are school, student, and parent resources. As an output it has
been used as a measure of disengagement from school (Astone, 1991; Archam-
bault et al, 2009) and a measure of non-cognitive skills (Imberman, 2011). It
could also be an input as an investment of student time and effort into a pro-
duction function that has education achievement as the output. As an input,
attendance has been used in the education production function as proxy for
student effort and engagement (Lamdin, 1996) and in conjunction with instruc-
tional time (Coates, 2003; Macerotte, 2007).
The description of attendance patterns above supports the idea that atten-
dance is an important input into the education production function. The type of
absences that are most correlated with negative outcomes are truant absences,
which are choices that students make over their education investment. That is
not to say that school policy and inputs do not have an affect on student atten-
dance. The patterns above also provide insight into how the timing and type of
absences enter into the education production function given a total number of
absences.
Students do not attend school all at once. Over time, students with worse
outcomes have more frequent spells of truancy and those spells increase in
length. Because of this, aggregate attendance does not appear to be the com-
plete picture of how attendance enters into the education production function.
Only 84% of students who miss more than 10% of the year will continue to 10th
grade compared to 88% of students who miss less than that, and that number is
lower (63%) for students who have had some of their absences as a multi-day
spell, and even lower (54%) if any of those absences were part of a multi-day tru-
ancy streak. Even students who only miss 5% of the school year are less likely
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to continue if any of those absences are part of a multi-day spell. This is sugges-
tive evidence that student skills may depreciate during the school year when,
given the same total number of absences, students are out of school for longer
consecutive periods of time. There is substantial evidence that student skills
depreciate over the summer (Cooper et. al, 1996; Downey et. al, 2004; Alexan-
der et. al, 2007) and worker’s skills, including critical reading, depreciate while
they are out of work (Arulapalam et al, 2001; Edin & Gustavsson, 2008). The
results above suggest that skill depreciation may also happen during the school
year. The grouping of absences also matters for test scores and achievement.
Given a total number of absences, having some of them as part of a spell re-
duces test scores in math by an additional 0.1-0.2 standard deviations and 0.12
- 0.24 standard deviations in English. If those are spells of truant absence, ELA
test scores fall by a further 0.3 standard deviations and math by a further 0.2
standard deviations. Additionally, test scores and continuance are lowest for
students with longer individual spells out of school and for students who have
ever missed more than a week of school at a time. These patterns are consistent
with incorporating attendance spells, in addition to total attendance, into the
education production function. Using total attendance implicitly assumes that
all absences are the same in how they contribute to student achievement dur-
ing the year. Multi-day spells have a larger affect on achievement, which could
be explained by skills, especially newly learned skills, depreciating and being
forgotten faster during longer absences.
Finally, within year attendance presents another mechanism through which
students’ peers affect their educational attainment. When students are absent
frequently and for long periods of time they fall behind their more regularly
attending peers. One likely consequence is that teachers have to spend more
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time with these students to try and catch them up to the rest of the class, or
teach at a slower rate so that they do not fall so far behind that they can not
catch up. Students with a higher fraction of absent peers may receive less di-
rect instructional time than students with a lower fraction of absent peers. An
alternative possibility is that teachers do not take into account chronic absentee
students and do not spend extra time with them. Although that may be better
for the achievement of present students, it could actually accelerate the process
of school disengagement as absentee students fall further and further behind
their peers potentially dropping out when it becomes impossible to catch up.
Absent peers could also affect other students’ decisions to attend school. Stu-
dents may feel pressured to spend time with peers out of school, or enjoy school
less when their friends are not present.
1.5.3 Empirical Implications of Attendance Measures and Pat-
terns
Attendance is commonly used as a desirable outcome in policy analytic stud-
ies as well as in state and federal accountability scores. The discussion above
stresses the importance of researchers and policy makers who use measures of
attendance and absence to know exactly how they are constructed and what
they are measuring. Both high and low performing high schools have similar
averaged attendance levels when students are counted as present if they are in
school at all during the day but, when present is defined as in school and on
time, low performing schools have much lower rates of averaged yearly atten-
dance. Policies targeted at improving attendance that function mainly through
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encouraging students to be at school first thing in the morning, such as free
breakfast, or encourage students to be in school for an entire day would appear
to have little effect if only an averaged yearly attendance rate is used. In fact,
studies of free breakfast find no significant effect on averaged yearly attendance
but most can not measure whether the policy increased the amount of the school
day that students spent in school (Leos-Urbel et al, 2013). Similarly after-school
programs that encourage students to stay through the end of they day would
also have muted measured effects if they encourage attending students to spend
more time in school rather than enticing out of school students back.
Focusing on average attendance rates also misses students who have serious
attendance problems. Chronic absenteeism is a better measure of the severity
of attendance problems within a school. However, how chronic absenteeism is
defined matters. When the cutoff for chronic absenteeism is low, missing 5%
of days, high and low performing schools appear more similar, which hides
the fact that lower performing schools have substantially more students who
are missing 10% or even 20% of school days. Single cutoffs for chronic absen-
teeism could also create unintended negative incentives for school districts. If
the chronic absenteeism rate is the percentage of students who miss more than
10% of the year, about 18 days, then the school has an incentive to keep stu-
dents from missing that 18th day but very little incentive to prevent students
from missing any subsequent days. This is especially troubling because the data
show that there is no discrete jump in achievement after missing 5% or 10% of
the school year. Every day that a student misses matters for their ability to grad-
uate and their achievement on tests. Researchers using measures of chronic ab-
senteeism should make sure they know exactly what cutoff the school or state
uses. Programs that target students who have the worst attendance records,
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such as high intensity mentorship or social worker involvement, may reduce
absences among their target students but even if those students increase atten-
dance if they are still above the cutoff for chronic absenteeism, then the policy
will appear to be no effect on chronic absenteeism.
1.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Recent changes in education reporting requirements at the federal and state
level now include rates of chronic absenteeism in addition to average measures
of attendance. Many school districts and non-profit organizations, such as At-
tendance Works and City Year, have recognized the importance of attendance
and chronic absenteeism for student success and have supported programs to
try and get students to school. Attempts to decrease both daily absentee rates
and chronic absenteeism include policies such as school and family partnerships
and school reforms to intervene with students who have attendance problems
(Epstein & Sheldon, 2002; Balfanz et. al., 2007; Balfanz & Byrnes, 2014). The
main attributes these programs have in common is identifying students early
and connecting them with high intensity mentors both to help them with their
schoolwork and push them to attend class.
The discussion above reveal some limitations to the current policy discourse
on the importance of attendance. The recent focus on chronic absenteeism has
been an important step forward in understanding how attendance interacts
with student achievement. However, the focus on keeping students’ absence
rate below 10% may be too high of an acceptable threshold and, thus, not the
best goal. Student achievement decreases for any absences beyond one or two
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and students start to fall below average in graduation, test scores, and GPA af-
ter missing 5% of school days, not 10%. Focusing on 10% as the only important
threshold does not fully address the importance of other absences.
Additionally, the data show that it is truant absences, not all absences, that
are most predictive of achievement. Students who miss 10% of the school
year for excused absences still have test scores, school continuation, and GPAs
around the average for the district but the more truant absences a student has,
the lower her achievement is. Nearly half of students who miss more than 10%
of days with 3 or more truancies will not continue in traditional school from
9th to 10th grade, compared to only 23% of students who miss 10% of days and
have fewer than 3 truancies.
Attendance risk factors show up as early as September of 9th grade. Hav-
ing a single truancy in September of 9th grade is more predictive of not staying
in traditional school than missing 20% of the school year for only excused ab-
sences. Policy makers should focus on policies designed specifically to prevent
truant absences, and to intervene with truants earlier to address the reasons
behind truancy. The most effective truancy prevention programs address both
attendance and academic problems. High intensity mentoring has reliably re-
duced truancy and increased test scores for at-risk students even late in high
school (Bell et. al., 2015; Oreopoulos et al, 2014; DeSocio et al, 2007; Marburger,
2006; Lemieux et. al, 2011). The importance of truancy also suggests that schools
should intervene with truants immediately after the first truancy, rather than
waiting until the third truancy to refer students to attendance remediation as is
the policy in LUSD.
Taken together, the results above provide valuable insight into the relation-
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ship between daily student attendance and education outcomes. Students who
have more absences in 9th grade are less likely to graduate, less likely to remain
in traditional public school, more likely to dropout, have lower grades, lower
test scores, and are less likely to pass their high school exit examinations. These
outcomes are the lowest for students with more truant absences, and students
who have more frequent and longer multi-day absence spells. Attendance de-




Table 1.1: Absence Measures by School Performance
Absence Measure All Bottom Low Middle High
Scools Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
Absent>5% 42% 48% 43% 46% 36%
Absent>10% 17% 24% 18% 17% 11%
Absent>15% 8.4% 13% 9% 7% 3%
Absent>20% 4.6% 8% 5% 3% 1%
Truancies>0 49% 69% 47% 39% 30%
Truancies>1 35% 55% 31% 24% 17%
Truancies>2 28% 45% 24% 18% 11%
Truancies>3 22% 39% 19% 14% 8%
Truancies>4 19% 34% 15% 11% 6%
Truant>5% 11% 21% 8% 6% 2%
Truant>10% 5.4% 11% 4% 2% .8%
Truant>15% 3.2% 7% 2% 1% .3%
Truant>20% 2.0% 4% 1% .8% .2%
% Preset at all 95% 94% 95% 95% 97%
% Present all day 91% 86% 90% 91% 94%
% Present and on time 84% 76% 85% 85% 90%
% Count day in September 97% 97% 97% 97% 98%
% Count day in June 95% 92% 95% 96% 97%
Absent>n% is the percent of students who miss more than n% of the school year for any rea-
son. Truant>n is the percent of students who have more than n truancies, and Truant>n%
is the percent of students who are truant for n% of the year or more. Present at all is the
average attendance for the school year if students are counted as present if they attend any
part of the school day. Present all day is the average attendance for the school year if stu-
dents are only counted as present if they attend the entire school day, Present and on time
is the average attendance for the school year if students are only counted as present if they
attend the entire school day and arrive to school on time. All schools is the average measure
for all LUSD. Bottom, low, middle, and high are then average measures for students in the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Attendance by Demographics
Demographic Sample Chronic Chronic Total Days Total Days
Variables Mean Absence Truant Missed Truant
Black .117 20.6% 31.8% 12.7 5.2
White .252 13.3% 8.50% 10.1 1.5
Hispanic .440 21.3% 33.6% 12.7 5.7
Asian .172 5.8% 7.80% 5.30 1.5
Female .485 16.6% 22.0% 11.0 3.7
Male .515 15.2% 23.1% 10.5 4.0
ELL 25.3% 43.0% 14.0 7.8
Black Female 20.7% 30.8% 13.1 5.2
Black Male 18.6% 32.8% 12.3 5.2
White Female 13.3% 8.50% 10.4 1.4
White Male 12.2% 9.90% 9.80 1.6
Hisp. Female 21.4% 32.9% 12.9 5.5
Hisp. Male 19.8% 34.1% 12.5 6.0
Asian Female 5.80% 7.80% 5.50 1.3
Asian Male 5.30% 8.10% 5.20 1.6
Averages are calculated off the 9th grade initial sample. Racial categories are coded by the
district, Hispanic, Black, White, and Asian are mutually exclusive categories. Traditional
graduates are those that receive a diploma from their original school, traditional dropouts
drop out without transferring first, alternative graduates transfer then graduate, alternative







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Absence Transition Probabilities by School Performance
Panel A: Bottom Schools
t \t+1 present sick family bus disciplinary truant
present 94.24 2.50 0.24 0.01 0.13 2.88
sick 73.08 21.74 0.55 0.03 0.23 4.38
family 49.01 3.37 43.29 0.03 0.19 4.12
bus 80.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
disciplinary 33.55 1.57 1.06 0.06 57.36 6.40
truant 59.41 2.17 0.27 0.03 0.29 37.83
Panel B: Low Schools
t \t+1 present sick family bus disciplinary truant
present 95.37 3.06 0.01 0.01 0.10 1.25
sick 74.88 22.86 0.00 0.01 0.17 1.71
family 52.39 4.39 0.02 0.14 0.22 2.28
bus 72.31 2.31 22.31 0.00 0.00 2.31
disciplinary 37.71 1.82 0.00 0.11 56.35 2.82
truant 63.15 2.25 0.01 0.01 0.28 34.04
Panel C: Middle Schools
t \t+1 present sick family bus disciplinary truant
present 95.59 3.22 0.29 0.01 0.09 0.79
sick 77.28 21.22 0.36 0.02 0.06 1.05
family 57.49 3.19 37.16 0.09 0.14 1.92
bus 92.36 2.87 0.64 0.00 0.32 2.55
disciplinary 33.72 1.47 0.95 0.03 61.89 1.93
truant 66.63 2.46 0.35 0.02 0.28 30.23
Panel D: Top Schools
t \t+1 present sick family bus disciplinary truant
present 96.70 2.58 0.20 0.01 0.06 0.45
sick 77.53 21.32 0.26 0.01 0.06 0.80
family 59.02 3.69 36.42 0.08 0.02 0.77
bus 91.01 3.37 0.00 1.12 0.00 2.25
disciplinary 37.56 1.60 0.77 0.00 57.95 2.13
truant 70.57 2.06 0.18 0.03 0.26 26.88
Cells are the estimated day to day transition probabilities between attendance and absence
types calculated for freshman. Panel A contains the probabilities estimated for students in
the worst performing high schools, and panel D for the best performing high schools. The
table reads left to right so the transition probability from present on date t to sick on date
t + 1 is the cell in the first row, second column of the transition matrix. Own transition































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Outcomes by Days Missed and Attendance Type
Days Continues Dropout GPA ELA Repeat Pass Pass
Missed to 10th under 2.0 Score Math English Math
Panel A: All Students
0-2 87% 3.20% 12% 51 4.80% 89% 91%
3-7 89% 5.30% 21% 49 7.20% 88% 88%
8-12 85% 7.10% 30% 47 9.50% 85% 85%
13-17 80% 9.10% 28% 45 11.0% 83% 81%
18-22 72% 13.9% 51% 43 14.0% 78% 79%
23-27 69% 15.7% 57% 40 15.0% 73% 70%
Panel B: Students with Fewer than 3 Truancies
0-2 87% 3.2% 12%
3-7 90% 4.4% 19%
8-12 87% 4.8% 22%
13-17 86% 5.1% 25%
18-22 81% 8.7% 30%
23-27 78% 8.0% 31%







Student outcomes are broken up by number of absences and number of truant absences.
Panel A is the average outcome by number of absences for all students, panel B is only
students who are not chronic truants, and panel C is only students with no truancies. English
pass and math pass is the percentage of students in each absence group who pass their exit
exam on the first try. All students are freshmen.
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Table 1.8: Continuation in Traditional School by Chronic Absence and Truancy Status and
Grade Transition
9th to 10th 10th to 11th 11th to 12th
No Chronic Absence or Truancy 88.1% 89.6% 93.0%
Chronic Absence Only 76.6% 80.8% 91.0%
Chronic Truant Only 75.1% 71.5% 75.9%
Both Chronic Absence and Truancy 56.4% 53.8% 59.0%
The table includes the percentage of students who continue in their traditional public school
when changing grades based on four categories of attendance behavior. Students have no
chronic absence or truancy if they miss less than 10% of the year and have fewer than 3
truancies. Absence only is students who miss 10% or more but fewer than 3 of those absences
are truant, truant only is students who are absent less than 10% of the year but have 3 or
more truancies, and both is students who miss 10% or more of the year and at least 3 of
those absences are truancies.
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Table 1.9: Student Outcomes by September of Freshman Year Absences and Truancies
Continues Trad. Drop. GPA GPA ELA Math Repeat Never Pass Pass
to 10th Grad. <2.0 Score Score Math Pass English Math
Panel A: Number of Total Absences
0 85% 69% 8% 2.6 24% .12 .17 8% 3.4% 85% 85%
1 81% 60% 11% 1.7 35% -.01 -.02 10% 5.2% 81% 81%
2 76% 51% 14% 1.3 44% -.12 -.11 11% 6.7% 80% 77%
3 67% 42% 15% 1.8 55% -.26 -.23 13% 9.6% 74% 74%
4 64% 33% 23% 1.6 62% -.43 -.36 13% 12.8% 68% 68%
5 60% 29% 21% 1.5 64% -.45 -.34 11% 14.8% 67% 66%
Panel B: Number of Truancies
0 84% 67% 9% 2.6 27% .09 .129 8% 3.80% 84% 85%
1 72% 37% 21% 1.7 60% -.50 -.39 15% 10.9% 68% 67%
2 61% 24% 24% 1.3 73% -.75 -.52 14% 18.2% 63% 60%
3 53% 18% 24% 1.9 79% -.82 -.61 12% 27.2% 54% 47%
4 52% 18% 30% .98 83% -.84 -.56 16% 15.7% 56% 56%
5 52% 9% 40% .93 84% -.91 -.61 10% 30.4% 44% 41%
Panel C: Number of Excused Absences
0 84% 66% 9% 2.6 27% .07 .13 8% 4.2% 84% 84%
1 81% 61% 10% 2.4 33% .02 .01 9% 4.7% 83% 82%
2 77% 53% 12% 2.2 41% -.05 -.06 10% 5.7% 82% 78%
3 70% 48% 14% 1.9 49% -.09 -.16 13% 6.6% 79% 79%
4 66% 41% 19% 1.8 54% -.27 -.22 12% 10.3% 74% 73%
5 67% 38% 15% 1.7 56% -.31 -.33 10% 11.7% 72% 72%
Panel D: Number of Truancies for Students with No Truancies
0 85% 69% 8% 2.6 24% .12 .18 7% 3.4% 85% 86%
1 83% 63% 9% 2.5 30% .08 .04 9% 4.0% 84% 84%
2 80% 58% 10% 2.3 36% .01 -.01 10% 4.5% 83% 80%
3 73% 52% 11% 2.1 44% -.02 -.09 12% 5.4% 82% 81%
4 70% 45% 19% 2.0 48% -.20 -.20 11% 8.7% 76% 76%
5 70% 43% 12% 1.9 51% -.23 -.28 10% 9.7% 74% 77%
This table includes averages for 11 outcome measures of student achievement broken out by
the number of absences a student has during September of her freshman year by absence
type. Panel A is the number of total absences, panel B is the number or truant absences,
Panel C is the number of excused absences, and Panel D is the number of excused absences
and includes only students with no truancies whereas panels A - C contain all students. ELA
and Math score are standard normal test scores and the units are standard deviation. Test
scores are 9th grade standardized tests, and never pass, pass English, and pass Math are
high school exit exam pass rates.
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1.8 Figures












Racial Composition by School
White Asian
Black Hispanic
Figure is based on author’s calculations from selected empirical sample of entering 9th

























































































































































































Truancy Distribution by School Performance
median mean









1 2 3 4
Excused Absence Distribution by School Performance
median mean
75th percentile 90th percentile
99th percentile
Bars are the mean, median, and percentiles of the truancy (top) and excused absence (bot-
tom) distributions by school performance group ranging from lowest performing (1) to high
performing (4). Performance quartiles are based on test scores, graduation rates, and grade
point average.
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Truancies as Fraction of Absences
Figures contain average daily attendance trends during freshman year by absence type.
The top panel shows the trends across the year for all absences, sick leave, family leave,
bus exceptions, and truant absences. The bottom panel is the fraction of absences that are
truant.
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Fraction Truant by School Performance: 9th Grade
Figures contain average daily attendance trends during freshman year by school per-
formance quantile for total absences (top), excused absences (middle), and truant ab-
sences(bottom). Each data point is a school day.
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Fraction Disciplinary Absence by School Performance
Figures contain average daily attendance trends during freshman year by school perfor-
mance quantile for disciplinary absences (top and family emergency absences (bottom).
Each data point is a school day.
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Continuation by Total Absences
Each circle is a school by number of days missed group and are scaled in size by the number
of students in the school by days missed cell. The y axis of the top panel is the fraction of
students in each cell that graduate from a traditional high school and the y axis on the
bottom panel is the percent of students continuing in traditional school from 9th to 10th
grade. Reference lines make the points in which a student would have missed 5% and 10%
of the school year.
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Fraction Disciplinary Absence by Next Year Enrollment
Figures contain average daily attendance trends during freshman year by 10th grade enroll-
ment for sick absences (top), truant absences (middle), and disciplinary absences(bottom).
Each data point is a school day. Top and bottom panels only include students who continue
in some type of school, the middle panel includes all students.
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ELA Score by Days Missed
Scatterplots contain means of GPA (top) and 9th grade ELA score (bottom) exit examina-
tions. Each circle is a school by number of days missed group and are scaled in size by the
number of students in the school by days missed cell. Reference lines make the points in
which a student would have missed 5% and 10% of the school year.
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Fraction Passing Math Exit Exam by Days Missed
Scatterplots contain means of first time passage rates for the ELA (top) and Math (bottom)
exit examinations. Each circle is a school by number of days missed group and are scaled in
size by the number of students in the school by days missed cell. Reference lines make the
points in which a student would have missed 5% and 10% of the school year.
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Figures contain average daily attendance trends during freshman year by weighted GPA
for total absences (top), excused absences (middle), and truant absences(bottom). Each data
point is a school day.
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Figures contain average daily attendance trends during freshman year by which exit exam-
inations the student passed on the first try if at all for total absences (top), excused absences
(middle), and truant absences(bottom). Each data point is a school day.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DYNAMICS OF HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT
2.1 Introduction
A large body of evidence finds that there are high lifetime returns to graduat-
ing from high school compared to dropping out or completing a high school
equivalency exam (GED) (Angrist & Krueger, 1991; Cameron & Heckman, 1993;
Card, 2001). Studies have found that students who are induced to stay in school
longer because of mandatory schooling laws have higher income over their life-
times (Rouse, 2008, Oreopoulos, 2007), are less likely to report being in poor
health (Muenning, 2008; Link & Phelan, 2005; Wong et. al., 2002; Lleras-Muney,
2004), are less likely to be unemployed, and less likely to report being un-
happy. Higher graduation rates are associated with declines in incarceration
rates (Lochner & Moretti, 2004) and school attendance reduces juvenile prop-
erty crime (Jacob & Lefgren, 2003). Additionally, many high school dropouts
regret the decision to drop out later in life. Bridgeland et. al (2006) conducted a
survey of young adult dropouts and found that 81% of students said that grad-
uating high school was important for success and that 74% would have stayed
in high school if they could do it over.
Despite the apparent benefits of high school and dropouts’ own beliefs about
the importance of graduation, dropout rates remain persistently high with esti-
mates varying from 20-30% of high school students.1 Even the Department of
Education’s high end official estimate of 82.3% (NCES, 2015) is still far below
1There is extensive debate on how to measure dropout rates. See Belfield & Levin (2008) for
an overview of the methodology.
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the OECD average and the US graduation rate places below that of Slovenia,
Portugal, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic (Murnane, 2013; OECD, 2013). Ad-
ditionally, this high average official graduation rate is not representative of all
students. Dropouts are disproportionately likely to be poor, Black, Hispanic,
and to live in a few districts, mostly large urban school districts, with very high
dropout rates (NCES, 2015). All five of the US’s largest districts have dropout
rates over 30%.
Labor economic studies of dropout and school attainment that seek to ex-
plain why graduation rates are low in the face of high measured returns to high
school, are generally implicitly or explicitly based in the Becker human capital
accumulation framework (Becker, 1962). In this framework, students are ratio-
nal forward looking economic actors and choose how much schooling they plan
to attend based on the expected costs and benefits of that schooling. Students
will attend until the marginal cost of doing so is equal to the marginal benefit
and drop out if the benefits to graduation are not high enough to justify the
cost. However, dropout is not a single event or decision, rather it is the outcome
of a series of small decisions over everything from finishing an assignment to
catching the right bus. It is unlikely that students have perfect knowledge of
the costs and benefits of schooling or the education production function itself.
Furthermore, the traditional Becker framework predicts that students should
attend school all at once, not alternate between periods in and out of school.
Increasingly severe truancy and academic problems before eventual dropout is
contrary to the predictions of a traditional Becker model. However, it is exactly
these patterns that are documented in the literature as precursors to dropout
(Christenson et al., 2012; Rhumberger, 2004; Bridgeland et. al., 2006).
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Understanding the process by which students make education input deci-
sions and accumulate schooling is critical to design effective dropout and tru-
ancy prevention policies. In the case in which students are not making perfectly
rational or informed education investment decisions, either because they are
shortsighted or do not understand the education production function, policies
that focus on lowering the cost of schooling for students may be more effective
than polices that stress the benefits. The set of policies that will successfully
reduce high school dropout rates depends critically on the decision model that
high school students follow and understanding the incentive students face.
This paper proposes a basic theoretical model of education investment to
motivate empirical results on how students respond to changes in the cost of
schooling, and how those cost changes can lead students to have snowballing
truancies and drop out of high school. The goal is to explain the persistence
of high school dropout despite the high measured returns to graduation and
remorse felt by dropouts themselves. I develop a model based in the Becker hu-
man capital accumulation framework in which high school education is mod-
eled as a customer-input technology and students do not have full knowledge
of the production function, specifically the relationship between present inputs
and future costs. Students are both the consumers and producers of education
and their choices over inputs affect not only the amount of schooling they re-
ceive (high school diploma, GED, dropout) but also the value of that schooling
in terms of diploma quality and human capital accumulation.
I model two types of decisions that students make; the daily decision
whether to attend high school or be truant each day, and the decision after the
end of the school year whether to return for the following year. In the model,
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students know that school is valuable in the future and that missing a day de-
creases both the value of their credentials and the probability of graduating, but
they are ignorant of the full dynamics of the education production function. The
key component of this model is that it allows students who ex-ante plan to grad-
uate to become off track and not complete high school despite ex-ante plans to
do so making dropout a gradual process of increasing truancy. It predicts that
students with a low cost threshold for school will have more frequent absences
over time and that spells of absence will be longer over time. This model is in
line with research on educational “engagement,” which views dropout as part
of a process in which students gradually disengage from school.2
To analyze the dynamic relationship between truancy, schooling cost, and
dropout more generally, I employ a novel and unique data set from a large ur-
ban school district (LUSD) that contains over 25 million observations of daily
level attendance information for over 37,000 students. On each day of school,
while the student is enrolled in their initial high school, I observe if she is in
school, and if she is not in school, whether it is an excused or truant absence.
I also observe when students transfer within or out of the district, if and when
they graduate, and what school or program they graduate from. In order to
evaluate how students respond to cost changes, and how those cost changes
affect attendance decisions and potentially snowball over time, I exploit an op-
portunity cost increase faced by students when they turn 16. At 16 students’
are allowed to legally work more jobs and longer hours. They are also no
longer subject to juvenile court truancy enforcement even through the manda-
tory schooling age is 18. Different students will face the cost shock at different
points in their academic careers based on their birth date. This provides plausi-
2See Christenson et al. (2012) and Rhumberger (2004) for overviews
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bly exogenous variation in the timing of a large increase in the opportunity cost
of schooling.
Consistent with the motivating model, I estimate the effect of turning 16 on
a student’s decision to attend school each day and the effect of those truancy de-
cisions on high school graduation. A key prediction of the model is that truancy
should not necessarily increase immediately following the increase in opportu-
nity cost at age 16. For daily attendance I use a double fixed effect framework
controlling for a student and day fixed effect to account for student fixed ability
and for any characteristics of the school day that are likely to affect whether or
not students attend on that day. The time a student is 16 enters as a quadratic
spline and the length of time a student has been 16 is allowed to have a non-
linear relationship with attendance. Students who are 16 longer are more likely
to be truant and are truant more often. I present both OLS and IV estimates for
the effect of truancy on dropout. The IV specification instruments total yearly
truancy with a quadratic spline of how long the student is 16 similar to the daily
level results.
I find that an increase in the opportunity cost of schooling increases the prob-
ability that a student will be truant, and that the probability becomes larger the
longer the student is exposed to the higher opportunity cost. Students who have
already had attendance problems before turning 16 face even greater increases
in their truancy than other students. A district-labeled “chronic truant” who
spends three additional months above the age of 16 during her sophomore year
is up to 69% more likely to be truant each day going forwards. Additionally,
students with more truancies are less likely to graduate, and if they do gradu-
ate, are more likely to do so with lower quality alternative degrees. A student
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with 3 truancies is 10% less likely to continue in her traditional school the fol-
lowing year. Turning 16 does not have the same effect on excused absences
which remain unchanged when a student turns 16. There is also no long term
dynamic effect from turning 15. The results support existing empirical evidence
that the most effective dropout prevention policies for students, once they reach
high school, are those that decrease the daily cost of schooling. These policies
include better truancy enforcement (Lemieux et al, 2011) or intensive tutoring
and mentorship programs that increases students’ desire to be in school and
their ability to complete coursework (Bell et. al., 2015; Oreopoulos et al, 2014;
DeSocio et al, 2007). The results also demonstrate on the importance of un-
derstanding the long term dynamic effects of education policies on truancy. A
traditional regression discontinuity framework would have shown no effect of
turning 16 because students develop truancy problems gradually as they face
higher costs of school. It is likely that other education policies, especially those
that permanently increase or decrease the cost of attending school, may have
similar long run effects on student truancy
After discussing the motivating dropout prevention and theory literature,
the paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the novel data set of daily level
student attendance information linked with education outcomes that I employ
in this paper. I then develop a theoretical model of high school dropout to moti-
vate my empirical econometric estimation. The model is based in the Becker
framework and incorporates aspects of education engagement theory. This
model predicts that students may ex-ante plan to graduate, appear to have the
ability to graduate, but then still become “off track” by missing more days of
school than planned and, most importantly, that an opportunity cost increase
can have a long term effect on truancy rather than an immediate effect. I then
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describe my two-part empirical strategy in which I estimate the daily effect of
the increase in opportunity cost at age 16 on daily truancy decisions using a
double fixed effect model with plausibly exogenous timing in a cost increase at
a student’s 16th birthday, and the between year effect of accumulated truancies
on continuation in traditional school at the end of each grade in both an OLS
and IV framework using the time a student was subject to the increased daily
opportunity cost as the instrument. I then conclude with the empirical results
and a discussion of policy implications.
2.2 Dropout Theory Literature
Because of the importance of dropout prevention, many researchers have stud-
ied the causes, consequences, and correlates of dropout. Some prominent inter-
ventions that have been examined in prior research include parent involvement,
drug use, school lunch programs, cash transfers, scholarships, student-teacher
relationships, and pregnancy (Walker et al 1998; Filmer & Schady, 2011; Mar-
shall, 2011; Roebuck et al, 2004; De Witte & Csillag, 2012; Lovenheim, Reback &
Wedenoja, 2015). However, there is a dearth of causal evidence because many
prevention programs are not implemented in a testable way. The studies of the
demographic, institutional, and community predictors of dropout are extensive
and include race, ethnicity, gender, parents’ education, income, neighborhood
crime, class size, and many others.3
The most common model that labor economists use to measure the causes
and effects of high school dropout, and school attainment more generally, is
3See Rhumberger (2001) for a detailed overview.
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the Becker human capital accumulation model (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1958). In
this model, students are rational forward looking economic agents and decide
on their level of schooling in order to maximize their lifetime utility. Students
will attend school until the marginal benefits of continued attendance are out-
weighed by the marginal costs. The model has been expanded to take into ac-
count that students do not make all of their schooling decisions at once, rather
that they make sequential decisions and decide before beginning an additional
year of schooling whether to start that year taking into account the probability
of not finishing the year (Cameron & Heckman, 1998,2001; Cunha&Heckman
2007, 2008, 2010; Eckstein&Wolpin, 1999).
The idea of high school dropout as the outcome of a series of small deci-
sions and events, such as truancy, is often referred to as “disengagement” from
school (Christenson et. al., 2012; Rhumberger 2004 for overviews). While social
scientists disagree about the exact mechanisms through which disengagement
develops, it can be observed as an increase in truancies and absences, failing
grades, behavior problems, and a lack of relationships with teachers or peers. In
the general framework of engagement and disengagement theory, engagement
is an unobservable quality that students have related to their ability, attitude,
upbringing, and other personal factors and how those traits interact with the
school and community around them. Engagement is not perfectly observable
but students who are more engaged are more likely to stay in school. Disen-
gagement could happen for a variety of reasons. Students could be frustrated
after school failures leading to the development of behavioral and other prob-
lems and eventually the decision to leave school or the inability to graduate
(Finn 1989). Students may also not feel that they belong at school because they
are not part of school sponsored activities (Wehlage et all 1989). In addition to
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push factors discussed above, students could face pull factors from outside the
school such as job opportunities, family obligations, or friendships with peers
who are not attending school.
Dropout is only one of the possible consequences of a disengagement pro-
cess manifested through truancy and failing grades. Transferring to another
school, especially within the same district, is a less severe form of disengage-
ment than completely dropping out (Lee & Burkham, 1992; Rhumberger & Lar-
son, 1998; Rhumberger 2003). Some students who disengage from school may
leave their traditional public high school for an alternative school for similar
reasons and through a similar process as those that lead other students to drop
out of school entirely.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for this project come from a Large Urban School District (LUSD) and con-
tain daily attendance records, demographic information, entrance, exit, and
transfer information, and test scores for five cohorts of freshman in traditional
neighborhood public schools. The dataset follows these students until they drop
out, graduate, or otherwise leave the district. The data set is at the student by
year and student by day level. The data include over 25 million observations
for 37,000 students and are unique in that they include students’ detailed atten-
dance by date for every day of their high school careers and links that informa-
tion to their educational outcomes.
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2.3.1 Student Record Files
Demographic data for the students come from LUSD’s student entrance file.
The entrance file includes all students who enter into a traditional public high
school between the years 2005 and 2009. The student file includes the entrance
school, school year, student demographics, and birth date and is augmented by
the student exit file that includes the last school that the student attended in
the district and the date and reason for a student’s exit: graduation, dropout, or
transfer. The exit file contains detailed administrative exit information generally
unavailable in survey datasets. It distinguishes between types of transfers (in
distinct, public in state, private in state, out of state, out of country) and types of
diplomas that students earned. Diploma types include a high school diploma
from a traditional school, a high school diploma from an alternative school,4 an
adult education diploma, a GED, or no diploma.
The data also contain students’ high school exit exam scores, yearly
weighted grade point averages,5 and accountability test scores in math and lan-
guage arts. Students in the same grade all take the same language arts test6 but
the math test is for the specific math class in which the student is enrolled.7 The
high school exit examination is required for graduation and generally first at-
tempted and usually passed in the spring of tenth grade; 80% of 10th graders
4I define alternative schools as public high schools within LUSD that waive LUSD’s standard
high school requirements. These schools may have non-standard school days, online classes,
fewer credits required for graduation, and may waive the high school exit exam and other re-
quired benchmarks. Gifted schools and schools with special programs that do not waive re-
quirements, such as arts or technology high schools, are not considered alternative schools.
5The weighted GPA is the one the district uses to determine if a student has passed the GPA
threshold of 2.0 to graduate.
6It is extremely uncommon for a student to repeat a grade’s language arts test; fewer than
1% take the same test two years in a row.
799% of students start in Algebra 1 or the equivalent and only 9% of students repeat the same
level of math the following year.
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pass the exams before 11th grade, although students may continue to re-take
the test until they pass.
2.3.2 Sample Selection
In this paper I focus on a sample of “traditional” public high school students
rather than restricting my analysis to “high risk” students. While many of
the risk factors associated with dropout are apparent in middle and early high
school, there are many students who appear capable of graduating upon entry
into high school and yet do not graduate. These are potentially students who do
not get dropout prevention services because they are not labeled high risk and
by the time that they start to exhibit problems are considered too old to help.
School districts have limited resources and services are often directed towards
younger students where they are believed to be more cost effective and where
they will have a longer term to be successful.
For this paper, I define traditional students as those who begin high school in
9th grade at their neighborhood school, are between the ages of 13.75 and 15.5,8
and are not in non-diploma bound special education programs.9 The resultant
sample of students is slightly higher achieving than the average 9th grade stu-
dent in the district in terms of GPA, graduation rate, and test scores. Most older
students who have been held back in the past are excluded from the sample as
8State law requires students be at least 5 years old by September 1st when they begin kinder-
garten in public schools, which equates to 14 years old in 9th grade and students must attend
school if they turned 6 years old by September 1st equating to 15 years old in 9th grade. Pri-
vate schools and other states do not have the same rules so students who began kindergarten
elsewhere may be younger than 14 or older than 15.
9Students with Individual Education Plans (IEPs), who are enrolled as diploma bound stu-
dents are included in the sample and can’t be distinguished from other students.
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are students who begin high school already in alternative programs.10 All stu-
dents in the sample take the grade level language arts exam in their first year
and take at least eighth-ninth transitional math.11 The sample also excludes
students who begin ninth grade late, after September, or who leave the district
before the end of September of their freshman year.
The specific school a student attends is based on residential district zoning
and as a result, the demographics of each school in the sample are different and
reflect the neighborhood in which the school is located. There are 16 high school
campuses in the sample with graduation cohorts ranging from 200-600 students.
The district is majority minority: 40% Hispanic, 10% Black, 27% White, and
20% Asian. However, due to the neighborhood catchment areas of the schools,
that the racial composition of individual schools varies greatly. Table 1 shows
the difference in student outcomes across schools in the district. Schools vary
greatly in the outcomes of their students in terms of transfer, graduation, and
dropout rates. The percentage of eventual district graduates ranges from 48%
to 79%.12
2.3.3 Attendance Data and Description
The primary data I use is LUSD’s daily final attendance code dataset. This
dataset contains extremely detailed information on the daily behavior of high
school students. The dataset contains one attendance code per student per day
and distinguishes between excused absences and truancy. The primary focus of
10I have not included official district metrics or differences from my measures in order to keep
the district anonymous.
11Over 90% take Algebra 1 or the equivalent.
12Eventual transfers are included in the denominator.
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this paper is truancy rather than excused or all absences. I use the legal defini-
tion of truancy: a student is truant if she is not in school on a day in which she
is legally required to be there and does not have a legally valid excuse for the
absence. Students are required to be in school if they are below the mandatory
schooling age of 18 and do not have a high school diploma or GED, have not
transferred officially to a school in another district, are not officially enrolled
in a home school program, and are not incarcerated or institutionalized. Stu-
dents also do not have unlimited excused absences. Beyond three days of illness
students are required to have a doctor’s permission and documentation of the
severity of the illness and many ill students still ‘attend’ school remotely which
is coded in the attendance file. Furthermore, parents can only excuse students
for illnesses, bereavement, and religious holidays all of which have day caps
and can require documentation. A parent’s permission is not enough to justify
a student’s absence and absences beyond these limits, even if excused by the
parents, are still truant absences.13
Students who do attend school fall into two categories: present and on-
time, referred to as “present” going forward and present and late, referred to as
“tardy.” On average, 85% of students attending traditional public high schools
are present and on time, 6% are tardy, 4.2% have excused absences and 2% are
truant. The percentage of students that are truant on an average day is very
low and does not remain constant across grades. The rate is highest freshman
year (2.15%) and is lowest senior year at 1% and increases over the course of the
school year from 0.82% in September to 2.69% in June. Truancy is widespread
among students but not universal: 72% of students will be truant at some point
13The final attendance code data set distinguishes between “Truant confirmed by parent” and
“unexcused” or “unverified” absence all of which fit the legal definition of truancy. The majority
are “Truant confirmed by parent.”
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during their high school career and 28% will never be.14
Truancy is low overall but are concentrated in a smaller number of chron-
ically truant students and students in low performing high schools. Close to
one third (28%) of freshman will be classified as a chronic truant, meaning that
they have missed over 3 days so far that year. Only 68% of ninth grade chronic
truants will continue in their neighborhood public school compared to 88% of
other students. There is also substantial variation across demographic groups
in both truancy and graduation as seen in Table 2. Black and Hispanic students
have higher levels of truancy and are less likely to graduate from traditional
programs. Nearly half of Black and Hispanic men will not graduate from a tra-
ditional school compared to less than 20% of Asian women and less than 30%
of White students.
A student is a “dropout” if she leaves LUSD without a diploma and has
not transferred to another school district, hence students can only drop out be-
tween school years. The intuition behind this definition is that students choose
to begin each school year and then, during that school year, decide each day
whether to attend or not. Even if a student drops out in the middle of the year
and no longer comes to school, that student still legally has the option (and re-
quirement) to return the next year and is not counted as a “dropout” until she
fails to re-enroll or transfer the following year. While most students who have
extensive truancies or disappear for months at the end of the school year do
not return the following year, some do, and should not be falsely labeled as
dropouts. I focus on the attendance behavior students exhibit while enrolled in
traditional public school, and how that behavior affects transfer to alternative
14See Wedenoja (2017) for detailed descriptions of attendance and truancy patterns and their
correlations with student outcomes.
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high schools between the school year in addition to how that behavior affects
dropout.
2.4 A Model of High School Attendance and Dropout
2.4.1 Motivation and Overview
The goal of this model is to provide a motivating framework for the empiri-
cal results by incorporating daily level attendance choices into a Becker Human
Capital framework. There are four relevant predictions from this model that
are consistent with the empirical results. First, students in this model will not
attend school all at once. Some students may have alternating periods of tru-
ancy and attendance even missing large sections of a school year and returning
the following year. Second, students who ex-ante plan to graduate and have
the ability to do so may still drop out of high school or transfer into an alter-
native program by becoming off track. Third, problems with truancy increase
over time as students face higher costs to schooling from missing earlier days.
Fourth, students who face a large permanent cost increase may not immediately
change their behavior, rather the longer the student is exposed to the cost shock,
the more likely she is to miss school.
Following the engagement and disengagement literature, the model treats
dropout as a process rather than an event. The model expands the standard
Becker human capital accumulation framework to daily decisions and makes
more lenient assumptions about students’ control over education outcomes and
their knowledge of the education production function. Specifically, each year
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students make the decision whether or not to begin another year of school based
on the expected costs and benefits, then, each day, make the decision to attend
school that day or not. They do not have full knowledge of the education pro-
duction function so they are not entirely aware of how the seemingly small daily
decisions they make affect the costs and returns they will face in the future.15
Neither high school dropout nor the choice to achieve another year of schooling
are single decisions as they are often portrayed in traditional Becker style mod-
els. Enrolling in another year of school may be a single decision but whether
that year is completed is the result of the series of education input choices in-
cluding attendance, assignment completion, and effort that follow enrollment.
These effort investment choices can be complex. Students, with varying de-
grees of autonomy from their parents, select the school they will attend, the
classes they take, how often to attend, how much time to spend on homework,
and whether or not to pay attention while they are in class, all of which con-
tribute to the probability that a student graduates and the market value of the
credential she earns. A high school diploma has a number of requirements, in
the case of LUSD those requirements include attending eight semesters for 6 pe-
riods per day, maintaining a GPA of 2.0 or higher, completing specific required
courses, and passing the state’s high school exit exam. Students need to manage
trade-offs and invest their time and effort accordingly over four years in order
to meet all of these requirements and graduate.
The model incorporates insights from the disengagement literature into the
Becker model in two ways. First, it expands the choice set that students face
from beyond years or levels of schooling to choosing daily inputs of attendance
15There is substantial evidence adolescents are less able than adults to consider future conse-
quences and are often hyper-responsive to immediate rewards. See Blakemore & Robbins (2012)
and Casey et al. (2008) for overviews of adolescent brains and decision making.
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and truancy. Second it expands the possible outcomes that students can face. In
addition to dropout, the model incorporates the decisions of students to leave
their current school to attend an alternative school or receive a GED as part of
the education investment process.
Students’ actions determine the future value of the high school credential
type, if any, they earn and the expected value of the credential affects whether or
not the student believes attempting to earn the credential is worth it. Schooling
is a customer-input technology because students are both the consumers and
producers of its value. Not all high school credentials have the same value. Stu-
dents who complete the GED or Adult Education Diploma (a separate degree),
or who have some of their requirements waived by attending an alternative pro-
gram are likely to have lower returns to those credentials than they would to a
traditional high school diploma (Cameron & Heckman, 1993). Additionally, stu-
dents who attend alternative programs with flexible schedules or online leaning
may miss out on developing valuable non-cognitive skills through interaction
with peers and developing skills to navigate a consistent daily schedule as is
generally required in the workforce.
Students make two different decisions: the decision to begin a year of school-
ing and the decision, after deciding to enroll, to attend school on each day or to
be truant. Students make this decision as traditional forward looking agents but
as ones who do not have all of the information about the education production
function. At the beginning of each year a student has an idea of the benefits
of completing that year of schooling and the distribution of daily costs that she
will face over the year in order to complete it. Using this information, she will
decide whether or not the expected benefit of that year outweighs the expected
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total cost. She considers how often her predicted daily costs will be so high that
she will not attend and how that will affect her human capital accumulation and
degree quality. She understands that if she misses too many days of school that
she will be unable to complete the year and graduate. If her expected truancy
is high enough that she expects not to finish the year, she will choose not to
start it. However, while she weighs how truancy will affect her returns to high
school, she does not consider the effect of truancy on its cost. Missing more days
makes it harder to graduate because she will have learned less. However, each
day missed also increases the cost of attending on future days through having to
catch up on school assignments, losing non-cognitive skills like the ability to get
up in the morning or do schoolwork for a sustained seven to eight hours, and a
loss of social connection at school. When deciding each day whether or not to
attend, the student does not take into account how the decision will increase the
costs she faces in the future. This can lead a student who began a year of school
with the intent to finish, and who believed that she had an achievable plan to
finish school, to drop out despite those ex-ante plans. After missing a few days,
she faces higher than expected costs, which cause her to miss even more days.
This may eventually lead her to dropout or transfer to an alternative program
that has lower costs due to waived requirements and lower returns because of
those waived requirements.
2.4.2 Costs
School is costly to students both directly, through the effort required, and in-
directly from the opportunity costs of the activities students give up while in
school such as work, time with friends, family responsibilities, or sleep. Stu-
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dents who have negative feelings about school because they have few friends,
are tired all the time, have low self esteem, do not understand the material, or
who fell physically bad having to sit in a desk all day, face higher daily costs
of schooling as well. Costs can be broken into two categories: shared costs and
individual costs. Shared costs are those associated with the characteristics of
a particular day such as the difficulty of transportation to school or the excite-
ment of a pep rally. Individual costs are those that are specific to the individual
student like ability.
Shared Costs
Shared costs depend on the characteristics of the school and school day itself.
For example, days adjacent to breaks or to weekends are more costly for stu-
dents because students receive value from beginning the break early or they are
tired after the break’s end. Costs may also be higher later in the school year or
semester due to the upcoming summer vacation or the stress of finals and term
papers and less costly at the beginning of the year because students are excited
to see friends and schoolwork has not yet become too difficult or demanding.
Days at traditional schools with their stricter requirements and rigid schedules
may also be more costly than days at alternative schools.
Let each day of school at a traditional school have a base shared cost C¯t for
all students, and let that cost be a function of all characteristics of the school
day. Shared cost has a known distribution such that C¯t ∼ (C¯, σ) where C¯ is the
average shared cost of a school day and σ is the standard deviation. C¯t can be
further broken down into components:
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C¯t = Xtβ + Et, (2.1)
where Xt is a vector of day characteristics and Et is an i.i.d daily cost shock.
Individual Costs
Individual costs are the costs that students face on a given day above or below
the base cost of schooling for that day. Let the individual cost component be cit.
The individual cost can also be broken into components:
cit = −bi − hcit + eit, (2.2)
where bi is a measure of a student’s ability that does not vary over the school
year. bi encompasses a student’s aptitude for school, cognitive and non-
cognitive skills that were accumulated before the year began, and any other
factors that affect a student’s time invariant cost of schooling. Individual costs
are decreasing as ability increases. hcit is a measure of accumulated human cap-
ital at time t such that:
hcit = f(ai1...ait−1), aij = {0, 1} (2.3)
aij is an indicator for whether student i attended school on day j. Human cap-
ital on date t is a function of students’ attendance investment in all days of the
school year before date t. Human capital increases in days attended and de-
creases in days truant: ∂HCt
∂aij
> 0 for all j < t and the effect of a past absence or




. In other words,
more recent truancies may have a larger impact on human capital than truancies
further in the past.
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Total Cost
The total cost faced by a student on date t is the combination of the shared
and individual costs. Students choose each day whether or not to attend school
based on the revealed cost of the day. The full cost becomes:
Cit = Xtβ − bi − hcit + e˜it (2.4)
The cost a student faces on any given day is determined both by the charac-
teristics of the day as well as the student’s history of attendance and personal
ability. For simplicity and ease of manipulation, all elements of the cost enter
the model additively. However, this assumption will be relaxed in the empirical
results to allow human capital to interact with other elements of the individ-
ual’s daily cost, specifically, the level of human capital a student has will affect
the opportunity cost change at 16. Students who have accumulated less human
capital are likely to face a larger increase in the opportunity cost of schooling
once they turn 16.
2.4.3 Returns to Education
The value that a student receives upon completing high school is based on the
credential that she receives and her inputs into that credential. Students with
lower human capital have lower returns from graduating with a traditional
diploma and are more likely to receive an alternative diploma or drop out.
Returns are a function of accumulated human capital over the course of high
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school, individual ability, and credential quality.
RiT = R(ai1...aiT , bi, DEGREE) (2.5)
where ait is the truancy choice for individual i on date t and bi is the time-
invariant individual component defined the same way as above and T is the
last day of high school. DEGREE is the type of degree a student received if
any. Students receive returns from schooling even if they do not complete a
degree because those students still have accumulated human capital that has
value in the labor market.16 Returns are increasing in human capital, ability,
and degree type quality.
2.4.4 Decision Problem
The Series of Decisions
Students make two types of decisions: the decision to begin a year of schooling
and the decision to attend school each day during that year. When students
decide to start a year, they do so with an expectation about the costs and benefits
of the year and their ability to complete that year of schooling and subsequent
years in order to get a degree. Students decide whether or not to begin 9th grade
and upon entering 9th grade decide, each day, whether to attend school or be
truant. In the summer after 9th grade, before the beginning of the next school
year, students decide whether to return to their neighborhood school, transfer
to another school, or dropout of school completely. If students choose to stay in
school, upon entering 10th grade, students decide each day whether to attend
16Dropouts benefit in the job market from developing more skills while in high school even
through they do not receive a credential (Tyler, 2004)
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school or to be truant. Students repeat this process for grades 11 and 12 by
deciding whether or not to begin the grade and then whether or not to attend or
be truant on each day of those grades. At the end of 12th grade, students still in
traditional school have either completed the requirements to graduate on time
and receive a diploma or they have not.17
Decision Problem
Students believe the daily cost of schooling they will face is: c˜it = C¯t − bi + eit,
in other words that accumulated human capital during the year will not change
future costs, and they make decisions according to that expected cost (c˜it). At the
beginning of each year while the student is in her original traditional school she














where ait is the student’s decision to attend on a specific date t, y1 is the first
school day of school year y and T is the last day of high school. biy is the stu-
dent’s ability at the start of year y. The student has an expectation of how costs
are distributed across school days at the beginning of the year, but the actual
cost of each individual day will only be revealed to the student on that day. The
day could have a particularly high cost due to its attributes,Xt−1, such as being
a Friday before a break, due to an idiosyncratic shock to the cost of the school
day, Et−1, such as a weather incident, or a personal shock to the student’s daily
cost, eit−1, such as a broken car or family emergency.
17While it is possible for 12th grade students who have failed to return for the following
year in their traditional school it is unlikely. Also, students who return would not be “on-time”
graduates and are sometimes required to attend “adult education” rather than traditional school
so the student may no longer have a choice over school type.
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The attribute of this model that causes students to potentially miss more
school than they ex-ante plan is that they do not account for the effect that
truancy has on future costs. While the actual individual cost on a day is
cit = −bi − hcit + eit, students believe the cost to be c˜it = −bi + eit. In other
words, they believe that the average expected individual cost will be the same
even if they miss a day of school. This belief on the student’s part makes sense
if she conceives of each missed day as an independent decision. Consider a
student who has missed a day of school (t − 1) because of a high cost draw:
cit−1 > c∗i . This choice affects the student’s cost distribution in the future. Be-
ginning at date t, the student will face a slightly higher cost each day than she
ex-ante expected because hcit < hcit−1 and hcit < E[hcit] due to the missed day.
This can result in the student missing additional days she did not plan to miss
because her decision rule remains the same but P (cit > c∗it) has increased. The
high cost draw cit−1 that resulted in the student missing day t− 1 could be due
to any element of the cost function.
This increase in cost can cause truancy to snowball. After missing one day,
the probability of missing any one day after that is higher, which will cause the
student to miss more days she would have ex-ante expected which will in turn
cause her to miss even more days after those days are missed. This result is
consistent with the survey findings that a majority of dropouts report missing
school so frequently before dropping out that they could not catch up. Figure 1
depicts a stylized example of this effect. Each day the low c∗18 student misses
results in a greater increase in P (cit > c∗it) as the cost distribution shifts to the
right with each absence. The lower panel shows how truancy would snowball.
It is unlikely, to say the least, that high school students are mathematically
18A student with a lower cost threshold for missing school.
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evaluating every decision they make about attending school. However, the
logic that students follow a simple decision rule is intuitive. Students have a
threshold for what they are willing to put up with at school and that thresh-
old is affected by their ability, traits, and what they can expect to get out of
high school. A simple decision rule for teenagers is also consistent with neu-
roscience research on adolescent brains. Adolescents are hypersensitive to im-
mediate rewards and have more problems with inter-temporal decision making
than adults (Blakewell & Robbins, 2012). The idea that a student wakes up each
morning and decides if it is worth it to get on the bus based on what she expects
of her day without considering the complicated long term consequences is con-
sistent with this research. Students do learn in this model and can change their
attendance plans, however they only change those plans between school years.
This reflects the idea that students may make a “fresh start” at the beginning
of the year and would take into account any damage they did to their ability to
graduate and receive a credential the year before.
If students had complete knowledge of the education production function
and were aware of the impact of human capital on the cost distribution, each
student would attend as much as she planned to attend ex-ante. The decision
rule c∗ would be chosen to take into account a daily cost increase after a student
misses a day of school. This could have two effects: first, students would set
their decision rule with a higher c∗ to accommodate cost increases in the future
because they believe that the benefits to completing the year of schooling still
outweigh this higher tolerance for daily costs. Second, it could result in students
deciding that the higher cost threshold they would need to complete the year is
too high to tolerate and choose not to enroll at all or to enroll in an alternative
program.
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This model demonstrates a process by which students who drop out get “off
track” or “disengage” and the importance of viewing truancy and dropout as
a dynamic process. A single high cost day or series of high cost days could
start a chain reaction leading students to miss more and more school eventually
dropping out. Students with an already low cost threshold for attending skip
school because the revealed daily cost is too high and then begin to have chronic
truancies that make it harder for them to return to school. These could even be
students who ex-ante truly planned to finish school and had the ability to do so.
In addition to unplanned drop out, students could also have an unplanned
transfer into a lower quality degree program because the shared cost of school-
ing, C¯t, depends on the school that the student attends. The average cost and
returns of attending an alternative school are lower than attending a traditional
school because alternative schools waive many of the requirements of tradi-
tional schools and have more flexible classes and schedules. A student who
misses more days than she ex-ante planned in year y, and therefore has accu-
mulated a lower level of human capital than she had planned, may decide not
to continue in traditional school in year y + 1 if the costs are too high. Consider
a student who at the beginning of year y plans to to spend years y and y + 1 in
traditional school. In year y she misses more school than planned and, due to
her lower than planned human capital, there is no attendance rule that would
make the expected costs of year y + 1 equal to the benefits such that:
E
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where TRAD is the indicator for a traditional high school diploma program
and ˜cTRADit is the individual’s daily cost of attending a traditional high school.
Instead of completely dropping out, the student may transfer to an alternative
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school in year y + 1. Even though the returns to attending an alternative school
are lower than a traditional school, if the costs are also low enough the student
will transfer. The student will begin year y+ 1 at an alternative program if there













where ALT is the indicator for an alternative degree and c˜ALTit is the student’s
daily cost of attending an alternative high school. If there is no attendance rule
for which the expected costs of the alternative school equal the expected returns,
the student will drop out of school completely.
2.5 Identification and Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 Identification
In order to test the predictions of the model and evaluate the dynamic impact
of costs on attendance and attendance on graduation. I exploit plausibly ex-
ogenous variation in the timing of a large opportunity cost increase that occurs
when a student turns 16. Opportunity cost increases at 16 for students because
they face more employment possibilities outside of school and less coercion to
be in school. Although the state mandatory schooling age is 18, the district court
will not hear truancy cases for students aged 16 and above nor will the district
refer truancy cases to their own internal remediation system after 16. There is
also a dramatic change in child labor laws. Before age 16 students can only work
a maximum of 18 hours per week and only between the hours of 7am and 7pm
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during the school year. At 16 students are permitted to work 4 hours each school
day and 8 hours on non-school days for a maximum of 48 hours per week (a 30
hour jump). Students aged 16 and older may also work as early as 5am and as
late as 10pm on schooldays as well as hold additional types of jobs compared
to younger students. Younger students are limited in job choice to low impact
service jobs such as working at soda fountains. Because truancy rules and child
labor laws are age based, students are subject to this increase in opportunity cost
at different times of the year and at different points in their high school careers
depending only on their birthdays. The majority of students turn 16 during
their sophomore years of high school: 16% first semester, 40% second semester,
and 20% during the summer before junior year. The remaining students turn 16
either during freshman year (3%), in the summer before sophomore year (4%)
or during the first semester of junior year (17%).
The effect of work on high school students is well studied and there are
mixed conclusions on its effect. Many studies show that students who work
in high school have higher labor market returns later in life compared to simi-
lar non-working peers (Meyer & Wise, 1982; Ruhm, 1997; Light, 2001; Carr et al,
1996). However, work during the school year, especially intensive work of 15-20
hours per week has been found to have a negative effect on academic outcomes
by lowering GPA (Greenberger & Steinberg, 1986; Eckstein & Wolpin; Oettinger,
1999) and decreasing the probability of completing high school (Stern, 1995).
Studies that use child labor laws as an instrument for work find negative aca-
demic effects of work (Rothstein, 2007; Lee & Orazem, 2009; Schulenberg &
Bachman). This is potentially because students aged 16 and over have much
greater opportunities to do the type of intensive work that has been shown to
have negative effects on academic performance.
85
The model predicts that an increase in opportunity cost will increase the
probability that a student will be truant from school immediately following the
cost increase at 16 and that probability will continue to increase with each subse-
quent day the student misses because of an increased probability of a cost draw
above c∗. Consider two students, A and B, with identical ability, and before
date t, identical attendance histories. Both students have the same attendance
rule, c∗AB. On date t student A turns 16 but student B does not turn 16 until 6
months later. Immediately student A faces a higher cost to each day of school-
ing. There is, therefore, a higher probability that student A will miss school
on any given day compared to student B. Let the students’ initial cost distri-
bution be cABt ∼ ( ¯CAB, σ). After his birthday student A faces the distribution
cABt ∼ ( ¯CAB+γ, σ) where γ is the additional opportunity cost of increased work
opportunities and decreased truancy enforcement.
There should not necessarily be an immediate observable response in A’s
actions. Whether A’s observable behavior changes relative to B’s is determined
by their c∗AB, how long A has been subject to the additional cost and therefore
how likely it is that he has received a sufficiently high daily cost draw to miss
school, and how large that increase in average cost actually is. If A and B have
a sufficiently high c∗AB the increase in opportunity cost for A would not increase
the number or frequency of his absences compared to those of B. This is borne
out in the data as nearly 30% of students in the sample never have a truancy
at any age. Figure 1 demonstrates the differential effects of an opportunity cost
increase and truancy on high and low c∗ students in the model. High c∗ students
are unlikely to experience cost draws high enough to result in truancy, and even
if they do, the resulting increase in the probability of an additional truancy is
very low compared to the effect on low c∗ students. However, if students A
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and B have a low c∗ they will be sensitive to the effect of the opportunity cost
increase. Figure 2 illustrates the model’s prediction of how the opportunity cost
change at sixteen will affect a marginal student and the accelerated increase in
truancy that can result.
This prediction of the model, that an increase in opportunity cost will not
necessarily have an immediate effect on student behavior but will potentially
result in a longer term truancy increase as they are exposed to the cost increase
for longer, is integral to the empirical strategy. A standard regression disconti-
nuity design would be unable to capture this long term effect. Comparing stu-
dents just before and after turning 16 would result in an underestimation of the
effect of the opportunity cost change despite beginning a process of increased
truancy and potential dropout.
The main identification assumption, that students face a permanent increase
in costs at age 16 the timing of which they cannot control, is tied to the assump-
tions in standard regression discontinuity and instrumental variable designs.
The interaction of exact birth date and school entry laws has been used before
to identify the effect of years of schooling on outcomes later in life (Dobkin &
Ferreira, 2010; Smith, 2009; Elder 2010; McCrary & Royer, 2011; Evans et al,
2010) . However, the focus has been on the effect of an entire year age difference
by comparing students who were just too young to enter school to those who
were just too old. In that case, the students who were just too young and did not
enter would be subject to mandatory schooling laws for a full year less than the
just old enough students. Previous studies have found evidence that students
who barely miss school entrance age drop out earlier (Angrist & Krueger, 1991;
Bell et al, 2015). Students who are held back later in middle school and are thus
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older in high school are also more likely to dropout (Jacob & Lefgren, 2009). By
examining how the age change affects students’ truancy decisions during the
year, I build on this literature by providing insight as to why this age timing
matters by examining truancy and disengagement as the mechanism through
which relatively older students drop out rather than the importance of binding
mandatory schooling laws. I also expand the methodology to daily rather than
yearly choices.
2.5.2 Daily Level Truancy Empirical Strategy
The main goal of the empirical strategy is to measure how a change in oppor-
tunity cost affects student’s dynamic attendance decisions including, how the
cost change immediately affects her truancy, how it affect her decisions as she
spends more time subject to the higher cost, and how those decisions are related
to dropout. I estimate a daily truancy equation in which truancy depends on
the student’s accumulated human capital, the student’s time invariant ability,
the average daily cost of school, and the student’s age relative to 16:
Truantigt =α0 + β0 ∗HCigt−1
+ β1 ∗ I(age > 16) + β2 ∗ (agem − 16 ∗ 12) + β3(agem − 16 ∗ 12)2
+ β4 ∗ (agem − 16 ∗ 12) ∗ I(age > 16) + β5 ∗ (agem − 16 ∗ 12)2 ∗ I(age > 16)
+ γig + δt + eigt
(2.9)
HCigt−1 is the level of accumulated human capital on date t − 1 in grade g
for student i, γig is the student’s time invariant ability, δt is the date fixed effect
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for date t, and β1 − β5 are coefficints on a quadratic function of agem which is
age in months, centered around age 16, allowing for both a different slope and
discrete change at age 16. I(age > 16) is an indicator that the student’s age in
years is greater than 16 on date t and eit is a student by day error term.
The empirical model is consistent with the motivating theory model. Stu-
dent’s daily attendance is determined by the opportunity cost they face from
being above 16 or not, how long they have been subject to that cost increase,
their accumulated human capital up until date t, their individual ability, and
the shared daily cost.
The human capital function is flexible but my preferred base specification is
a function of total truancies during the school year before date t, total truancies
in the semester before date t and total truancies in the month before date t. This
specification is nested, and the coefficients on the semester and month truancies
are the additional effect that those more recent truancies have on the student’s
actions at date t beyond the effect of the total number of truancies that year.
HCigt−1 = β0sch ∗
t−1∑
j=schyear0









Where schyear0, semester0, and month0 are the first date in the school year,
semester, and month that contain date t respectively, and Truantigj is the stu-
dent’s previous truancies in that year (j), semester (k), or month (l).
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2.5.3 Between Year School Transitions
OLS
At the end of each school year students decide whether they will continue in
their current school, transfer to another school, or drop out of school entirely.
Students decide if the expected value of attending that year is higher than the
expected cost. The student’s truancies in the year determine the human capital
she will go forward with the next year. This human capital accumulation deter-
mines the costs and benefits the student faces from continuing schooling. The
baseline specification for this continuation decision is:
CONTINUEicg = β0s + β1 ∗DEMOGicg + β2 ∗ SCOREicg (2.11)
+β3 ∗HCicg + γcg + eicg
CONTINUEicg is an indicator for whether student i in cohort c in grade
g continues in her present traditional school for grade g + 1. DEMOGicg is
a vector of demographic characteristics for student i, SCOREicg is a vector of
student achievement scores: GPA, ELA score, and whether or not the student
has to repeat math. γcg is a student by cohort (entrance year by entrance school
group) fixed effect and eicg is an error term. HCicg is a truancy human capital
specification.
The baseline human capital function is the total number of truancies the stu-






Where schyear0 is the first day of the school year and Tg is the last day of
the school year. Truanticgj takes on the value 1 if student i in cohort c and
grade (school year) g was absent on date j. In this specification it is the total
amount of time that students spent in school that matters. Because there is only
one instrument, I use total truancies during the year as the measure of human
capital in both the OLS and IV models. However, truancies are likely to have
different effects depending on when they occur during the year and section 6.2.3
includes additional OLS estimates which provide suggestive evidence on effect
of truancy timing on continuance.
IV approach
The OLS specification could suffer from omitted variables bias or endogeneity
problems. Students who have obligations at home, dislike school, or have lim-
ited parental supervision are likely to both be absent more during the year and
to not return the following year. In order to disentangle the causal effect of tru-
ancy on dropout, I use the change in opportunity cost at 16 as an instrument for
the total number of truancies that a student has during the year. Students who
have been subject to the higher opportunity cost longer will be induced to have
more truancies than those who spend less time with the higher cost.
First Stage:
HCicg =α1 ∗ (AGEig − 16 ∗ 12) + α2 ∗ (AGEig − 16 ∗ 12)2
+ α3 ∗ (AGEig − 16 ∗ 12) ∗ I(AGEig > 16)
+ α4 ∗ (AGEig − 16 ∗ 12)2 ∗ I(AGEig > 16) + α5OV ER16ig




CONTINUEicg = β0s + β1 ∗DEMOGicg + β2 ∗ ĤCicg + γcg + eicg (2.14)
Here AGEig is the age of individual i at the end of school year g and
I(AGEig > 16) is an indicator that the student was over 16 at some point during
that year. This specification is almost identical to the one used in the the daily
level results. OV ER16ig is an indicator for whether the student will be above
16 at the beginning of the next school year. DEMOGicg is a vector of demo-
graphic characteristics including race, gender, school entrance age, and English
as a second language and ĤCicg is the predicted human capital value from the
first stage. ηicg and eicg are error terms. The identification assumption is that,
when controlling for the age the student began high school, the time a student
spends over 16 during the year only affects the probability of continuation the
following year through the accumulation of human capital and whether the stu-
dent will begin the following year after turning 16. For the instrument to not be
valid, the amount of time a student is 16 would have to affect her ability and de-
cision to continue school without affecting her truancy. One possibility is that
students who are over 16 are more likely to have excused absences they would
be more likely to not continue school because they missed important lessons
even though they did not miss them due to truancy. However, that does not
appear to be the case. Students can not excuse their own absences at 16 nor is




2.6.1 Within Year Truancy
Baseline Results
The vast majority of students turn 16 either during their sophomore years or
in the summer between sophomore and junior year of high school. Students
who turn 16 during their freshman year were either held back at some point,
or originally began school in a state with different entrance laws. Students who
turn 16 during junior year are similarly young for their grade and likely began
kindergarten outside of the state’s public school system. I focus on the effect of
turning 16 on truancy in 10th grade because that is when students who are of
the correct age for their grade will turn 16. However, I also show results for 9th
and 11th grade attendance as well and all students are 16 before the beginning
of 12th grade.
Figure 3 provides a visible depiction of the effect of turning 16 on truancy.
The top panel shows the effect on raw truancy using a fractional polynomial
fit and the bottom shows the effect on residual truancy. Using raw truancies
is problematic because age is correlated with time during the school year. If
students are more likely to be truant at the end of the school year and more likely
to be 16 at the end of the school, evidence that turning 16 causes truancy could
be erroneous. In the second panel of Figure 3 average residual truancies are
plotted against age. Residual truancy is the estimated residual from regressing
truancy on date and individual fixed effects. The graphical depiction of residual
truancy mimics the double fixed effect set up of the econometric results.
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Truantigt = α0 + γig + δt+igt (2.15)
Where γig is the fixed effect for student i in grade g and δt is the fixed effect
for date t. The residual truancy is ˆrigt = Truantigt − ˆTruantigt or the level of
individual truancy not explained by the date and individual fixed effects.
The increase in truancy seen in Figure 3 is consistent with the empirical re-
sults. Table 3 contains the baseline estimation results for the effect of the op-
portunity cost change at 16 for students in grades 9, 10, and 11. Coefficients
and standard errors have been scaled by 1000 for ease of reading. The bottom
panel includes back of the envelope calculations of the relative effect of turning
16 on truancy after 1, 3, and 6 months in 10th grade. These percent increases are
scaled by the average level of truancy: 2%. The main coefficients of interest are
those on the interaction terms months 16*over 16 and months 16 squared*over
16 If both these coefficients are positive, then the longer a student is 16, the
more likely she is to be truant, and that the frequency of truancy increases over
time. For students who turn 16 during 10th grade this is the case. A student
who has been 16 for 3 months in 10th grade is 1% more likely to be truant each
day compared to other students. However, while this number seems very low,
the relationship between age and truancy is quadratic; the longer a student has
been subject to the higher opportunity cost after turning 16, the more likely she
is to be truant. After 6 months a student is 4.4% more likely to be truant and
after 12 months, which is the equivalent of barely missing the school entrance
cutoff and being nearly a full year older than her youngest peers, is 14% more
likely to be truant.
These results are also consistent with the predictions of the model. The
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model predicts that there should not necessarily be an immediate discrete
change in student behavior upon turning 16 but that, once the opportunity cost
increases, students who have a low enough cost rule will miss more and more
days as they push their future costs higher.
There are slightly different patterns for students who turn 16 in 9th and 11th
grade. Students who turn 16 in 9th grade are older and likely repeated a grade in
the past. These students face even greater increases in the probability of truancy
at 16. A student who has been 16 for 3 months in 9th grade is nearly three times
as likely to be truant compared to a student who has not turned 16. Students
who turn 16 in 11th grade are those who began school young. The coefficient
on over 16 is positive and significant implying that students who turn 16 in 11th
grade after most of their peers do appear to immediately change their behavior
unlike students who turn 16 earlier. However, the point estimates on the in-
teraction terms, though insignificant, are negative suggesting that, at most, the
average student who turns 16 in 11th grade does not have worsening truancy
over time.
The estimated effect of human capital, accumulated past truancies, on tru-
ancy is also consistent with the model. Students who have had truancies in the
past are more likely to be truant especially if the student had a truancy in the
past month. The human capital specification is nested so the effect of one tru-
ancy in the past month is the sum of the coefficients on year truancies, semester
truancies, and month truancies. A student who has had only one truancy in
10th grade but in the last month is 40% more likely to be truant compared to
the baseline. However, if that one truancy occurred the semester before and the
student has had no subsequent truancies she is 0.5% less likely to be truant. The
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coefficient on month truancies. This is consistent with the model. More recent
truancies would have a larger effect on the cost of the school day because the
student has not had time to catch up to missed work or may be in the habit of
not attending school. The effect of past truancies on human capital and future
truancies does decay over time.
The students who have the largest increases in truancy after turning 16 are
the students who have had past truancies. In terms of the model, these are stu-
dents who have accumulated less human capital than their peers by the time
they turn 16 and are also students who are likely to have a lower c∗ so they
miss lower cost days than other students. Additionally, students who have al-
ready become chronic truants are more likely to know when truancy enforce-
ment changes so the opportunity cost increase for these students is higher at
age 16.
The specification in table 4 explores the interaction between opportunity cost
and human capital accumulation. It is essentially a triple difference specifica-
tion which interacts the accumulated human capital a student has at her 16th
birthday with turning 16. TRUANT3 is an indicator that the student has al-
ready had 3 truancies by the time she turns 16. These students would have
already received letters from the school about the truancy remediation process
and are more likely to know that enforcement changes at 16. The coefficients
of interest are the interaction terms with TRUANT3, again, all coefficients have
been multiplied by 1000 for ease of reading. The coefficients on all interaction
terms are significant. For 10th graders, the coefficient on the interaction term
with months 16 squared is negative, but very small indicating that, for chronic
truants, there is a diminishing rate of increase in truancy frequency after 16. The
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bottom panel of the table includes similar calculations to the baseline results of
the percentage increase in truancy, relative to the 2% average rate, for students
who have fewer that 3 truancies and students with more than 3 when they turn
16. Although the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, students who have had
fewer than 3 truancies before 16 are less likely to truant once they turn 16. How-
ever, students with previous truancies are much more likely to be truant. They
are 34% more likely to be truant after 1 month, 63% after 3 months, and twice
as likely to be truant after 6 months. The small average results in the baseline
appear to be driven by chronic truants.
“At Risk” Students
Much of the dropout prevention literature focuses on students that are at high
risk for dropout. These are generally students with low socioeconomic status,
who go to low performing schools, and they are disproportionately likely to be
racial minorities. Figure 4 plots the residual truancy for students at high risk
(low performing) schools in the district compared to students at other schools.
Students at low performing high schools are more likely to be truant than other
students, on average students are truant 7 – 10 days freshman year depending
on the school and up to 90% of students will have at least one truancy com-
pared to less than 50% at high performing high schools. As can be seen in fig-
ure 4, high risk schools have more truancy overall and the rate of truancy may
accelerate after 16 faster than for lower risk schools. Table 5 formalizes these
results, the results in column (1) are similar to a triple difference specification.
Interaction terms allow students at high risk schools to have different truancy
age slopes before and after 16 compared to low risk school students. While stu-
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dents in high risk schools are more likely to be truant and have a steeper slope
of truancy accumulation to age, the increase in that slope after 16 is not statis-
tically significantly different from the increase for all students. Column (2) is
estimated only for high risk schools. In this specification, only students at high
risk schools contribute to estimating the day fixed effect reflecting the assump-
tion that shared cost is school specific. None of the results are economically or
statistically significantly different from those for all students.
Race and gender are also often used to identify higher risk students and it is
possible that Black and Hispanic students will have different truancy behavior
compared to other students after turning 16. Figure 5 plots the residual truancy
for Black and Hispanic students compared to other students. While both Black
and Hispanic students have higher rates of truancy, there does not appear to be
much differential effect of turning 16.19 Figure 6 also shows that there is little
difference in truancy behavior at or before 16 for female and male students.
Robustness Checks
One important threat to identification is that teenagers may not actually face
an increase in opportunity cost at age 16. Students could already be working
off the books when 15 or could not work at all at any age. They could also be
unaware of both the change in labor law and truancy policy. It is also possible
that the apparent increase in truancy after age 16 is an artifact of the data. One
advantage of the double fixed effects specification is that it controls for each date
separately which rules out the possibility that age is a proxy for season or time
during the school year. An additional benefit of this design is that it captures the
19Econometric results for Black and Hispanic students will be made available in an online
appendix or upon request.
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dynamic effects of opportunity cost over time. Using a regression discontinuity
design to compare students just before and after 16, would falsely conclude that
there is no difference in their behavior which would imply that either, students
do not react to the cost change, or that there is no cost change.
There is also the possibility that there is nothing special about turning 16,
and that students’ behavior changes in a similar fashion at all of their birthdays.
Figure 7 compares the changes in truancy at ages 15.5 and 16. There is no visibly
discernible change between the fractional polynomial estimated from 14.75 to
15.5 and from 15.5 to 16. In fact, when attempting to include indicators in the
baseline regression for over 16 and over 15.5 simultaneously the two were co-
linear. Students who turn 15.5 in 10th grade and who turn 16 are extremely
similar. They have both transitioned from 9th to 10th grade, and they are both
within the normal school starting age.
Table 6 compares three different estimates of the increase in truancy at 16
taking into account that there could also be a change in behavior at age 15.
Columns (1) and (2) are the baseline 9th and 10th grade estimates, and column
(3) is a specification that includes both indicators for time over 16 and time over
15 simultaneously for 9th graders. The coefficients on the over 16 variables in-
teraction variables are robust to this inclusion with the exception of the over 16
indicator. The baseline estimate for the linear and squared interaction terms are
-9.51 and 6.83 respectively for 9th graders and with the inclusion of the over
15 interactions those become -10.5 and 6.7. These estimates are within the 95th
percentile confidence interval of each other.
Another possibility is that truancy isn’t actually increasing at 16 and the ap-
parent increase is just absences changing labels. Students may have more au-
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tonomy when they turn 16 and, as a result, absences that parents would have
excused when they were younger now become truant absences. In other words,
students are in school the same amount of time, but being out of school is called
something different. This is inconsistent with the data. Figure 8 plots residual
absences and tardies, defined the same way as residual truancy, and shows vir-
tually no change in the probability of excused absence at age 16. There seems
to be no evidence that students are substituting excused absences with truan-
cies once they turn 16. Additional suggestive evidence is found in the bottom
panel of Figure 8, there is an increase in residual tardies at age 16. Tardies,
like truancies are within control of the student rather than the parents. Table
7 compares the estimated effect of turning 16 on truancy, absence, and tardies.
The coefficients of interest are the interaction terms of months16 ∗ over16 and
months16squared ∗ over16 Each column is a separate regression and the out-
comes are truant, absent, and tardy. Unlike the coefficients in the truancy re-
gression which are positive, the coefficients on the interaction terms for both
tardies and excused absences are negative.
2.6.2 Between Year School Transitions
OLS Baseline Results
There are four possible outcomes for a student transitioning to 10th, 11th, or
12th grade. The student can continue in her current traditional school, drop out
of school entirely, transfer to an alternative school, or transfer out of the dis-
trict. For the following results I focus on the decision of students to stay in their
traditional high school but will also discuss the results for continuing in any
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school or dropping out. As can be seen in Figure 9, students with higher levels
of truancy in 10th grade are less likely to continue in their neighborhood school
between 10th and 11th grade and less likely to continue in any school. A student
with three truancies compared to none is nearly 10 percentage points less likely
to continue in traditional school. While most students who have more than 30
truancies (15% of the school year) do not return to their neighborhood school
the following year, there are still students with very high truancy levels that do
return as can be seen in the right tail of the graph. Even some of the students
that miss more than an entire semester worth of classes return for the following
year. From comparing the top and bottom panels of the figure, it is clear that
most of the students who leave their traditional school do not immediately drop
out but rather transfer to another school. Even the majority of students with a
semester’s worth of absences continue into 11th grade.20
Table 8 provides the OLS results for the effect of truancies on the transition
from 10th to 11th grade. Each additional truancy decreases the probability of
returning to school by .006 to .01. Overall 82.5% of tenth graders continue in
their original school so each truancy decreases the probability of returning by
0.5 to 1 percentage point. Controlling for demographics and cohort, each addi-
tional truancy makes a student 1% less likely to continue in their neighborhood
school. Columns 3 -5 include additional achievement covariates including the
students’ test scores, whether they have to repeat the same math class the next
year, and two different measures of GPA: weighted GPA and an indicator for
having a GPA under 2.0 (a 2.0 GPA is a requirement for graduation). The direc-
tion of the truancy effect is the same with the addition of these covariates but
the magnitude decreases. Including the test score and GPA variables is prob-
20Patterns are similar for the 9th to 10th and 10th to 11th grade transitions and will be made
available in an online appendix and upon request.
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lematic because both test scores and GPA are highly correlated with truancy.
Truancy could cause low grades when students miss lessons, and low grades
could cause truancy by making students dislike school. Table 9 expands the set
of covariates to include excused absences as well. The coefficients on truancies
in all specifications are robust to the inclusion of excused absences. The coef-
ficient on truancy is also larger than the coefficient on excused absences, each
truancy is associated with a larger decrease in continuance than an excused ab-
sence. The results for the transition from 9th to 10th and 11th to 12th grade
follow a similar pattern.21
While my focus is on the effect of truancy on continuing in traditional high
school, there is also an important effect on continuing in any high school and
dropping out. Tables 10 and 11 include the estimates for the effect of truancy on
continuing in any school and dropping out respectively. Each cell is a regression
and the estimates are the coefficient on truancy. Truancy decreases the probabil-
ity of attending any school by between 0.1 and and 0.6 percentage points which
is much smaller than the effect on continuing in traditional school. The effect on
dropout is also much smaller in part because most students transfer to another
program before dropping out.
IV
While the OLS results are informative, the change in the magnitude of the tru-
ancy variable when covariates are added demonstrates the potential for omit-
ted variable bias and endogeneity concerns in the OLS model. The total effect
of truancy on transition could be higher if a student’s truancy caused her bad
21Results will be made available in an online appendix and upon request
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grades or caused the necessity of repeating math. Table 12 contains results for
the IV specification for the transitions between 9th and 10th and 10th and 11th
grade. The effect of truancy on continuation in traditional school is estimated
to be much larger in this specification compared to the OLS estimates. With
each additional truancy a student is 2 percentage points less likely to continue
in her neighborhood public school. With an average continuation rate of 83%, a
chronic truant with only 3 truancies, is 10% less likely to continue in her neigh-
borhood school compared to a student with no truancies.
In panels 2 and 3 I include the results for the effect of truancies on continu-
ing in any school and dropping out. Like the OLS results, these estimates are
much lower than the estimates for continuing in traditional school Truancy has
a larger effect on continuing in traditional school than on dropping out entirely.
This is likely because most students first transfer to an alternative school and
then drop out. The difference between the OLS and IV estimates highlights
the complicated role truancy plays in dropout. Truancy not only affects con-
tinuation directly, but also through its effect on grades and test scores. This
interaction is difficult to tease out in OLS.
OLS: Alternative Human Capital Specifications
In the IV specification above the only human capital measure used is the sum of
all truancies during the year because there is only one instrument: the amount
of the year the student was 16. However, it is likely that not all truancies should
affect school continuation in the same way. Truancies could be more or less im-
portant later in the year or there could be a non-linear relationship between tru-
ancy and continuation. Table 13 allows truancy to have a non linear relationship
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with school continuance, specifically that any truancy beyond the 3 that label a
student as a chronic truant could have an aggravating or dampening effect on
continuance. The results show, across specifications and grade transitions, that
each truancy beyond the first three decreases continuance by less than each of
the three initial truancies. This diminishing effect of truancy is likely due to the
district’s policy focusing on 3 truancies as an important benchmark for students.
Finally, truancies could have different effects on continuation depending on
the time of year in which they occur. Table 14 repeats the baseline OLS analysis
allowing the coefficient on truancy to vary month to month. As is predicted
by the model and documented in the literature, truancies that occur in the late
spring, May and June, have the largest effect on continuing school. This could
be due in part to the fact that some of those truancies are students who have
already dropped out but are still counted as truant. Despite the importance of
May and June, the effect of monthly truancies changes by grade. In 10th grade
truancies in September and December have the largest effect on continuing of
any month other than June, a pattern not seen in 9th grade. In 11th grade,
truancies in September have a larger effect than truancies in any other month
but June. The importance of these fall semester truancies could provide early
warning indicators for dropout.
2.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The important implication of these results is that the changes in costs that stu-
dents face in attending school can have dramatic effects over time when left
un-addressed. While an increase in the daily cost of schooling may have ei-
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ther no immediate effect, or a very small immediate effect, there is potential
for the effect to increase overtime and cause students to make more and more
bad decisions endangering their ability to graduate. This is especially true for
students who already have histories of poor attendance. The more truancies a
student has had in the past, the more likely she is to be truant again and the tru-
ancies that are most predictive are those within the same month. Additionally,
students who have already been labeled chronic truants (they have 3 or more
truancies) by the time they turn 16, accumulate truancies at a faster rate than
their peers
These results support the idea that the most effective programs for prevent-
ing dropout, once students are in high school, are those that lower the cost of
physically attending school by increasing truancy enforcement or decreasing
the negative aspects of school. Many of the high school dropout prevention
programs that have the best evidence for success are high intensity mentorship
programs that serve to both lower the psychic costs of school for a student by
providing a social relationship and by helping students keep up with course
work and monitoring her attendance (Bell et. al., 2015; Oreopoulos et al, 2014;
DeSocio et al, 2007).
The results also cast doubt on the idea that it is “too late” to intervene with
older students. Students react to a change in the cost of schooling as late as
their junior year of high school and that cost increase over time decreases their
likelihood of remaining in school. Some of the students who eventually drop
out have even passed their high school exit exams before leaving school. These
results are consistent with evidence that older students do benefit from enforced
attendance. In college mandatory attendance policies aimed at students not
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much older than high schoolers have been shown to be effective at increasing
learning when they increase attendance (Marburger, 2006).
The results are also additional evidence that aggressive truancy prevention
strategies, such as case worker intervention, are more effective than less intense
strategies like warning letters (Lemieux et al, 2011). Students are more likely to
be truant after enforcement has decreased once they turn 16 and can no longer
be referred to the county’s juvenile court or the district’s own intensive reme-
diation system. This is especially problematic for students that already have
chronic truancy problems because they are likely to notice the drop in enforce-
ment. Sustaining efforts to keep students in school when they are mandated to
be there, no matter how old the student is or how late in her career she begins
missing school, could help prevent this disengagement and eventual dropout.
The results also call for further study to understand the role alternative high
school programs play in the dynamic process of dropout. More than half of stu-
dents who transfer to an alternative school in the sample eventually drop out
and the transfer students have lower human capital in their original school be-
fore transferring compared to those who stay. While these schools award lower
quality diplomas, it is unclear from the data whether the net effect of alterna-
tive schools is positive or negative. Students would be worse off in alternative
schools if they would have been able to finish in a traditional high school if
an alternative school were not available or if they were not pushed toward one.
However, students would do better in an alternative school if the student would
have dropped out earlier if alternative school were not an option. One impor-
tant challenge of alternative programs, especially those with large online learn-
ing components, is to prevent he structure and content of alternative programs
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from re-enforcing bad behavior on the part of students. When students with
truancy problems are transferred to online programs with minimal oversight,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Baseline: Daily level truancy for full sample (Coefficients scaled by 1000)
(9th) (10th) (11th)
Truant Truant Truant
over 16 3.44 -.218 2.27
(1.62) (0.277) (0.760)
months 16 -11120 9873 383
(36.18) (77.68) (65.1)
months 16*over 16 -9.51 0.0537 -0.895
(2.62) (0.120) (1.51)
months 16 squared 0.0493 0.0103 0.379
(0.00200) (0.00518) (0.628)
months 16 squared*over 16 6.83 0.0213 -0.332
(0.877) (0.0107) (0.628)
year truancies 0.0331 -0.0734 -0.00110
(0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0174)
semester truancies 0.876 0.808 1.28
(0.0126) (0.0166) (0.0221))
month truancies 7.11 8.82 12.0
(0.0548) (0.0693) (0.0869)
1 Month Effect 3.8% -0.6% –
3 Month Effect 182% 0.9% –
6 Month Effect – 4.3% –
Observations 6810498 5588743 4648138
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort (entrance year by school)
level. Each column is an individual grade, all students are 16 before 12th grade so 12th
grade is omitted. Months 16 is the student’s age in months centered around 16 and over
16 is an indicator that the student is over 16 on date t. Year, semester, and month truancies
are the total number of truancies a student has accumulated before date t during that year,
semester, or month. All specifications include both student level and date level fixed effects.
Coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1000 for ease of reading. The 1
month, 3 month, and 6 month effect is the percentage increase in truancy, relative to the
baseline average of 2% for students after they have been 16 for 1, 3, or 6 months.
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Table 2.4: Daily Truancy Interacted with Human Capital (Coefficients scaled by 1000)
9th truant 10th truant 11th truant
over 16 -0.904 -0.718 0.340
(.86) (0.292) (0.770)
months 16 -11110 9805 383
(36180) (77670) (65.1)
months 16*over 16 -4.04 -0.402 -1.07
(3.03) (0.129) (1.51)
months 16 squared 0.0493 0.0101 0.404
(0.00200) (0.00518) (0.628)
months 16 squared*over 16 2.86 0.0282 -0.364
(1.02) (0.0116) (0.628)
over 16*TRUANT3 17.1 4.44 18.5
(3.74) (0.694) (1.28)
months 16*over 16*TRUANT3 -20.0 3.70 1.92
(6.04) (0.288) (0.149)
months 16 squared*over 16*TRUANT3 14.8 -0.127 0.0245
(2.01) (0.0237) (0.00659)
Year Truancies 0.0324 -0.0741 -0.00189
(0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0174)
Semester Truancies 0.874 0.788 1.20
(0.0126) (0.0166) (0.0221)
Month Truancies 7.11 8.81 11.9
(0.0548) (0.0693) (0.0870)
Not Truant 1 Month Effect – -5.4% –
Not Truant 3 Month Effect – -8.6% –
Not Truant 6 Month Effect – -10% –
Truant 1 Month Effect – 34% –
Truant 3 Month Effect – 63% –
Truant 6 Month Effect – 101% –
Observations 6810498 5588743 4648138
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Months 16 is the student’s age in months and over 16 is
an indicator that the student is over 16 on date t. Year, semester, and month truancies are the
total number of truancies before date t during that year, semester, or month. “TRUANT3”
is an indicator variable that the student had 3 accumulated truancies at the time she turned
16. All specifications include both student level and date level fixed effects. Coefficients and
standard errors have been multiplied by 1000 for ease of reading. The 1 month, 3 month,
and 6 month effect is the percentage increase in truancy, relative to the baseline average of
2% for students after they have been 16 for 1, 3, or 6 months. “Truant” indicates that the
increase is calculated for students who had 3 or more truancies before turning 16.
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months 16 9842 38880
(77480) (281700)
months over 16 0.197 -0.115
(0.134) (0.423)
months 16 squared 0.00643 0.0324
(0.00570) (0.0187)
months over 16 squared -0.00168 0.00469
(0.0121) (0.0354)
over 16 * in at risk school -1.62
(0.724)
months 16 * in at risk school 2.29
(0.179)
months over 16 * in at risk school -0.190
(0.308)
months 16 squared * in at risk school 0.0264
(0.0134)
months over 16 squared * in at risk school 0.0125
(0.0261)
Year Truancies -0.0736 -0.0947
(0.0159) (0.0337)
Semester Truancies 0.778 0.818
(0.0166) (0.0365)
Month Truancies 8.75 8.00
(0.0693) (0.155)
Observations 5588743 1000146
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort (entrance year by school)
level. Each column is an individual grade, all students are 16 before 12th grade so 12th
grade is omitted. Months 16 is the student’s age in months centered around 16 and over
16 is an indicator that the student is over 16 on date t. Year, semester, and month truancies
are the total number of truancies a student has accumulated before date t during that year,
semester, or month. All specifications include both student level and date level fixed effects.
Coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1000 for ease of reading.
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Table 2.6: The Estimated Effect of Turning 15 (Coefficients scaled by 1000)
(9th) (10th) (9th)
Truant Truant Truant
over 16 3.44 -0.218 0.71
(1.62) (0.277) (1.7)
months 16 -11120 .873 -11100
(36180) (77680) (36170)
months 16*over 16 -9.51 0.0537 -10.5
(2.62) (0.120) (2.60)
months 16 squared 0.0493 0.0103 0.02
(0.00200) (0.00518) (0.002)




months over 15 -0.2
(0.12)
months over 15 squared .091
(0.012)
Observations 6810498 5588743 6810498
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort (entrance year by school)
level. Each column is an individual grade, all students are 15 before 11th and 12th grade
so they are omitted. Months 15 is the student’s age in months centered around 15 and over
15 is an indicator that the student is over 15 on date t. Year, semester, and month truancies
are the total number of truancies a student has accumulated before date t during that year,
semester, or month. All specifications include both student level and date level fixed effects.
Coefficients have been multiplied by 1000 for ease of reading.
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Table 2.7: Baseline Model: Additional Outcomes (Coefficients scaled by 1000)
(10th) (10th) (10th)
Truant Absent Tardy
over 16 -0.218 1.02 0.98
(0.277) (0.425) (0.53)
months 16 9873 -23870 31360
(77680) (119000) (147300)
months 16*over 16 0.0537 -0.578 -0.018
(0.120) (0.185) (0.23)
months 16 squared 0.0103 0.016 -0.007
(0.00518) (0.008) (0.009)
months 16 squared*over 16 0.0213 -0.0137 -0.012
(0.0107) (0.0164) (0.02)
Observations 5588743 5588743 5588743
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort level. Each column is an
individual grade, all students are 16 before 12th grade so 12th grade is omitted. Months
16 is the student’s age in months centered around 16 and over 16 is an indicator that the
student is over 16 on date t. Year, semester, and month truancies are the total number of
truancies a student has accumulated before date t during that year, semester, or month. All
specifications include both student level and date level fixed effects. Coefficients have been
multiplied by 1000 for ease of reading.
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Table 2.8: Yearly Transition Results OLS: 10th Graders Continuing in Original School for
11th Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
Total Truancies -0.0103 -0.0102 -0.0110 -0.00607 -0.0067
(0.0002) (0.000206) (0.00028) (0.00215) (0.00029)




GPA under 2.0 -0.0740 -0.0720
(0.0068) (0.0067)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 30542 30534 29531 30534 29531
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 10th grade (midyear) are excluded from
the sample.
Table 2.9: Yearly Transition Results OLS: 10th Graders Continuing in Original School for
11th Grade with Excused Absences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
Total Truancies -0.0099 -0.0971 -0.0103 -0.00599 -0.00648
(0.0002) (0.000206) (0.00028) (0.00215) (0.000290)
Total Absences -0.00514 -0.00544 -0.00500 -0.00313 -0.00648
(0.000256) (0.000257) (0.00026) (0.000253) (0.000290)




GPA under 2.0 -0.0758 -0.0748
(0.0068) (0.0067)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 30542 30534 29531 30534 29531
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 10th grade are excluded from the sample.
Total absences are the total excused absences that a student has in addition to truancies.
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Table 2.10: Yearly Transition Results OLS: All Grades Continuing in Any School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Any Any Any Any
9th to 10th -0.00360 -0.00345 -0.00163 -0.00315 -0.00127
(0.000078) (0.000079) (0.000092) (0.000088) (0.000101)
10th to 11th -0.00446 -0.0043 -0.00286 -0.00396 -0.00247
(.00008) (.000083) (0.0001) (.00009) (.00109)
11th to 12th -0.00653 -0.0061 -0.00475 -0.00546 -0.00378
(.00117) (.00013) (.00018) (.000136) (0.000194)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Test Scores X X
GPA measures X X
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 11th grade are excluded from the sample.
Table 2.11: Yearly Transition Results OLS: All Grades Dropout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dropout Dropout Dropout Dropout Dropout
9th to 10th 0.00232 0.00204 0.000315 0.00229 0.00031
(0.00031) (0.0000317) (0.0000329) (0.000035) (0.00035)
10th to 11th 0.00168 0.00135 0.000498 0.00146 0.00048
(.000028) (.000028) (0.000033) (.000031) (.000035)
11th to 12th 0.00266 0.00185 0.000875 0.00187 0.000768
(.0000412) (.0000437) (.0000572) (.000046) (0.000061)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Test Scores X X
GPA measures X X
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.13: Yearly Transition Results OLS: All Grades Continues in Neighborhood School
with Chronic Truancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
9th to 10th -0.0217 -0.0204 -0.0193 -0.0093 -0.0113
Total Truancies (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00214) (0.00215) (0.00214)
9th to 10th 0.0127 0.0114 0.0099 0.00361 0.005
Truancies >3 (0.00214) (0.00214) (0.00209) (0.00211) (0.00208)
10th to 11th -0.0304 -0.0261 -0.0239 -0.0096 -0.0116
Total Truancies (.00235) (.00237) (0.00233) (.0023) (.00229)
10th to 11th 0.0199 0.0157 0.0127 0.00351 0.00485
Truancies >3 (0.00232) (0.00234) (0.0023) (0.0226) (0.0022)
11th to 12th -0.0201 -0.0167 -0.0177 -0.00327 -0.00638
Total Truancies (.00213) (.00212) (.00207) (.00203) (0.00202)
11th to 12th 0.0096 0.00625 0.00476 -0.00290 -0.00113
Truancies >3 (0.00211) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00199) (0.00194)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Test Scores X X
GPA measures X X
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 11th grade are excluded from the sample.
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Table 2.14: Grade 10 to 11 – Estimates for Truancies by Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
continues continues continues continues continues
September -0.0176 -0.0152 -0.00630 -0.00908 -0.00207
Truancies (0.00290) (0.00291) (0.00322) (0.00280) (0.00314)
October -0.00539 -0.00601 -0.00158 -0.00278 0.000162
Truancies (0.00237) (0.00239) (0.00269) (0.00230) (0.00262)
November -0.00751 -0.00790 -0.00546 -0.00138 -0.000579
Truancies (0.00283) (0.00284) (0.00310) (0.00273) (0.00302)
December -0.0203 -0.0196 -0.0175 -0.0150 -0.0129
Truancies (0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00291) (0.00264) (0.00283)
January -0.00627 -0.00630 -0.00456 -0.00316 -0.00126
Truancies (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00223) (0.00199) (0.00218)
February -0.00151 -0.00219 -0.00111 -0.000289 0.00205
Truancies (0.00240) (0.00239) (0.00268) (0.00230) (0.00261)
March -0.00952 -0.00948 -0.0144 -0.00647 -0.00966
Truancies (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00226) (0.00196) (0.00221)
April -0.00657 -0.00629 -0.00880 -0.00391 -0.00549
Truancies (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00222) (0.00196) (0.00217)
May -0.0124 -0.0121 -0.0199 -0.00895 -0.0150
Truancies (0.00186) (0.00185) (0.00202) (0.00178) (0.00198)
June -0.0236 -0.0228 -0.0251 -0.0117 -0.0169
Truancies (0.00237) (0.00236) (0.00241) (0.00228) (0.00235)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Test Scores X X
GPA measures X X
Observations 30542 30534 29531 30534 29531
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.102 0.108 0.171 0.152
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students





Figure 2.1: Theory Model Cost Distribution Change for High and Low C*
Students
Initial Cost Distribution Post Truancy Cost Distribution
change in average daily cost of schooling
due to decrease in human capital from truancy
Low Cost                                                               c*low              c*high         High Cost
The Effect of Truancy on Cost Distribution
Low Cost                                                                  c*           High Cost
Magnification of Truancy
The top panel depicts a stylized version of the effect of truancy on future schooling costs
and additional truancy. Students who receive a cost draw in the area below the initial cost
distribution curve to the right of the c* line will select not to attend school. This decision
lowers the student’s human capital for subsequent days which increases the daily cost of
schooling and shifts the cost curve from the initial distribution to the post truancy cost
distribution. The probability of a subsequent truancy is now higher. Students with lower c*
both have a higher likelihood of receiving a cost draw that causes them to miss school and
face a higher increase to that probability for a given change in cost. The lower panel depicts
how that effect magnifies.
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Figure 2.2: Theory Model Cost Distribution: Effect of turning 16
Pre-16 Cost Post-16 Cost
Opportunity Cost
Increase at 16
Low Cost                                                                             c*          High Cost
Opportunity Cost Shift at 16
Students who receive a cost draw in the area to the right of the c* line from the initial (solid
and black) cost distribution will elect to miss school. The probability of missing a subse-
quent day in now higher and the cost curve will shift right. With each subsequent truancy
the cost curve shifts further right increasing the probability of another truancy at an increas-
ing rate. After the student turns 16 there is an additional large increase in the daily cost of
schooling which shifts the cost distribution to the right even if the student has no addi-
tional truancies. The permanent cost increase increases the rate of truancy accumulation for
students who continue to be truant.
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14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age







14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age
10th Grade: All students, All Schools
The top panel includes raw truancy by school and age cohort for all 10th grade students
in the sample. Each circle is weighted by the number of students in that cell. The bottom
panel includes residual truancy by the same school and age cohorts. Residual truancy is the
estimated residual of an OLS regression of truancy on student and date fixed effects only.
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14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age
High Risk Schools (mean) truant1res
High Risk Schools High Risk Schools
Low Risk Schools Low Risk Schools
10th Grade: High v. Low Risk Schools
Each circle is the average residual truancy for an age group school cohort at a low perform-
ing high school weighted by the number of students in that school of that age. The triangles
are the same grouping for higher performing schools. Residual truancy is the estimated
residual of an OLS regression of truancy on student and date fixed effects only.
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14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age
Black Students Non-Black Students
Black Students Black Students
Non-Black Students Non-Black Students















14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age
Hispanic or Latino Not Hispanic or Latino
Hispanic or Latino Hispanic or Latino
Not Hispanic or Latino Not Hispanic or Latino
10th Grade: Residual Truancy Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Students
Each circle is average residual truancy for an age group school cohort for Black students
in the top panel and Hispanic students in the bottom panel. Each triangle is an age group
school cohort for the non-Hispanic or non-Black students. markers are weighted by the
number of students in that cell. Residual truancy is the estimated residual of an OLS regres-
sion of truancy on student and date fixed effects only.
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10th Grade: Residual Truancy Male and Female Students
Each circle in the top panel is average raw truancy by age group school cohort for Male
students, triangles are Female student averages. Markers are weighted by the number of
students in that cell. The bottom panel is average residual truancy by the same groups.
Residual truancy is the estimated residual of an OLS regression of truancy on student and
date fixed effects only.
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14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age
10th Grade: All Students, All Schools, Breaks at 15 and 16
Each circle is the average residual truancy in an age group school cohort for all students.
Markers are weighted by the number of students in that cell. Residual truancy is the esti-
mated residual of an OLS regression of truancy on student and date fixed effects only. The
flexible polynomial fit varies between 14.75 and 15.5, 15.5 and 16, and 16 and 17.5.
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14.75 15 15.25 15.5 15.75 16 16.25 16.5 16.75 17 17.25 17.5
Age
10th Grade: Tardy Residuals for All Students
The top panel circles are average residual excused absences by school, age cohort weighted
by cell size. The bottom panel circles are average residual tardies with the same grouping.
Residual excused absences and tardies are the estimated residuals of an OLS regression of
excused absences or tardies on student and date fixed effects only.
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Figure 2.9: 10th to 11th Grade Transition
Chronic Truant


























































0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
10th Grade Truancies
Any School
Each circle is weighted by the number of students in the sample at each school with that
number of truancies, the line is a median spline also weighted by number of students with
each level of truancy. Vertical lines indicate the level at which students are considered
chronic truants and the median spline estimate of the number of truancies when a student
has an equal probability of returning or leaving her school. The top panel is the return to
the original school, the bottom panel is the return to any school.
130
CHAPTER 3
DOES ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AFFECT TEEN BIRTH RATES AND
SCHOOL DROPOUT RATES? EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOL-BASED
HEALTH CENTERS (WITH MICHAEL LOVENHEIM AND RANDALL
REBACK)
3.1 Introduction
Access to affordable health care for low-income Americans has become a pre-
eminent policy issue in the U.S. The massive expansions of Medicaid and the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program that occurred over the past several
decades have caused the gap in health insurance coverage between children
from low-income and high-income families to all but disappear. Yet, health care
access for children depends both on the affordability of care and on convenient
availability of effective health care. Despite the elimination of the health insur-
ance coverage gap, low-income families still face considerably higher costs of
accessing high-quality health care services that drive disparities in the quality
of care across the socioeconomic distribution (Smedley, Stith and Nelson 2003;
Andrulis 1998). This quality gap can be attributed in part to supply-side factors,
such as medical practices choosing not to accept Medicaid insurance and the
reluctance of many doctors to locate their practices in low-income urban or ru-
ral areas. The gap also may be due to demand-side factors, such as low-income
adults lacking information on appropriate health care providers or finding it
difficult to take time away from hourly-paid jobs in order to accompany their
children to these providers.
Medicaid eligibility leads to better health (Currie and Gruber, 1996a; Finkel-
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stein et al., 2012; Kaestner, Joyce and Racine 2001; Currie, Decker and Lin 2008),
more stable household finances (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011) and higher edu-
cational attainment and earnings (Cohodes et al. forthcoming; Brown, Kowalski
and Lurie 2014). However, inadequate access to primary care facilities and doc-
tors among low-income families may preclude them from realizing these bene-
fits of health insurance, which can render the roughly $86 billion the U.S. spends
on Medicaid for children less effective. Given the large and persistent dispari-
ties across the socioeconomic distribution in academic achievement, health care
access, and health status,1 understanding how primary care health care services
affect important life outcomes among youth is of high policy relevance.
In this paper, we explore whether expanding teenagers’s access to health care
influences their fertility rates and their educational attainment. We estimate the
effects of providing primary care health services to teens through school-based
health centers (SBHCs), which are health clinics located in a school or on school
grounds. While they vary in size and scope, virtually all SBHCs provide basic
preventative health services to students, and many of them also provide re-
productive health services and contraception. SBHCs target underserved com-
munities by predominantly locating in schools in low-income urban and rural
areas. They therefore can reduce the costs of obtaining health care services for
children from low-income families. Particularly for reproductive health among
teenagers, these SBHCs may be extremely effective at increasing health care uti-
lization because they reduce any reliance on parents to bring teenage students
to the doctor. Currently, there are over 2,000 SBHCs in the US, and their preva-
lence has increased markedly over the past 25 years (see Figure 1). Although
1For example, see Currie, Decker and Lin (2008), Adler and Rehkopf (2008), Case, Lubotsky
and Paxson (2002), Cunha et al. (2006), Conti, Heckman and Urzua (2010), and Todd and Wolpin
(2007).
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these centers are an increasingly important provider of primary care health ser-
vices to youth in low-income areas, little is known about how they affect student
health and education.
Our analysis makes two contributions to the literature. First, we present
new evidence on the effect of primary health care services delivered through
schools on teen birth rates. Whether a teenager gives birth is a critical health
outcome that can have long-run consequences for the individual. Teen fertility
rates in the U.S. are very high relative to similarly-industrialized nations but
also have declined substantially in the last 25 years (Kearney and Levine 2012).2
Currently, there is very little understanding of which policies are effective in
reducing teen births. Providing health care services to teens, and in particular
easy-to-access contraception through health centers in schools, may be an effec-
tive policy tool with which to lower teen birth rates. This paper is the first in
the literature to estimate the causal effect of such primary care services on teen
fertility.3
Second, our paper is the first to examine how primary health care services
affect the educational attainment of children from low-income families. Pro-
viding access to primary health care services could increase educational attain-
ment through any effect on child health as well as on family finances. A sizable
amount of work has demonstrated that poor health or adverse health events
among children are associated with worse long-run outcomes (e.g., Currie et al.
2Kearney and Levine (2014) find evidence that the MTV show 16 and Pregnant explains about
one third of the decline in teen births that occurred between 2009 and 2010. Due to the timing
of when this show began, they are unable to examine the causes surrounding the large drop in
teen fertility between 1990 and 2009, which is the period on which our study focuses.
3Much prior research has examined the effect of the diffusion of the birth control pill in the
1960s and 1970s on fertility decisions and life outcomes of somewhat older women (Goldin and
Katz 2002; Bailey 2006, 2010; Ananat and Hungerman 2012). This literature does not analyze
the effect of access to contraception among teens on fertility nor does it examine the efficacy of
providing contraceptive services through schools, which is what we focus on in this analysis.
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2010; Case, Fertig and Paxson 2005; Case, Lubotsky and Paxson 2002). Stud-
ies have found positive effects from specific types of child health interventions,
such as hookworm eradication (Bleakley 2007), malaria eradication (Bleakley
2010) and school-based deworming drug interventions (Miguel and Kremer
2004). Several papers also have explored the ‘fetal origins’ hypothesis and have
found evidence that pre-natal health care and health outcomes affect subsequent
academic performance and success (e.g., Almond and Currie 2011; Figlio et al.
2014). Yet, we are unaware of prior research that credibly estimates the causal
effect of comprehensive health services for school-age children on their educa-
tional attainment in an industrialized country setting.
A major hurdle in estimating the effect of health care services on fertility and
education that has impeded prior research is that access to such services is not
exogenously assigned: unobserved factors correlated with the quality of health
care service availability are likely to be correlated with underlying fertility and
education outcomes. We overcome this problem by exploiting the timing of ex-
pansions of school-based health centers in different school districts in the U.S.
We obtained data from surveys of SBHCs conducted by the National Alliance
on School-Based Health Care in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011. Centers are fol-
lowed longitudinally, and in addition to being able to link them to the districts
they serve, we have information on when each center opened, its size in terms
of students served, hours open, staffing hours, and the specific health services
it provides to students. We focus on centers that serve high school students
(grades 9-12); overall, we observe 2,586 centers during our analysis period.
To identify the effect of SBHCs on teen fertility and dropout rates, we com-
bine the NASBHC survey data with county-level information on births as well
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as district-level information on high school completion. For births, we use U.S.
vital statistics data for which the smallest level of geographic identification is the
county. Our main analysis focuses on births among 15-18 year old women, as
they are most likely to have been recently enrolled in high school.4 We measure
treatment by whether there is any SBHC open in the county or school district
as well as by treatment intensity using the primary care staff hours per week
and total medical staff hours per week offered by all SBHCs in the county or
district. These measures provide a comprehensive depiction of the medical ser-
vices offered to students. As discussed further below, the process of opening
an SBHC is typically initiated by hospital administrators who may then spend
several years searching for a school to partner with, securing funding, and ren-
ovating a space to meet health clinic regulations. The timing of center entry
varies significantly across counties and school districts as a result.
There are three potential threats to identification of the causal effects of
SBHC services on teen fertility and dropout rates. First, the timing of center en-
try might be endogenous. In theory, this could bias estimates in either direction;
centers might be opening when local officials are relatively resourceful, or when
they are worried about unusually high rates of teen pregnancy or high school
dropouts. Event study analyses provide extensive evidence that the timing of
the initial center entering in a county or school district is not endogenous with
respect to pre-treatment trends in our outcomes of interest. We therefore exploit
the variation in timing across counties and school districts in initial center entry
to identify how SBHC services affect teen outcomes. Second, yearly service level
variation after initial entry might be endogenous. Event study analyses suggest
this is indeed the case: services hours are targeted to areas that are experienc-
4We refer to birth rates among women aged 15-18 as “teen birth rates” throughout this anal-
ysis.
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ing higher birth rates, especially right after an initial center opens. We address
this issue by estimating an instrumental variables model that uses information
about the first center opening in a district/county to predict future service level
variation in that district/county. Third, there might be omitted variables, con-
temporaneous policies or shocks affecting outcomes in the low-income commu-
nities where SBHCs locate. All of our analyses control for state-by-year fixed
effects, so state-level policy changes and state-level shocks are not a concern.
Robustness checks add controls for various types of year-specific income cate-
gories; these robustness checks confirm that the main results are not influenced
by omitted variables differentially affecting low-income populations. Falsifica-
tion tests also indicate that coincidental policies or shocks are not a source of
concern: we do not see fertility effects for women in their early 20s when health
centers opened in local high schools, and we do not find any relationship be-
tween SBHCs and per pupil expenditures in schools.
Our findings suggest that SBHCs reduce teen fertility, with relatively large
reductions among younger teens, African American teens, and Hispanic teens.
Our baseline estimates show that center entry in a county reduces the teen birth
rate by 1.3 per 1,000, which is a 3.0% reduction relative to the baseline birth rate.
Just using the existence of a center in a county ignores potentially-important
service differences across centers. Our preferred estimates examine the effects
of changing the primary care or total medical staff hours offered by SBHCs;
to facilitate interpretation, we scale the treatment effects to reflect the impact
of adding services equivalent to an average-sized SBHC. These results indicate
that service changes equivalent to opening an average-sized center lead to a
2.4%-2.7% reduction in births per 1,000 women aged 15-18. The IV results are
larger: in our preferred model an average-sized center reduces teen birth rates
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by over 5%. We prefer the IV estimates because they address the endogeneity
concerns related to SBHC service level variation as well as any attenuation bias
from measurement error. Further analysis provides suggestive evidence con-
cerning which types of services are most important for reducing teen fertility.
The largest effects come from the subset of SBHCs that offer on-site prescrip-
tions of hormone-based contraceptives. Providing teenage girls with access to
hormone-based contraceptives, with reduced parental involvement, might be
an effective way to reduce teen births.
Despite the effectiveness of SBHCs in reducing teen pregnancies, we find no
evidence that they substantially reduce high school dropout rates. We measure
high school dropout rates using reported high school diplomas awarded at the
district level and U.S. Census and American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Our estimates are universally small in magnitude, vary in sign across specifica-
tions, and are only rarely statistically significantly different from zero. Even for
the largest of these point estimates, we can rule out at the 5% level that increas-
ing primary care service hours equivalent to an average-sized SBHC would re-
duce high school dropout rates by more than 1.0 percent. The high school years
might be too late in a child’s life to substantially alter the likelihood of high
school completion via improved access to primary health care.
Our most economically significant finding is that school-based health centers
produce large declines in teen childbearing. There is much policy interest in
reducing teen birth rates in the U.S. due to their high levels and the potentially
high private and social costs associated with teen births (Kearney and Levine,
2012). At least for this outcome, these centers are quite effective at altering teen
health. That they do not translate into changes in high school dropout rates
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underscores the importance of more research examining the role of health care
services for school-age children in determining educational attainment.
3.2 School-based Health Centers
School-based health centers (SBHCs) are health clinics that are located inside
specific schools or elsewhere on the school’s property.5 They are funded by var-
ious combinations of state and federal grants, in-kind donations by hospitals,
donations from private foundations, and reimbursements from Medicaid and
private insurance companies. School districts themselves typically do not pro-
vide direct financial support to SBHCs, other than providing space for them on
school grounds. While SBHCs have been in existence since the 1930s, a surge
in SBHC openings during the 1990’s coincided with many states increasing
revenues available to SBHCs using newly-available funds from tobacco com-
pany lawsuit settlements, cigarette taxes, and Maternal-and-Child-Health block
grants from the federal government. Figure 1 shows the distribution of opening
years for SBHCs in our data. Almost 83% of these SBHCs opened after 1989,
with over 38% opening after 1997. Figure 2 shows the number of SBHCs in our
data in each state relative to the size of the school-aged population in 2011. SB-
HCs are located in all but nine (mostly small) states. An eclectic mix of states
such as Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, and West
5These are distinguished from community health centers that began opening in the mid-
1960s to provided care to low-income communities as part of President Johnson’s war on
poverty. Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015) exploit the timing of the opening of these centers
and show they had a significant effect on mortality rates of people over 50 years old. Relative to
these centers, school-based health centers are focused on a much younger population with dif-
ferent health needs, and their prevalence is much more recent than general community health
care centers. However, both types of centers are focused on bettering the provision of health
care services to low-income communities.
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Virginia have relatively large numbers of SBHCs per high school-aged child.
While cross-state variation in funding policies influenced the growth of SB-
HCs, our methodological approach is to exploit within-state variation in the
timing of SBHC entry. SBHCs provide services for two main types of students:
urban students in school districts serving low-income populations and rural
students. As of school year 2010-2011, 54% of the centers were located in ur-
ban schools, with 28% located in rural schools and 18% in more suburban areas.
Sixty-three percent of the students exposed to a school-based health center are
of either African American or Hispanic descent.6 Across similar communities
in the same state, the provision of SBHCs may vary depending on relationships
between school principals and local health administrators. While the specific
requirements differ by state, typically it takes several steps to open the SBHC:
1) conduct a needs assessment to determine lack of access to health care among
students, 2) build a partnership between a school and the local health organiza-
tion (e.g., hospital, non-profit health clinic), 3) generate a funding plan, 4) find
appropriate space in the school, 5) obtain approval from the state/local gov-
ernment, 6) develop a staffing plan that includes mechanisms for coordinating
services across agencies, and 7) modify the space in the school so that it meets
code for health clinics and has proper equipment. The impetus to open a center
in a specific location can come from local health officials, school administrators,
or community leaders. States typically require that an application for a new cen-
ter is sent directly from the health organization that would operate the center,
along with appropriate sign-off from the school district that would host the cen-
ter. Given the bureaucratic and organizational hurdles associated with opening
a center, it usually takes several years between initial conception and a center
6Online Appendix Table A-1 shows characteristics of counties and school districts with and
without a SBHC by 2011.
139
opening. The unpredictability of both the location and timing of center open-
ings provides the variation we need to estimate our models, and we conduct
several tests to explore whether this variation is exogenous.
The focus of SBHCs is on providing primary care services for student popu-
lations. The majority of centers are attached to high schools, but many centers
also provide services for students outside of the school to which they are at-
tached: only 38% of centers report that use is restricted to students in the school.
About a quarter of the SBHCs allow for families of the student to use the ser-
vices, and 25% also allow use by school personnel. Almost 35% of the centers
also report that they serve students from other schools. In some cases, the ser-
vices provided are free to students. However, most centers operate more like
traditional clinics and charge patients for services rendered. Due to the loca-
tion of SBHCs, most students exposed by these centers are Medicaid-eligible,
though, so these fees are unlikely to pose a large constraint to access. This fea-
ture of SBHCs highlights the fact that the treatment we examine is mostly due
to health care provision, not due to health insurance access per se.
All centers provide primary care services, but the exact mix of services varies
across centers. The distribution of primary care services is shown in Panel A of
Figure 3. About 85% of centers also provide some form of reproductive health
service. Panel B of Figure 3 shows the distribution of reproductive health ser-
vices other than contraception provided by SBHCs in 2007-2008. Mostly, these
services include testing for sexually transmitted infections, preventive care such
as gynecological exams, PAP tests and prenatal care, as well as both abstinence
and birth control counseling. Almost 40% of centers also are allowed to either
prescribe or dispense contraceptives of some form directly, but many of the re-
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mainder refer students to other providers for contraception. Table 1 shows de-
tailed information about the types of contraceptive services SBHCs offer. Over
37% either can dispense or prescribe the birth control pill, and another 30% can
refer patients to other doctors for a prescription. Condoms are dispensed at over
30% of centers, and emergency contraception or plan B also is available either
directly or through referral at the majority of SBHCs. Table 1 highlights that a
large proportion of SBHCs provide significant contraceptive services but that
there is considerable heterogeneity across centers in the types of contraceptives
to which they give student access and the method by which students can access
contraceptives. Because of the location of these centers, they may provide par-
ticularly important access to contraceptive services for female students who do
not need to be taken to them by parents or guardians.7
In addition to primary care and reproductive health services, many school-
based health centers have mental health and dental services. Eighty-four per-
cent of centers provide oral health education, and 57% have dental screenings.
Only about 20% conduct dental examinations, but the majority are able to refer
students to dentists if they require dental services. Over 70% of health centers
also have mental health providers on staff, with the remainder typically pro-
viding referrals through the primary care doctors for students who need mental
health services.
Overall, SBHCs give students access to primary care doctors and nurses as
well as more specialized medical services depending on the center. Since most
centers can refer patients to more specialized doctors, the increased access to
7Currently, 26 states allow all minors over 12 to consent to birth control without their parents’
approval. Another 20 states allow minors to consent under certain circumstances, such as being
deemed “mature” or having a health issue. The remaining four states have no statutes regarding
minor access to birth control.
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primary care services that SBHCs represent is likely to increase health care op-
tions substantially for students who are served by these centers. The focus of
this paper is on evaluating whether this increased access to health care affects
teen birth rates and high school dropout rates. The main mechanisms through
which these centers could impact student educational attainment are twofold.
First, access to health care services could lead directly to better student health
outcomes. To the extent that health enters positively in the production function
for educational achievement, these health increases could drive better educa-
tional outcomes. A potential concern with this mechanism is that teens may be
quite healthy. If high school students do not require much access to health care,
then SBHCs will have little impact on them, at least in the short-run.
Despite the fact that high school corresponds with a relatively healthy part
of the lifecycle, there is evidence that a substantial fraction of teens have health
problems that would benefit from medical interventions. Figure 4 shows tabu-
lations from the 2011 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS), which
is a nationally-representative health survey conducted by the CDC that focuses
on students in high school. As the figure demonstrates, the incidence of mental
health issues and the prevalence of sexual activity amongst high school students
is high. For example, almost 30% of students report feeling sad or hopeless,
over 15% report considering suicide, and about 7% have attempted suicide. Al-
most 60% of these students have had sex, and many have done so without a
condom or without any birth control. Furthermore, a non-trivial proportion
of the sample reports being a victim of physical violence, and incidence rates
of asthma and obesity are also high. Figure 4 shows racial/ethnic differences
in these health outcomes as well, with black and Hispanic students reporting
outcomes consistent with lower health levels and more risky behaviors. As dis-
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cussed above, most health centers offer reproductive services that include birth
control as well as pregnancy and STI testing. In addition, most offer mental
health services. The tabulations in Figure 4 are suggestive that such services
would be of value to many high school students.
There is further evidence of unmet health care needs among lower-SES high
school students. In a review of the public health literature, Flores (2010) reports
that the preponderance of work points to large disparities in adolescent health
outcomes and health care access across the socioeconomic spectrum. Harris et
al. (2006) show that about 25% of black and Hispanic adolescents report needing
medical attention but not receiving it, as compared to about 18% for whites.
About 7-10% of these adolescents also report being in poor health. Hence, there
is ample evidence that teens in the U.S. have health outcomes and unmet health
care needs that could lead SBHCs to have a substantial positive impact on their
health and on their subsequent educational attainment.
Access to affordable primary health care can also reduce the household’s ex-
posure to financial risk from an adverse health event (Gross and Notowidigdo,
2011; Leininger, Levy and Schanzenbach, 2009; Finkelstein et al. 2012). Receipt
of primary care services may make students healthier and allow them to ad-
dress health problems before they worsen and cost more to treat. This effect of
primary care service provision thus could better the financial position of house-
holds, which can lead to higher student academic attainment.8
Despite the rise in SBHC prevalence in the US over the past several decades,
there is no nationally-representative study of these centers using methods that
can plausibly identify their causal effects on health and education. Several prior
8See Michelmore (2013) and Dahl and Lochner (2012) for evidence on the effect of family
income on student academic attainment.
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analyses have examined the relationship between SBHCs and student health
and educational achievement, and they typically show a positive relationship
between SBHCs and these outcomes (Kerns et al. 2011; Walker et al., 2010;
Geierstanger et al., 2004; Kisker and Brown, 1996). However, these studies have
several serious shortcomings that we seek to address in this paper. First, all pre-
vious analyses have focused on identifying the effect of one SBHC or of several
in a particular city or school district. No study of which we are aware has es-
timated SBHC impacts on health and academic outcomes for the entire United
States. Results from the current literature thus are hard to generalize to larger
state or national populations. Second, the previous work in this area largely has
been cross-sectional in nature, either comparing outcomes across students who
do and do not use the SBHC within a school or comparing student outcomes
across schools with and without a health center. It is unlikely the set of con-
trol variables in the data sets used are sufficient to control for selection across
schools or into SBHC use within a school. Thus, using cross-sectional methods
in this context makes it very difficult to identify the causal effect of SBHCs on
student educational attainment.
One recent study of SBHCs in New York City instead identifies the effects
of SBHCs by examining longitudinal changes in academic performance among
students who enrolled in elementary and middle schools shortly before and
shortly after those schools added SBHCs (Reback and Cox 2016). New York is
one of the only states in the country where SBHCs are restricted by law to only
serve the students enrolled in the hosting school. They find evidence that the
addition of SBHCs to elementary or middle schools increases students’ scores
on standardized tests in math and language arts. Their findings suggest that the
health benefits from SBHCs could increase educational attainment, particularly
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if positive effects on middle school students do not fade during high school. Our
work complements this analysis by examining the impacts of SBHCs serving
high school students, by examining teen fertility, by providing both short term
and longer term estimates, and by providing estimates for the entire US.
3.3 Data
The data for this analysis come from four sources: 1) National Alliance on
School-based Health Care National Census of School-based Health Centers, 2)
Live birth data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Na-
tional Vital Statistics System, 3) National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
data on high school diplomas awarded and enrollment, and 4) U.S. Census and
American Community Survey data on school district dropout rates. Below, we
discuss each of these data sources in turn.
3.3.1 NASBHC Census of School-based Health Centers
Beginning in fall 1998, the National Alliance on School-based Health Care be-
gan surveying school-based health centers about their locations, staffing levels,
services provided, usage and the timing of when they first opened. They re-
peated their survey in fall 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011. The survey is designed to
be a census in the sense that all centers known to NASBHC are contacted, but
there is considerable non-response. In the 1998 survey, 70% of centers contacted
responded, and the response rates were 85%, 78%, 64% and 77% in 2001, 2004,
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2007 and 2011 surveys, respectively.9 Across all surveys, we observe 2,586 cen-
ters serving high school students in 566 school districts throughout the United
States. This number of centers is larger than the total number of centers that
exists in any one year, which is due to center closures over time.
Each NASBHC survey contains detailed information on center location (e.g.,
zip code), services, utilization, days and hours open, what populations the cen-
ter serves, and staffing hours for both primary care and total medical staff. Pri-
mary care staff includes physicians and nurse practitioners only. Total medical
staff hours include mental health, dental care, nurse and physicians’ assistant
hours in addition to primary care. Thus, for survey respondents, we have com-
prehensive information on the level and types of services the center provides
for students.
We link centers over time across the different surveys to obtain a panel of
SBHCs. The center identification codes NASBHC used changed over time, so
that a unique id does not exist for each center. Instead, we match centers over
time by linking them to the school districts in which they are located. Matching
centers to school districts is complicated by the way centers report the schools
that they serve. Since the survey question is open-ended, many centers give re-
sponses such as “all schools in district” or “only our schools” without naming
the district or individual schools. Instead of relying directly on school names
for the match, we use the geographic information about the center that was pro-
vided in the 1998, 2007 and 2011 waves. Centers in these waves were matched
to school districts based either on their zip code or on their city and state. A
9Much of this non-response is actually due to center closures. Although NASBHC attempts
to purge their roles of closed centers, which centers close is difficult to observe. Thus, the re-
sponse rates among currently active centers is likely to be significantly higher than what is
reported here.
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school district was considered a match if it was the only district that shared this
geographic information. Centers that could not be linked to school districts in
this way, either because the geographic information applied to more than one
district or the survey was missing information, were hand-matched to districts
by using the NCES online school search tool. Centers were then matched to
each other over time using the name of the center, the school in which the cen-
ter is located, the schools the center serves, and the opening year. A center was
matched across time if the name of the center and state were the same or the
school location, name, and state were the same. Due to changes in reported
names or school location, many centers had to be hand-matched across waves.
It is important to highlight that the aggregation to the school district level means
that errors made in matching specific centers to each other over time will not af-
fect our results as long as we correctly link centers to school districts. Given the
data limitations in the NASBHC data, using school-district level aggregations
likely leads to less measurement error than if we had attempted to match each
center to a specific school.
One of the drawbacks of our data is that we observe service and staffing
levels only for the years in which the surveys were completed. However, for
all but 51 centers (or 1.9% of the total centers observed), the opening date is
contained in the survey.10 These center opening dates allow us to use outcome
data from before 1998. As Figure 1 demonstrates, 62% of the centers in our data
were opened prior to 1998, so the use of these earlier data increases the amount
of treatment variation considerably. For observations prior to 1998, we assume
each SBHC has the service level equal to the first time we observe the center in
the data. We linearly interpolate center service levels between surveys as well.
10We drop these 51 centers from our analysis, since we have no way of knowing when they
first opened.
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Furthermore, we assume a center closed when we no longer observe it in our
data.11
3.3.2 Vital Statistics Birth Data
Data on all live births in the US come from the birth certificate files of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention National Vital Statistics Data.12 For each
birth, we observe the race and ethnicity of the mother as well as her age. For
mothers who live in counties with more than 100,000 residents, we also observe
the county of birth. Recall from Section 2 that SBHCs are concentrated in urban
and rural areas. The fact that geographic identifiers only are available for large
counties means that our birth analysis is most relevant for the urban school-
based health centers. The birth and SBHC data are merged based on the county
of the SBHC. To the extent that school districts split county lines, we assign each
center to the county in which it is located.
The vital statistics data give us information on all live births in 524 counties
in the US from 1990 through 2012. Beginning the analysis in 1990 captures 86%
of the SBHC opening variation in our data; we are loathe to extend the analysis
sample back farther given that the first year we observe SBHC characteristics is
in 1998. We construct “teen” birth rates – births per 1,000 women aged 15-18
– in each county and month.13 To account for the timing differences between
11The way we identify center closings likely confounds closure and survey non-response for
centers that respond to the survey in an earlier year but not subsequently. However, this method
will bias our estimates towards zero to the extent that some centers we code as closing are still
providing services to students. Furthermore, our instrumental variables strategy should ac-
count for any measurement error induced by center closures and non-response, as the instru-
ments we use are unlikely to be related to closure or non-response.
12These data are available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data access/Vitalstatsonline.htm.
13For the remainder of the analysis, we refer to the birth rate among 15-18 year old women as
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conception and birth, we link all births at the month-year level to the school
year in which the conception took place assuming a 9 month gestation time. We
then aggregate births to the school year-county level to construct a birth rate for
each county and school year.
3.3.3 Common Core of Data High School Diploma Data
Since 1998, the National Center of Education Statistics has collected information
on the number of high school diplomas awarded in each school district. These
data are reported as part of the Common Core of Data (CCD).14 We use these re-
ports, combined with grade-specific enrollments, to construct a measure of high
school dropout rates. Specifically, we estimate the dropout rate for a given grade
as 1− Diplomast
Enrollmentt−g
, where g∈ [0, 1, 2]. For example, when g=2, this formula yields
the 10th grade dropout rate. In particular, it is the proportion of 10th graders in
the district from two years ago that do not receive a high school diploma this
year. Similarly, we calculate the 11th and 12th grade dropout rate using once-
lagged enrollment of 11th graders and year t enrollment of 12th graders. We
calculate these rates for each school district in the US, from 1998-2010.15
Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) and Mishel and Roy (2006) provide detailed
discussions of the problems arising from using the CCD diploma data to calcu-
late graduation rates.16 The biggest problem with these data is associated with
the use of 9th grade enrollments, as there is a substantial amount of grade reten-
tion in 9th grade. This grade retention is more prevalent for low-SES students
the ”teen birth rate.”
14The CCD diploma data are available at http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/drpagency.asp.
15Because diploma data are from the spring of each year and the SBHC surveys are in the fall,
we lag all graduation rates by one year to align them with the SBHC service data.
16See also the comprehensive review of U.S. high school graduation rates in Murnane (2013).
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as well, and it leads one to understate graduation rates, especially for minority
students. Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) show that when one uses 8th grade
enrollments instead, this bias is reduced considerably. We instead ignore 9th
grade enrollment and focus on enrollment in higher grades that are less prob-
lematic. To the extent that SBHCs affect the likelihood of being held back in
9th grade, we thus will miss some of the ways in which these centers influence
students’ paths through high school. However, our estimate should not be se-
riously affected by the retention rate problems that come with using 9th grade
enrollment data.
The CCD diploma data cannot distinguish between actual dropout rate
changes and changes in the timing of degree receipt and student transferring
behavior. Thus, this dropout rate will predominantly measure “on time” high
school graduation for those in each grade cohort net of transfer. If there is a net
loss of the 10th-12th grade cohorts due to transferring out of the school district,
however, this measure will show an increase in dropout rates. For transferring
to create a bias in our estimates, it would have to be correlated with SBHC en-
try/exit and service changes. While possible, we do not believe such effects
would be large. The complications induced by these data are balanced by the
fact that they are yearly, allowing us to exploit more within-district variation in
SBHC services. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of dropout rates calculated
using these data.
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3.3.4 US Census and ACS Data
We supplement our graduation analysis with 1990 and 2000 Census data as well
as with the 2005-2011 American Community Survey. Using these data, we cal-
culate for each school district the proportion of 14-17 year olds living in the
school district who are not enrolled in school and who do not have a high school
degree. This is the 14-17 year old dropout rate. The 18-19 dropout rate is calcu-
lated similarly using those aged 18-19. These data provide several advantages
over the diploma data. First, they allow us to distinguish between males and fe-
males. Given our focus on teen fertility rates and the fact that males are more at
risk of dropping out, it is useful to examine dropout effects by gender. Second,
high school degrees in the Census/ACS include GEDs while the diploma data
do not. Even though the returns to a GED are lower than the returns to a tradi-
tional high school diploma (Heckman and LaFontaine 2006), it is important to
distinguish between any shifts across degree types versus any change in over-
all degree attainment. To the extent that the Census/ACS and CCD graduation
rate estimates yield similar results, it suggests that our estimates are not being
driven by changes in the proportion of students receiving a GED. A drawback
of these data is that we only observe each school district a maximum of 4 times:
in 1990, 2000, 2005-2007 and 2008-2011. But, combined with the diploma results,
this analysis provides a more complete picture of the effect of SBHCs on high
school completion. Because the ACS data are for a period of 3 years, we use the
average SBHC service level over those 3 years for each school district when we
analyze these data. Descriptive statistics of the dropout rates in the Census and
ACS are shown in Table 2.
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3.4 Empirical Methodology
Our methodological approach to overcoming the inherent endogeneity between
health care access, health and educational attainment is to use the variation in
student exposure to health care services that is driven by school-based health
center openings and the scope of the services provided. Our baseline model is
a straightforward difference-in-differences design that uses variation only from
the initial center entry in an area. We compare changes in birth or graduation
outcomes in areas that receive their first center relative to areas that do not re-
ceive their first center in that year. Due to data limitations, our birth rate analy-
sis and completion rate analysis occur at different levels of aggregation. In the
birth data, the county is the most disaggregated level of geography available, so
this part of the analysis is done at the county level.17 In particular, we estimate
models of the following form:
Ycst = β0 + β1SBHCct + γc + δst + cst, (3.1)
where Ycst is the birth rate per thousand women aged 15-18 in county c in year
t,18 γ is a set of county fixed effects, and δ is a set of state-by-year fixed ef-
fects that control for any state-level unobserved shocks in each year as well as
state-year level policies (such as Medicaid). The variable SBHC is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if there is a school-based health center in the county and is
zero otherwise. Thus, the variable of interest in equation (1) is β1, which shows
the effect on the birth rate of a SBHC entering the county.
17One benefit of using aggregated data is that our estimates account for both the direct ef-
fect of SBHCs on teen pregnancy and the indirect effects coming through peer influences that
Yakusheva and Fletcher (2015) show are important.
18We also have estimated models that use the log of the birth rate. These estimates are very
similar to those shown below and available from the authors upon request.
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The county fixed effects control for any fixed differences across counties in
birth rates that are correlated with SBHC treatment. The identifying variation
for β1 comes only from differences in the timing of the first center opening across
counties. Identification of β1 thus rests on several assumptions that are com-
mon in difference-in-differences analyses. The first is that the decision to open
a center is uncorrelated with trends in teen birth rates. Put differently, counties
in which a SBHC will open in the near future should have the same outcome
trends as those that will not experience an initial opening in the near future. Of
particular concern is whether centers are put into schools where the teen birth
rate is declining. If so, equation (1) will not be able to distinguish treatment ef-
fects from differential secular relative trends. We do not believe, however, that
this concern is very relevant in this context. It is far more likely that SBHCs are
targeted toward schools that have declining health outcomes. As discussed in
Section 2, the timing of when centers open is likely to be related to lack of health
care access among students, the desire and ability of a principal or administra-
tor to partner with a local health care provider, space in the school, and demand
among the community for expanding health care access for low-income kids.
Many of these factors may be related to underlying trends in health or edu-
cational attainment, but the sign of any resulting bias would be towards zero.19
We test directly for whether center entry is related to pre-SBHC birth rate trends




ατI(t− t0 = τ)ct + γc + δst + cst. (3.2)
In equation (2), I(t− t0 = τ) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation
19We also note that if the timing of center openings were related to unobserved trends, our
birth rate and dropout rate estimates should be biased in the same direction. That we find
no effect on high school dropout rates but a large negative effect on teen fertility rates argues
against such selection.
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is τ years away from the first SBHC opening in the county and is equal to zero
otherwise. These variables are zero for counties that have no health centers in
the time period of our analysis. This event study model allows us to both test
for pre-treatment trends by examining α−5 − α−1 and to test for time-varying
treatment effects (given by α0 − α10) that might be missed in equation (1). We
focus on the event window from relative year -5 to 10 as outside that window
we have fewer observations with which to identify each relative time parameter.
We group together observations with event time less than -5 and observations
with event time greater than 10 in order to avoid altering the analysis sample.
The model includes all “never-treated” counties as well, which constitute the
implicit control group.
Another identification concern with difference-in-differences analyses is that
secular shocks or unobserved policies that correlate with the timing of the treat-
ment can bias the results. Such shocks are unlikely to be a factor in this analysis,
however. Since the timing of the treatment varies across counties, it is doubt-
ful secular shocks exist that are highly correlated with the timing of SBHC en-
try. That it takes several years for centers to open from when they are initially
conceived also makes it unlikely that they are systematically correlated with
county-level shocks. As well, the use of state-by-year fixed effects helps control
for any state-level policies or shocks that could be correlated with the timing
of treatment. Nonetheless, it could be the case that policies disproportionately
impacting low-income communities (such as welfare reform and EITC expan-
sions) are passed in similar time periods to when centers entered. In Section
5.1.2, we show our estimates are robust to controlling for separate time effects
for low-income counties and to allowing for different state-year fixed effects by
whether the county median income in 1990 is below that of the median county
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in the state. We also conduct falsification tests using birth rates among women
in their twenties that confirm that the birth effects are isolated to high-school-
aged women. The results of these falsification tests are inconsistent with the
idea that important alternative policies or secular trends were correlated with
the rollout of SBHCs.
The coefficient β1 in equation (1) yields the average effect of center entry.
This treatment specification omits a large amount of heterogeneity across cen-
ters, though, in the amount and type of services offered. From a policy per-
spective, we are interested more in the services offered through the centers than
the centers per se. We therefore estimate versions of equation (1) that replace
SBHCct with Service Hoursct, which are measures of the amount of services pro-
vided by each center relative to the underlying size of the student population.
Specifically, we focus on two different service measures: Primary Care Staff
Hours per week and Total Medical Staff Hours per week. These services are
set to zero prior to an SBHC opening. The Total Medical Staff Hours differ from
Primary Care Hours due to hours from mental health staff, dental staff, physi-
cian’s assistants and nurses. In the Online Appendix Table A-2, we also show
estimates that use Days per Week or Hours per Week as the service measures.
As Primary Care Staff and Total Medical Staff Hours are the most comprehen-
sive measures of the medical services provided by school-based health centers,
they are our preferred treatment variables. Means of these treatment measures
are shown in Table 2.
Throughout the analysis, the SBHC service variables are constructed by first
summing the total amount of each service measure for each county or school
district and year. For example, we calculate the total number of medical staff
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service hours in the county and year across all centers in the county. We then
divide by the total high-school-aged population in the county.20 This provides
a measure of the hours of SBHC medical services per high-school-aged student
in the county. Finally, we re-scale the measure to be representative of a typical
center by multiplying by 1000, which is the approximate average size of a high
school in our sample. The method is identical for our school district level regres-
sions, where we sum over districts rather than counties. Using the primary care
or medical staff hours as our treatment measures, β1 is interpreted as the effect
on the birth rate of SBHCs increasing their service levels by an additional hour.
When multiplied by the average SBHC service level, this estimate shows the ef-
fect of a service increase equivalent to one more average-sized center opening.
We focus on this parameter for policy purposes.
Variation in primary care and medical staff hours comes from two differ-
ent sources: 1) openings/closings of SBHCs with different service levels and
2) changes in service levels among open centers from year to year. In addi-
tion to the identification assumptions discussed above, we now require that de-
cisions about the amount of services each center offers are uncorrelated with
pre-treatment trends in teen birth rates. If service levels rise in areas that were
already beginning to experience rising or falling teen birth rates, then our esti-
mates of β1 will be biased.
We address these core identification concerns in several ways. First, we esti-





ατService Hoursct0 ∗ I(t− t0 = τ) + γc + δst + cst. (3.3)
20Our high-school-aged population count includes individuals between the ages of 15 and 19.
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The Service Hours variable in equation (3) is set to the first observed service level
in that county. That is, we set it equal to the service level observed when τ=0,
denoted t0. This model thus tests for selection related to initial service levels as
well as time-varying treatment effects by initial service levels. We also estimate
a version of this model in which we allow Service Hours to vary over time after
initial entry, similar to how it is specified in equation (1). Comparing the post-
entry estimates across these two versions of this model provides evidence on
whether post-entry variation in service levels is exogenous.
Second, in order to account for the potential endogeneity of year-to-year ser-
vice level variation, we employ an instrumental variables strategy. We instru-
ment Primary Care Staff Hours and Total Medical Staff Hours with an indicator
for whether there is a center in the county and with a quadratic trend in the
time since first center entry. This quadratic time trend is set to zero prior to the
first center entering a county. As long as center entry is uncorrelated with pre-
entry trends in birth rates, this instrument is valid. Thus, equation (2) is a direct
test of the validity of this IV approach. Critically, because the instruments do
not contain variation in service levels after the initial center is opened, they will
account for any endogeneity in equation (1) in year-to-year service levels.
Our analysis of high school dropout rates takes a very similar form as our
birth rate models. The main difference between the two is that, for high school
dropout rates, we observe outcomes at the school district level, rather than at
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the county level. We estimate the following models:








ατService Hoursdt0 ∗ I(t− t0 = τ) + γd + δst + dst. (3.6)
In equations (4)-(6), we now include district, rather than county, fixed effects.
The assumptions underlying the identification of the treatment parameters in
equations (4)-(6) are essentially identical to those for equations (1)-(3), except in-
stead of there being no differential county-level relative trends, here there must
be no differential district-level trends. Equations (5) and (6) allow us to test
for such trends as well as for time-varying treatment effects. We also estimate
instrumental variables models akin to those at the county level to account for
any endogeneity associated with yearly variation in SBHC service levels in our
dropout analysis.
A final potential methodological issue is the presence of measurement error
in our service hours treatment measures. One source of measurement error is
the fact that, while the NASBHC National Census is designed to cover all health
centers, there is not complete coverage in every year. The use of multiple years
of data combined with information on the date of opening of the centers should
mitigate this problem. But, it is possible there are health centers we do not ob-
serve in our data and some we code as closing when they still exist. To the extent
that some districts and counties are more heavily treated than our data show,
this should attenuate our OLS estimates. The instrumental variables model es-
timates should avoid similar attenuation, however, because the instruments are
unlikely to be correlated with center closure or with survey non-response.
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A second source of measurement error is that prior to 1998, the first year
of NASBHC data, we cannot observe changes in the level of services provided.
For all centers opened before 1998, we use the first observed service levels (typ-
ically from the 1998 survey). This could produce further measurement error in
the Service Hours variables. Finally, aggregation to the county and school dis-
trict levels could produce measurement error because many students in each
county and district do not have centers in their own school buildings. Some
aggregation would be appropriate even if it were not necessitated by the data,
because 62% of centers are open not only for students in the hosting schools
but also for other community residents. Furthermore, SBHCs are concentrated
amongst the lowest-SES schools in counties and districts, which also are schools
in which teen pregnancy and dropout rates are most prevalent.21 This argu-
ment supports our contention that the aggregated data can provide informative
estimates of the relationship between school-based health centers, teen child-
bearing, and educational attainment.
21We also note that it would be exceedingly difficult to match schools to specific centers.
The school codes for centers are not consistently present in the data, and many centers have
administrative offices that occasionally answer the surveys. In some years the administrative
offices answer the surveys and in some years the centers themselves do. Aggregating to service





Table 3 presents the baseline estimates of the effect of school-based health cen-
ters on teen birth rates. Each cell in the table is from a separate regression, and
all standard errors are clustered at the county level. In the first column, we show
OLS estimates of β1 from equation (1). The top row shows results using an indi-
cator for the presence of any center in a county as the treatment measure. When
the first SBHC enters a county, the teen birth rate declines by 1.3 per 1000, which
represents a 3.0% percent decline. The remaining rows show estimates using
Primary Care Staff Hours and Medical Staff Hours as the treatment measures.
Across these two treatment variables, the table shows a consistent negative re-
lationship between SBHC service levels and teen birth rates. Ten additional
primary care staff hours or medical staff hours per week decreases teen births
by 2.18 or 1.08 per 1,000 respectively. A useful way to interpret these estimates is
to calculate their implications for the effect of opening an average-sized center.
To calculate such an effect, we multiply the estimates by the average amount of
services each center supplies (shown in Table 2) and then divide by the average
birth rate for this group. The estimates suggest that adding an average-sized
center in a county would reduce birth rates by 2.4 or 2.7%. The magnitude of
these estimates is similar to, if somewhat smaller than, the 6.8% decline in birth
rates among 18-19 year olds following Medicaid family planning waiver expan-
sions reported in Kearney and Levine (2009).
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A central concern with the type of difference-in-differences analysis we em-
ploy is that centers may be targeted at areas based on preexisting trends. Figure
5 shows the estimates of α from equation (2). We have excluded relative year -1
such that all estimates are relative to this year. The points in the figure show the
point estimates of α, while the lines extending from each point show bounds of
the 95% confidence intervals that we calculated using standard errors that are
clustered at the county level. There is no evidence of negative pre-treatment
trends in birth rates. The pre-treatment trend line is flat, especially within 5
years of center entry, and the pre-treatment coefficients are jointly insignificant
(p-value of 0.56). These results suggest that center entry is exogenous with re-
spect to teen birth rate trends.
The second pattern evident in Figure 5 is that the long-run effects of SBHCs
are much larger than the short-run effect. These are at least three potential ex-
planations for these rising effects. First, repeated exposure during all four years
of high school should produce larger effects for students than exposure for a
smaller number of years. Second, centers may take time to ingrain themselves
in the community. Third, many counties initially opening a center later expand
their services and have subsequent center openings. Controlling for state-by-
year effects, we find that county-level service hours hit their peak 5 years after
the first center opens and district-level service hours hit their peak 8 years after
the first center opens.22
While the timing of center openings is exogenous with respect to pre-existing
teen fertility rate trends, the amount of services they offer are correlated with
22These tabulations come from event study analyses of how service levels vary after initial
center entry. Online Appendix Table A-6 shows similar estimates that impose a quadratic time
trend. While service levels grow modestly in the several years following initial center entry, the
majority of the service level variation is driven by the timing of first entry.
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these trends. Both initial service levels and post-entry service level variation ap-
pear to be related to pre-entry fertility trends (as displayed in Online Appendix
Figure A-1).23 More services appear to be targeted towards areas experiencing
increasing teen fertility rates, which attenuates the OLS estimates that use ser-
vice hours as the treatment measure. To account for the endogeneity of service
levels, we instrument for Primary Care Staff Hours or Medical Staff Hours with
the timing of the first center opening. Our instrumental variables are an indi-
cator variable for whether a center has opened and quadratic time trends for
the number of years since that first center opened. The results from these IV
models are shown in column (ii) of Table 3. The instruments are strong, with
first-stage F-statistics above 50.24 The estimates in column (ii) are considerably
larger in absolute value than the OLS estimates and are statistically significantly
different from zero at the 5% level. The larger estimates are due to the fact that
the instruments account for the targeting of services based on teen fertility rate
trends. In our IV models, opening an average-sized center reduces teen birth
rates by over 5%. On the whole, the results in Table 3 tell a consistent story that
opening an SBHC in a county has a sizable negative effect on teen birth rates on
the order of 3-5 percent.
At which age are teens’ fertility rates most affected by SBCHs? In theory,
SBHCs may affect both younger and older teens. On the younger end, middle
school students might also be able to visit centers. On the older end, the im-
pact of centers on sexual behavior and use of contraception may persist beyond
23Panels A and B of Figure A-1 presents evidence that counties with higher initial hours of
service have rising birth rates, although the estimates are not jointly significant. The increase in
birth rates continues for the first year after the center has opened. In Panels C and D, we hold
service hours constant at their initial levels both pre- and post-initial entry and show a steady
decline in birth rates after the first center opens. Taken together, these results suggests that
the counties continuing to experience relatively high birth rates tend to increase their centers’
service hours the most.
24First-stage coefficients are shown in Online Appendix Table A-6.
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a woman’s time in high school. Table 4 presents estimates by age, including
19 year olds and those under 15. For each age, we show estimates using the
same models and treatment measures as shown in Table 3. A consistent pat-
tern of results emerges in Table 4: health care services from SBHCs reduce teen
birth rates among teens of all ages, with the largest proportional effects coming
from the youngest teens. For example, in our 2SLS models predicting primary
care hours, an average-sized SBHC reduces births among girls 14 and under by
15.2%, among 15-year olds by 12.0% and among 16-year olds by 9.6%. Among
teens aged 17 or 18, the estimated effects are less than 6%. Across model specifi-
cations, the estimates for 19 year olds are much smaller and often are not statis-
tically significant; this is sensible, because many of these women are no longer
enrolled in high school and may thus have far less access to SBHCs. Propor-
tionally larger effects for younger women is an important finding, because the
private and social costs of teen fertility may be highest for the youngest moth-
ers. That SBHCs have such a large effect on young teen births suggests they
are most successful at reducing fertility among the population that is of highest
concern among policymakers.
SBHCs differ in the types of contraceptive services they offer. About 65% of
centers offer some type of birth control, either directly or through referral (see
Table 1). In Table 5, we show estimates of equation (1) that allow the effect of
Primary Care Staff Hours and Medical Staff Hours to differ by the type of con-
traceptive services offered by the clinic. We split centers into four groups that
together encompass the entire range of birth control offerings in US SBHCs:
centers that prescribe hormone-based contraceptives on-site,25 centers that re-
25Hormone-based contraceptives include birth control pills, Depo-Provera, implants, inter-
uterine devices (IUDs), the patch, and the NuvaRing. We code centers as offering hormone-
based contraceptives if they report offering birth control pills or report offering more than one
other form of hormone-based contraception.
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fer patients for hormone-based birth control but do not offer condoms on-site,
centers that refer patients for hormone-based birth control and offer condoms
on-site, and centers that do not offer any contraceptive services. Each column
in Table 5 comes from a separate regression. The results are broadly consistent
with SBHC services most affecting teen birth rates in centers that can prescribe
hormone-based birth control, but the estimates are somewhat imprecise and the
differences in slopes are not statistically significant at conventional levels. As
shown in Figure 3, many of the centers that do not offer contraception do offer
other family planning services, such as pregnancy tests, tests for sexually trans-
mitted infections, abstinence counseling, and general health advice that would
come with a primary care visit. Table 5 reveals that our results are not driven by
condom distribution, which is consistent with theoretical and empirical research
arguing that distributing condoms may not reduce (and might increase) teen
birth rates (Buckles and Hungerman 2014; Arcidiacono, Khwaja and Ouyang
2012). The results suggest that providing female teenages with easier access to
hormone-based contraception, access that does not require them to go through
their parents, may substantially decrease teen fertility rates. SBHCs might also
reduce rates of sexually transmitted diseases.26
School-based health centers may have a larger effect on African American
and Hispanic students than on white students because these centers are targeted
26We estimated state-level models of how SBHC services affect STD rates among teens using
data from the U.S. Center for Disease Control, which are shown in Online Appendix Table A-
5. Unlike birth data, data by age group for STDs are available at the state level and not the
county level (county level data are not disaggregated by age). We regressed rates of three STDS -
gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis – among 15-19 year olds on the number of hours of primary
care and total medical staff services provided by school-based health centers in that state, in
models controlling for state fixed effects and year effects. Although most of the estimates are
not statistically different from zero, they all point to sizable declines in STD rates among teens
when SBHC services in the state rise. While the need to aggregate to the state level leaves us
with too little power to draw definitive conclusions, these results are suggestive of positive
sexual health benefits of SBHCs in addition to lower teen birth rates.
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at low-income populations. Furthermore, African American and Hispanic teen
birth rates are much higher than those of whites, which makes these groups par-
ticularly important to study. In Table 6, we show OLS and IV estimates of the
effect of SBHCs on teen fertility rates by race/ethnicity. As in Table 3, we also
calculate percent effects of opening an average-sized center in order to compare
more easily across specifications. There is no evidence that opening a SBHC re-
duces teen birth rates among whites. The estimates are universally small and
are not statistically different from zero. This non-result is likely driven by the
fact that our treatment is at the county level, and white students in treated coun-
ties are far more likely to be in wealthier areas that do not have a center. Thus,
within a treated county, whites are less likely to be actually exposed to a center
than black and Hispanic students. As a result, SBHCs have a much larger im-
pact on birth rates among black and Hispanic teens. In the 2SLS models, adding
an average-sized SBHC reduces both black and Hispanic teen birth rates by
about 8%. Although the Hispanic estimates are imprecise, these results demon-
strate that school health centers affect teen births most among racial and ethnic
minorities who are more likely to live in low income areas that have such cen-
ters.
Robustness Checks
As discussed in Section 4, one of the central identification assumptions under-
lying our approach is that there are no secular trends or shocks that align with
the rollout of SBHCs across areas. Of particular concern is whether federal
or state governments passed policies disproportionately affecting cities with
higher concentrations of low-income residents during the same time period
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when many SBHCs opened. Many centers opened in the mid-1990s (Figure 1), a
time period in which welfare programs were reformed, the EITC was expanded,
and many states were expanding public health insurance programs. The state-
year fixed effects should account for these policy changes if they affected teen
birth rates in all counties similarly in a state and year. But these policies dispro-
portionately affected low-income communities, so they may have dispropor-
tionately affected teen birth rates in these communities. Table 7 shows several
robustness checks to compare with the results from Table 3. Columns (i) and (ii)
of Table 7 reveal that the results are robust to controlling for state-year-median
income fixed effects by allowing the state-year fixed effects to differ based on
whether a given county’s median income in 1990 was in the bottom half of all
counties in that state. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 7 show that the results are
also robust to controlling for both state-year fixed effects and differential year
fixed effects among the bottom 20% of counties in the US according to 1990 me-
dian earnings. The estimates in columns (i) through (iv) are similar to those in
Table 3, with somewhat larger estimates for the IV models. Table 7 thus sug-
gests that our main results are not upwardly biased by state or national policies
aimed at lower-income communities.
Next, we relax the linear functional form assumption between SBHC service
levels and outcomes. We do this by controlling separately for SBHC services
and for the existence of a center in the county rather than just the interaction
of these two measures. This is a more flexible way to model the treatment, and
the estimates in column (v) of Table 7 show that this leads to a slightly larger
percentage effect of SBHCs on teen fertility. If anything, the functional form
embedded in our baseline estimates leads to somewhat conservative estimates.
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Another check for the existence of secular trends or shocks that can bias our
estimates is to examine whether the short run effects of SBHCs are limited to
teen women. If older women also experience declines in birth rates when SB-
HCs enter, this could be evidence that the emergence of these centers is cor-
related with other factors affecting fertility rates for women of all ages. This
falsification test is complicated by the fact that many older women were treated
by SBHCs when they were younger and by the fact that many centers are open
to the community at large. We examine birth rates among women aged 20-24
and aged 25-29, and we restrict the sample to counties that did not have a center
when women in these age ranges were of high school age. We also restrict our
sample to states in which fewer than half of SBHCs report that they serve non-
students. Table 8 shows these results; for both age groups, there is no evidence
of a decline in births associated with SBHC entry. Indeed, birth rates among
25-29 year olds increased slightly in counties with greater intensity of services
from SBHCs. These results are not simply due to the change in sample: column
(iii) repeats the analysis on the same sample for 15-18 year olds. The results in
column (iii) are similar to those shown in column (i) of Table 3. That the fertil-
ity effects of SBHCs are isolated to those who are of high school age strongly
supports our identification strategy.
3.5.2 High School Dropout Results
The results presented above suggest that school-based clinics promote better
health outcomes among the teens exposed to them, at least in terms of birth
rates. A question of high importance is whether the changes in teen health
caused by these centers, in terms of pregnancy as well as other health outcomes,
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affect educational attainment. For students in the low-income areas targeted by
SBHCs, high school completion is a very important measure of educational at-
tainment, and it thus is the focus of our analysis. In Table 9, we present the
first evidence in the literature on the effect of providing primary care services
to low-income school-age children on high school dropout rates. Due to serial
correlation of errors within districts over time, all estimates are accompanied
by standard errors that are clustered at the school district level throughout the
dropout rate analysis.
The estimates in Table 9 are in percent terms, such that a coefficient of 1
would mean that a 1 hour increase in SBHC services would increase dropout
rates by 1 percent (rather than by 100% if the dependent variable was in per-
centage terms). Across all models and treatment measures, there is little evi-
dence that SBHCs or SBHC services affect high school dropout rates.27 Roughly
half of the estimates are positive, and only one of the estimates is statistically
significant at even the 10% level. Furthermore, the estimates are precise: the
95% confidence intervals show we can rule out declines in dropout rates from
an average-sized center of more than -0.5% for 10th grade, -1.0% for 11th grade,
and -0.7% for 12th grade.28
Figure 6 shows the event study estimates from equation (5) for 10th, 11th
and 12th grade dropout rates. Estimates of equation (6) using Medical Staff
Hours and Primary Care Staff Hours are shown in Online Appendix Figures
A-2 through A-4. These figures show that the null finding in Table 9 does not
27See Online Appendix Table A-6 for first-stage IV estimates.
28Similar to Table 5, we have estimated dropout models that examine heterogeneous SBHC
effects by birth control services offered. These are shown in Online Appendix Table A-3 and do
not point to any dropout rate effects in centers that offer access to certain types of contraception.
We also have examined effects of service hours among centers that offer mental health services.
We find no evidence of a dropout rate effect among centers that offer such services. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
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mask important heterogeneity in long-run effects or selection on pre-treatment
trends. Recall that our dropout rate sample begins in 1998, and as a result we
have much fewer observations pre-dating center openings. Thus, the standard
error bounds in the pre-treatment period are relatively large. Still, there is little
evidence of differential trends prior to center entry, and there is no evidence of
a dropout effect post-entry either in the short or long run.
Dropout rate estimates using Census/ACS data are shown in Table 10.29
Similar to Table 9, we fail to see statistically significant effects of SBHCs on high
school dropout rates. The one exception is for women aged 18-19. When we
use Primary Care and Medical Staff Hours as the treatment measure, there are
small, negative effects of an average-sized SBHC on the dropout rate. However,
these estimated effects are no more than one quarter of a percent, are not robust
to using a center indicator as the treatment measure, and are not statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level. Thus, we view these estimates as being consistent with
at most a very small impact of SBHCs on female high school dropout rates.
Our findings relate to a large literature examining the causal effect of teen
childbearing on educational outcomes. While there is a robust positive correla-
tion in most data sets between teen pregnancy and the likelihood of dropping
out of high school, obtaining credible causal evidence of this link has proven
difficult. The difficulty in establishing causality in this context is that it is very
hard to generate variation in teen pregnancy rates that is driven by factors that
do not affect schooling decisions as well. The literature on this subject, while
large, is quite mixed. Ribar (1994) uses age at menarche, OB-GYN availability
and state abortion rates as instruments and finds no effect of teen childbearing
29The limited number of observations per district preclude us from estimating IV models with
these data.
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on high school completion. Hotz, McElroy and Sanders (2005) use natural ex-
periments driven by miscarriages to generate plausibly exogenous variation in
teen births. They find a small negative effect of teen childbearing on high school
completion. Fletcher and Wolfe (2009) and Ashcraft, Fernandez-Val and Lang
(2013), however, argue that miscarriages are not exogenous events; they report
modest negative effects of adjusted teen birth effects on high school completion.
More closely related to this study, Klepinger, Lundberg and Plotnick (1999) use
state-level variation in family planning and abortion services/policies as instru-
ments for teen childbearing. They report that a teen giving birth reduces her
educational attainment by 2.5 years. Finally, there are several studies that use
sibling fixed effects as well as matching estimators to identify the effect of teen
childbearing. While the sibling fixed effects analyses come to very mixed con-
clusions (Ribar, 1999; Holmlund, 2005; Geronimus and Korenman, 1992), the
results from the matching literature point more consistently to a negative effect
of teen fertility on educational outcomes (Levine and Painter, 2003; Sanders,
Smith and Zhang, 2008). Our estimates, however, suggest that the teen birth
rate declines as well as the other health benefits teens receive as a result of these
centers do not substantially affect their likelihood of completing high school.
One explanation for the lack of an effect on dropout rates in the presence
of a teen birth effect could be that the birth estimates only use data from large
counties. To explore this potential explanation, in Online Appendix Table A-4
we estimate dropout rate models using the CCD diploma data in which we use
only the counties included in the birth rate analysis. The results are extremely
similar to baseline and show no effect of SBHC services on high school comple-
tion. Thus, the difference between the birth and dropout findings is not due to
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the differences in the samples used.30
Another alternative explanation for the lack of a dropout rate effect is that
SBHCs lead to a reduction in school resources that counteract any health ef-
fects. These centers are not financed by the school, and they do not use school
resources aside from the space that they are allocated. However, it still is pos-
sible that SBHCs use other school resources in a manner that might influence
our dropout rate estimates, or SBHC entry could be correlated with unobserved
trends in school resources. In Table 11, we examine whether SBHC service
variation is correlated with school expenditures using data from the 1998-2011
Common Core of Data. We see that there is no relationship between SBHC
services and per-student expenditures: the coefficients are small, precisely esti-
mated and are not statistically different from zero at even the 10% level. These
results suggest that there are no expenditure changes correlated with SBHC en-
try or service level variation that could bias the results and conclusions of our
analysis.
3.6 Conclusion
Disparities in health care access, health and educational attainment are large in
the United States, and policies to help close these gaps have received much pol-
icy attention. In this paper, we study school-based health centers that provide
primary health care services to students and families living in under-served
communities. Despite the rapid growth of SBHCs in the US over the past two
30In results available upon request, we also have estimated dropout rate models aggregated
to the county-year level rather than the district-year level. The estimates are very similar to
those shown in Table 9.
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decades, the effect of these centers on health and educational attainment has
not been studied previously in a manner that allows one to overcome the endo-
geneity problems related to center placement and use decisions. Using detailed
data from repeated surveys of SBHCs conducted by the National Alliance on
School-based Health Care, we construct district- and county-level measures of
SBHC services over time and employ difference-in-differences and instrumen-
tal variables techniques to identify the causal effect of these center services on
teen fertility rates and on high school dropout rates.
We present two broad findings from our empirical analysis. First, we show
the SBHCs have negative effects on fertility rates among teenage girls. Adding
a center with the average amount of SBHC services leads to a decrease in the
15-18 year old birth rate of about 5% relative to the baseline fertility rate. These
effects are larger for younger teens, and they are concentrated among African
American and Hispanic teens who are most likely to be exposed to a center.
Second, despite the large effect of SBHCs on teen fertility, we find no substantial
effect on high school dropout rates.
There are several implications of our results that are important for public
policy. One central message of our findings is that SBHCs are a useful tool to
reduce teen birth rates in the US, which are among the highest in the indus-
trialized world (Kearney and Levine 2012). Another important implication of
our results is that the provision of low-cost and convenient primary care ser-
vices through schools has at most a small effect on students’ decisions to drop
out of high school. This is not to suggest that providing such services does
not improve these students’ lives, but it does suggest that any positive health
benefits of this care do not immediately yield greater educational investment.
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High school health interventions may come too late to influence high school
completion; it is possible that expanding health care services to these children
when they were younger would have produced greater effects on high school
completion rates. Our work highlights the importance of further study of the
linkages between health care access, health outcomes and educational invest-
ment decisions to determine whether there are aspects of health care provision




Table 3.1: Percent of Health Centers Providing Different Contraceptive Services
Prescribed & Dispensed Prescribed Referrals No
Contraception Type On Site On Site Only Provision
Condoms 31.7 N/R N/R 68.3
Birth Control Pills 22.1 15.5 29.9 32.5
Birth Control Shot (Depo-Provera) 25.7 7.7 32.1 34.6
Implant 4.9 6.6 47.1 41.5
IUD 4.3 6.6 49.6 39.5
Patch 14.6 12.5 34.9 38.0
Ring (NuvaRing) 16.5 12.2 33.5 37.9
Emergency Contraception 20.0 11.0 30.2 38.8
Any Hormone Contraception 26.9 9.2 28.2 35.7
Any Contraception 31.7 6.6 26.4 35.3
Source: 2011 National Alliance on School-based Health Care census data. Hormone
contraception includes all listed methods except condoms and emergency contraception.
“N/R”=not relevant for that category.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables
Variable Mean SD
Treatment Measures
Center Indicator 0.174 0.379
Primary Care Staff Hours per Week 0.876 4.970
Primary Care Staff Hours per Week (in districts with any center) 4.881 10.761
Primary Care Hours with Hormones Prescribed On Site 2.054 7.442
Primary Care Hours with Hormones Referred, No Condoms 2.019 7.059
Primary Care Hours with Hormones Referred & Condoms Dispensed 0.136 1.389
Primary Care Hours with No Birth Control Services 0.665 3.289
Medical Staff Hours per Week 1.910 10.363
Medical Staff Hours per Week (in districts with any center) 10.987 22.762
Medical Staff Hours with Hormones Prescribed On Site 4.790 16.241
Medical Staff Hours with Hormones Referred, No Condoms 4.149 14.504
Medical Staff Hours with Hormones Referred & Condoms Dispensed 0.466 3.956
Medical Staff Hours with No Birth Control Services 1.569 7.170
Outcome Measures
Birth Rate per 1,000 Women Aged 15-18 44.28 21.60
10th Grade Dropout Rate (%) 22.39 12.18
11th Grade Dropout Rate (%) 15.43 9.79
12th Grade Dropout Rate (%) 9.28 8.75
14-17 Dropout Rate (%) 10.08 20.59
Female 14-17 Dropout Rate (%) 9.98 20.73
Male 14-17 Dropout Rate (%) 10.16 20.66
18-19 Dropout Rate (%) 15.50 8.20
Female 18-19 Dropout Rate (%) 14.81 7.34
Male 18-19 Dropout Rate (%) 15.82 7.34
Sources: School-based health center service data come from the 1998-2011 National Alliance
on School-based Health Care census data. Birth rates are calculated from US vital statistics
data from 1990-2012. The 10th through 12th grade dropout rates are calculated from National
Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data on school enrollments and high school
diplomas awarded from 1998-2011. The male and female dropout rates come from the 1990
and 2000 US Census as well as the 2005-2011 American Community Survey. Means of treat-
ment variables use the diploma data sample. All service hours are per 1,000 high school aged
student in the school district. The “in districts with any center” tabulations showing mean
service hours per 1,000 high school aged students among schools districts with any center.
Birth control service level means include only those schools districts with any center. All
tabulations are school district level means, except for the birth variables which are county
level means.
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% Effect of Average Center -3.0%
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.218
∗ -0.492∗∗
(0.115) (0.176)
% Effect of Average Center -2.4% -5.4%
Medical Staff Hours -0.108
∗∗ -0.228∗∗
(0.046) (0.079)
% Effect of Average Center -2.7% -5.7%
First-stage F-Stat (Primary Care) 51.34
First-stage F-Stat (Medical Staff) 53.93
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (1) as described in the text. The dependent variable
is 15-18 year old birth rates per 1000. Each cell comes from a separate regression. In column
(ii), Primary Care Staff Hours and Medical Staff Hours are instrumented with an indicator
for whether there is a center in the county as well as a quadratic in the number of years since
a center was first opened in the county (set equal to zero in the years prior to a center first
opening). All estimates include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions
are weighted by the high school aged population in the county. Percent effects for the Center
Indicator results are calculated by dividing the coefficient by the mean birth rate. The percent
effects for the staff hours estimates show the percent effect relative to the mean for a center
with the average number of primary care or medical staff hours. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.4: The Effect of SBHC Services on Teen Birth Rates per 1000 Women, by Age
Mother’s Age
≤14 15 16 17 18 19
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
OLS
Center Indicator -0.082
∗∗ -0.842∗∗ -1.229∗∗ -0.938∗ -1.836∗∗ -1.101∗∗
(0.025) (0.258) (0.409) (0.504) (0.595) (0.560)
% Effect of Average Center -8.9% -7.0% -4.8% -2.2% -2.8% -1.3%
OLS
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.016
∗∗ -0.129∗∗ -0.201∗∗ -0.222∗ -0.257∗∗ -0.194
(0.007) (0.052) (0.119) (0.113) (0.131) (0.128)
% Effect of Average Center -8.6% -5.3% -3.8% -2.5% -1.9% -1.1%
2SLS
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.029
∗∗ -0.296∗∗ -0.506∗∗ -0.285 -0.684∗∗ -0.374
(0.008) (0.091) (0.142) (0.184) (0.259) (0.257)
% Effect of Average Center -15.2% -12.0% -9.6% -3.2% -5.2% -2.1%
OLS
Medical Staff Hours -0.008
∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.128∗∗ -0.070
(0.003) (0.022) (0.041) (0.049) (0.058) (0.074)
% Effect of Average Center -9.1% -5.0% -4.1% -2.7% -2.2% -0.9%
2SLS
Medical Staff Hours -0.013
∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.230∗∗ -0.136∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.186
(0.004) (0.041) (0.064) (0.083) (0.116) (0.115)
% Effect of Average Center -15.0% -12.1% -9.8% -3.5% -5.4% -2.4%
Mean Birth Rate 0.93 11.98 25.85 43.41 64.57 86.31
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (1) as described in the text. Each cell comes from a
separate regression. The Center Indicator IV estimates instrument Primary Care Staff Hours
or Medical Staff Hours with an indicator for whether there is a center in the county as well
as a quadratic in the number of years since a center was first opened in the county (set equal
to zero in the years prior to a center first opening). All estimates include county and state-
by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population
in the county. Percent effects for the Center Indicator results are calculated by dividing the
coefficient by the mean birth rate for that age group. The percent effects for the staff hours
estimates show the percent effect relative to the mean for a center with the average number
of primary care or medical staff hours. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in
parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10%
level.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of SBHC Services on Teen Birth Rates per 1000 Women, by Birth
Control Services
Service Measure: Primary Care MedicalStaff Hours Staff Hours
Birth Control Services (i) (ii)
Hormones Prescribed On Site -0.628
∗∗ -0.239∗
(0.271) (0.134)
Hormones Referred, No Condoms -0.244 -0.144(0.161) (0.093)
Hormones Referred & -0.221 -0.108
Condoms Dispensed (0.551) (0.113)
No Birth Control Services -0.567 -0.238
∗∗
(0.363) (0.079)
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (1) as described in the text. The dependent variable is
15-18 year old birth rates per 1000. Each column comes from a separate regression. The birth
control service measures include the number of service hours of each type in centers with
the given birth control policy. The birth control policy groups are exhaustive and mutually
exclusive. All estimates include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions
are weighted by the high school aged population in the county. Standard errors clustered at
the county level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.6: The Effect of SBHC Services on Teen Birth Rates per 1000 Women, by
Race/Ethnicity
OLS 2SLS
Race/Ethnicity: White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Treatment Measure
Center Indicator 0.138 -1.400
∗ -3.204∗
(0.244) (0.828) (1.757)
% Effect of Average Center 0.7% -2.4% -4.7%
Primary Care Staff Hours 0.006 -0.157 -0.677
∗ -0.026 -0.928∗∗ -1.113
(0.052) (0.157) (0.373) (0.096) (0.375) (0.773)
% Effect of Average Center 0.2% -1.3% -4.8% -0.6% -7.9% -7.9%
Medical Staff Hours 0.004 -0.120
∗ -0.410∗∗ -0.011 -0.408∗∗ -0.532
(0.019) (0.067) (0.170) (0.043) (0.168) (0.347)
% Effect of Average Center 0.2% -2.3% -6.6% -0.6% -7.8% -8.5%
Mean Birth Rate 19.60 57.66 68.35 19.60 57.66 68.35
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable is 15-18 year old birth
rates per 1000. Each cell comes from a separate regression. In columns (iv)-(vi), Primary
Care Staff Hours and Medical Staff Hours are instrumented with an indicator for whether
there is a center in the county as well as a quadratic in the number of years since a center was
first opened in the county (set equal to zero in the years prior to a center first opening). All
estimates include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted by
the high school aged population in the county. Percent effects for the Center Indicator results
are calculated by dividing the coefficient by the mean birth rate for the age and racial/ethnic
group. The percent effects for the staff hours estimates show the percent effect relative to the
mean for a center with the average number of primary care or medical staff hours. Standard
errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5%
level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.7: The Effect of SBHC Services on Teen Birth Rates – Robustness Checks
State-Year- Year-Bottom Allowing
Median Income 20% Income for Level
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Shifts
OLS IV OLS IV OLS




% Effect of Average Center -2.8% -2.9%
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.216
∗∗ -0.648∗∗ -0.193∗ -0.506∗∗ -0.121




% Effect of Average Center -2.4% -7.1% -2.2% -5.6% -4.0%
Medical Staff Hours -0.110
∗∗ -0.288∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.234∗∗ -0.060




% Effect of Average Center -2.7% -7.1% -2.5% -5.8% -4.0%
First-stage F-Stat (Primary Care) 50.45 52.09
First-stage F-Stat (Medical Staff) 52.64 54.81
Notes: Authors’ estimation as described in the text. The dependent variable is 15-18 year
old birth rates per 1000. Center Indicator is an indicator variable equal to 1 if any school-
based health center exists in the county. All results contain county fixed effects. Estimates
in columns (i) and (ii) include state-year-median income fixed effects, where median income
is an indicator for whether the 1990 median household income in the county is above the
median household income in the state in 1990. Estimates in columns (iii) and (iv) include
state-year fixed effects and year fixed effects interacted with an indicator for the county being
in the bottom 20% of median household income in 1990. Estimates in column (v) contain
state-year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in
the county. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses: ** indicates
significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.8: The Effect of SBHC Services on Birth Rates Among Older Women Without Ac-
cess to a SBHC
Mother’s Age
20-24 25-29 15-18
Treatment Measure (i) (ii) (iii)
Center Indicator 0.421 -0.067 -1.674
∗
(1.130) (0.770) (0.906)
Primary Care Staff Hours 0.101 0.399
∗∗ -0.454∗∗
(0.128) (0.115) (0.178)
Medical Staff Hours 0.023 0.138
∗∗ -0.123∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.075)
Mean Birth Rate 100.58 114.19 44.28
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (1) as described in the text. Each cell comes from a
separate regression. The sample consists of states in which less than half of centers report
they are accessible to those who do not attend the school in which they are located and are
restricted to counties in which there were no centers when the women in each age group
were of high school age. All estimates include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and
the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in the county. Standard
errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5%
level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.9: The Effect of SBHC Services on High School Dropout Rates (in Percent) –
Diploma Data
OLS 2SLS
Grade: 10th 11th 12th 10th 11th 12th
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Treatment Measure
Center Indicator 0.576 0.014 0.600(0.426) (0.529) (0.442)
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.006 -0.023 -0.003 0.064 -0.024 0.154
∗
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.086) (0.097) (0.091)
% Effect of Average Center -0.03% -0.13% -0.01% 0.31% -0.12% 0.75%
Medical Staff Hours -0.005 -0.010 -0.003 0.042 -0.003 0.068(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042)
% Effect of Average Center -0.02% -0.05% -0.01% 0.20% -0.02% 0.33%
First-stage F-Stat (Primary Care) 44.18
First-stage F-Stat (Medical Staff) 45.51
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (4) using NCES CCD high school diploma data from
1998-2010. Each cell comes from a separate regression. In columns (iv)-(vi), Primary Care
Staff Hours and Medical Staff Hours are instrumented with an indicator for whether there is
a center in the school district as well as a quadratic in the number of years since a center was
first opened in the school district (set equal to zero in the years prior to a center first opening).
The 10th grade dropout rate is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t
and the 10th grade enrollment in year t− 2. The 11th grade dropout rate equals 1 minus the
ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the 11th grade enrollment in year t− 1, and the 12th
grade dropout rate is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the
12th grade enrollment in year t. All estimates include school district and state-by-year fixed
effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in the school
district. The percent effects for the staff hours estimates show the percent effect for a center
with the average number of primary care or medical staff hours. Standard errors clustered
at the school district level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *
indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.10: The Effect of SBHC Services on High School Dropout Rates (in Percent) – Cen-
sus/ACS Data
14-17 Year Olds 18-19 Year Olds
All Female Male All Female Male
Treatment Measure (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Center Indicator -0.124 -0.123 -0.141 0.484 0.234 0.682(0.148) (0.169) (0.155) (0.503) (0.610) (0.555)
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.011 -0.052
∗ 0.013
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024)
% Effect of Average Center -0.02% -0.01% -0.03% -0.05% -0.25% 0.06%
Medical Staff Hours -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.025
∗ 0.018
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
% Effect of Average Center -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.12% 0.04%
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (4) using 1990 and 2000 Census data as well as 2005-
2011 ACS data. Each cell comes from a separate regression. The dropout rates measure the
proportion of each age group living in the district that does not report attending school and
that does not have a high school degree. All estimates include school district and state-by-
year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in
the school district. The percent effects for the staff hours estimates show the percent effect
for a center with the average number of primary care or medical staff hours. Standard errors
clustered at the school district level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5%
level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.




Primary Care Staff Hours 0.0005(0.0003)
Medical Staff Hours 0.0002(0.0001)
Notes: Authors’ estimation as described in the text using data from the 1998-2011 Common
Core of Data. All estimates include school district and state-by-year fixed effects. Regres-
sions are weighted by the high school aged population in the school district. Standard errors
clustered at the school district level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5%
level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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3.8 Figures


























































































Source: NASBHC School-based Health Center Census, 1998-2011. The figure includes only
centers that serve high school students.
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Source: NASBHC School-based Health Center Census, 2011. The figure includes only cen-
ters that serve high school students. States without SBHCs (HI, ID, MT, ND, NH, SD, VT,
WI, WY) are omitted from the figure.
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Figure 3.3: Primary Care and Non-Contraceptive Reproductive Health
Services Provided by SBHCs
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Panel B: SBHC Reproductive
Health Services
Source: These figures are reproduced from the 2007-2008 School-
based Health Centers National Census annual report, avail-
able at http://www.sbh4all.org/atf/cf/%7Bcd9949f2-2761-42fb-bc7a-
cee165c701d9%7D/NASBHC%202007-08%20CENSUS%20REPORT%20FINAL.PDF.
The reproductive care service tabulations show the percent providing each service on-site
and the percent providing referrals for each service.
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Figure 3.5: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SBHC Entry on Teen



















0<−5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
Years Relative to First Center Opening
Authors’ estimates of equation (2) as described in the text. The dependent variable is 15-
18 year old birth rates per 1000. Each point shows the coefficient estimate on the service
measure or center indicator interacted with the relative time to the first center opening in the
county. All estimates include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are
weighted by the high school aged population in the county. The lines extending from each
point show the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals that are calculated using standard
errors clustered at the county level. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are relative
to this year.
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Figure 3.6: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SBHC Entry on High
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0<−5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
Years Relative to First Center Opening
Panel C: 12th Grade Dropout Rate
Authors’ estimates of equation (5) as described in the text. Each point shows the coefficient
estimate on the total medical staff hours service measure interacted with the relative time to
the first center opening in the school district. All estimates include school district and state-
by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population
in the school district. The lines extending from each point show the bounds of the 95%
confidence intervals that are calculated using standard errors clustered at the school district
level. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are relative to this year.
189
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua Angrist. 2000. “How Large Are Human-
Capital Externalities? Evidence from Compulsory-Schooling Laws.” National
Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual 2000, edited by Ben S.
Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, pp. 9 59. MIT Press.
[2] Adler, Nancy E. and David H. Rehkopf. 2008. “U.S. Disparities in Health:
Descriptions, Causes, and Mechanisms.” Annual Review of Public Health 29:
235–252.
[3] Advocates for Children of New Jersey. 2016. “Showing Up Matters: The
State of Chronic Absenteeism in New Jersey, 2nd Annual Report.”
[4] Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. 2002. Identity and Schooling:
Some Lessons for the Economics of Education. Journal of Economic Literature,
40(4): 1167-1201.
[5] Alexander, K. L., Entwisle, D. R., & Olson, L. S. 2007. “Lasting consequences
of the summer learning gap.” American Sociological Review, 72(2), 167-180.
[6] Almond, Douglas and Janet Currie. 2011. “Killing Me Softly: The Fetal Ori-
gins Hypothesis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(3): 153-172.
[7] Ananat, Elizabeth Oltmans and Daniel M. Hungerman. 2012. “The Power
of the Pill for the Next Generation: Oral Contraception’s Effects on Fertility,
Abortion, and Maternal and Child Characteristics.” Review of Economics and
Statistics 94(1): 37–51.
[8] Andrulis, Dennis P. 1998. “Access to Care Is the Centerpiece in the Elim-
ination of Socioeconomic Disparities in Health.” Annals of Internal Medicine
129(5): 412-416.
[9] Angrist, J. D., & Keueger, A. B. 1991. “Does Compulsory School Attendance
Affect Schooling and Earnings?.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4),
979–1014.
[10] Archambault, I., Janosz, M., Fallu, J. S., & Pagani, L. S. 2009. “Student en-
gagement and its relationship with early high school dropout.” Journal of ado-
lescence, 32(3), 651-670.
190
[11] Arcidiacono, Peter, Ahmed Khwaja, and Lijing Ouyang. 2012. “Habit Per-
sistence and Teen Sex: Could Increased Access to Contraception Have Unin-
tended Consequences for Teen Pregnancies?.” Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics 30(2): 312-325.
[12] Arulampalam, W., Gregg, P., & Gregory, M. 2001. “Unemployment scar-
ring.” The Economic Journal, 111(475), 577-584.
[13] Aschraft, Adam, Ivan Fernandez-Val and Kevin Lang. 2013. “The Con-
sequences of Teenage Childbearing: Consistent Estimates When Abortion
Makes Miscarriage Non-random.” The Economic Journal 123(571): 875-905.
[14] Ashenfelter, Orley, and Alan Krueger. 1994. “Estimating the Returns to
Schooling Using a New Sample of Twins.” American Economic Review 84 (De-
cember): 1157 73.
[15] Ashenfelter, Orley, and Cecilia Elena Rouse. 1998. “Income, Schooling, and
Ability: Evidence from a New Sample of Identical Twins.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 113 (February): 253 84.
[16] Astone, N. M., & McLanahan, S. S. 1991. “Family structure, parental prac-
tices and high school completion.” American sociological review, 309-320.
[17] Attendance Works. 2015.“ NEW FEDERAL EDUCATION LAW
INCLUDES CHRONIC ABSENCE TRACKING, TRAINING,” web:
¡http://www.attendanceworks.org/new-federal-education-law-includes-
chronic-absence-tracking-training/¿
[18] Bailey, Martha J. 2006. “More Power to the Pill: The Impact of Contracep-
tive Freedom on Women’s Life Cycle Labor Supply.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 121(1): 289–320.
[19] Bailey, Martha J. 2010. ““Momma’s Got the Pill”: How Anthony Comstock
and Griswold v. Connecticut Shaped US Childbearing.” American Economic
Review 100(1): 98-129.
[20] Bailey, Martha J. and Andrew Goodman-Bacon. 2015. “The War on
Poverty’s Experiment in Public Medicine: The Impact of Community Health
Centers on the Mortality of Older Americans.” American Economic Review
105(3): 1067-1104.
[21] Balfanz, R.; Byrns, V. 2014. “Meeting the Challenge of Combating
191




[22] Balfanz, R.; Herzog, L.; Mac Iver, D.J. 2007. “Preventing Student Disen-
gagement and Keeping Students on the Graduation Path in Urban Middle-
Grades Schools: Early Identification and Effective Interventions.” Educational
Psychologist, 42(4) 223-235.
bibitem Bleakley, Hoyt. 2007. “Disease and Development: Evidence from
Hookworm Eradication in the American South.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 122(1): 73-117.
[23] Bleakley, Hoyt. 2010. “Malaria Eradication in the Americas: A retrospec-
tive Analysis of Childhood Exposure.” American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 2(2): 1-45.
[24] Becker, Gary S. 1967. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
with Special Reference to Education. Columbia University Press.
[25] Belfield, C. R., & Levin, H. M. (Eds.). 2008. The Price We Pay : Economic
and Social Consequences of Inadequate Education. New York, NY, US: Brookings
Institution Press.
[26] Blakemore, S.J. & Robbins, T.W., 2012. “Decision-making in the adolescent
brain.” Nature neuroscience, 15(9), pp.1184-1191.
[27] Bridgeland, J. M., DiIulio Jr, J. J., & Morison, K. B. 2006. “The silent epi-
demic: Perspectives of high school dropouts.” Civic Enterprises.
[28] Brown, David, Amanda E. Kowalski, and Ithai Lurie. 2014. “Med-
icaid as an Investment in Children: What is the Long-Term Im-
pact on Tax Receipts?” Yale University Working Paper, available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/ ak669/medicaid.latest.draft.pdf, last accessed
10/7/2014.
[29] Buckles, Kasey and Daniel Hungerman. 2014. “Estimating the Incidental
Fertility Effects of School Condom Distribution Programs.” Mimeo.
[30] Cameron, S. V., & Heckman, J. J. 1993. “The Nonequivalence of High School
Equivalents.” Journal of Labor Economics, 1-47.
192
[31] Cameron, S.V. and Heckman, J.J., 1998. “Life cycle schooling and dynamic
selection bias: Models and evidence for five cohorts of American males.” The
Journal of Political Economy, 106(2), p.262.
[32] Card, D. 2001. “Estimating the return to schooling: Progress on some per-
sistent econometric problems.” Econometrica, 69(5), 1127-1160.
[33] Case, Ann, Darren Lubotsky, and Christina Paxson. 2002. “Economic Status
and Health in Childhood: The Origins of the Gradient.” American Economic
Review 92(5): 1308–1334.
[34] Case, Anne, Angela Fertig, and Christina Paxson. 2005. “The Lasting Im-
pact of Childhood Health and Circumstance.” Journal of Health Economics
24(2): 365-389.
[35] Casey, B.J., Jones, R.M. and Hare, T.A., 2008. “The adolescent brain.” Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), pp.111-126.
[36] Coates, D. 2003. “Education production functions using instructional time
as an input.” Education Economics, 11(3), 273-292.
[37] Cohodes, Sarah, Daniel Grossman, Samuel Kleiner, and Michael F. Loven-
heim. Forthcoming. “The Effect of Child Health Insurance Access on School-
ing: Evidence from Public Insurance Expansions.” Journal of Human Resources.
[38] Cooper, H., Nye, B., Charlton, K., Lindsay, J., & Greathouse, S. 1996. “The
effects of summer vacation on achievement test scores: A narrative and meta-
analytic review.” Review of educational research, 66(3), 227-268.
bibitem Conti, Gabriella, James Heckman and Sergio Urzua. 2010. “The
Education-Health Gradient.” American Economic Review 100(2): 234–238.
[39] Cuhna, Flavio, James J. Heckman, Lance Lochner, and Dimitriy Masterov.
2006. “Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation.” In Handbook
of the Economics of Education, Vol. 1, ed. Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch, 697-
812. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[40] Currie, Janet and Jonathan Gruber. 1996. “Health Insurance Eligibility, Uti-
lization of Medical Care, and Child Health.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
111(2): 431–466.
[41] Currie, Janet, Sandra Decker and Wanchuan Lin. 2008. “Has Public Health
193
Insurance For Older Children Reduced Disparities in Access to Care and
Health Outcomes?” Journal of Health Economics 27(6): 1567–1581.
[42] Dahl, Gordon B. and Lance Lochner. 2012. “The Impact of Family Income
on Child Achievement: Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 102(5): 1927–1956.
[43] Dobkin, C. and Ferreira, F., 2010. “Do school entry laws affect educational
attainment and labor market outcomes?” Economics of Education Review, 29(1),
pp.40-54
[44] Downey, D. B., Von Hippel, P. T., & Broh, B. A. (2004). “Are schools the
great equalizer? Cognitive inequality during the summer months and the
school year.” American Sociological Review, 69(5), 613-635.
[45] Allensworth, E.M. & Easton, J.Q. 2007. “What Matters for Staying On-Track
and Graduating in Chicago Public High Schools.” Consortium on Chicago
School Research, University of Chicago: Research Report
[46] Edin, P. A., & Gustavsson, M. 2008. “Time out of work and skill deprecia-
tion.” ILR Review, 61(2), 163-180.
[47] Epstein, J. L., & Sheldon, S. B. 2002. “Present and accounted for: Improving
student attendance through family and community involvement.” The Journal
of Educational Research, 95(5), 308-318.
[48] Evans, W.N., Morrill, M.S. and Parente, S.T., 2010. “Measuring inappro-
priate medical diagnosis and treatment in survey data: The case of ADHD
among school-age children.” Journal of health economics, 29(5), pp.657-673.
[49] Figlio, David, Guryan, Jonathan, Karbownik, Krzysztof, and Jeffrey Roth.
2014. “The Effects of Poor Neonatal Health on Children’s Cognitive Develop-
ment.” American Economic Review 104(12): 3921-55.
[50] Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan
Gruber, Joseph P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, Katherine Baicker and Oregon
Health Study Group. 2012. “The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evi-
dence from the First Year.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3): 1057–1106.
[51] Fletcher, Jason M. and Barbara L. Wolfe. 2009. “Education and Labor Mar-
ket Consequences of Teenage Childbearing: Evidence Using the Timing of
194
Pregnancy Outcomes and Community Fixed Effects.” Journal of Human Re-
sources 44(2): 303–325.
[52] Flores, Glenn. 2010. “Technical Report: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the
Health and Health Care of Children.” Pediatrics 125(4): e979–e1020.
[53] Gross, Tal and Matthew J. Notowidigdo. 2011. “Health Insurance and the
Consumer Bankruptcy Decision: Evidence from Expansions of Medicaid.”
Journal of Public Economics 95(7-8): 767–778.
[54] Geierstanger, Sara Peterson, Gorette Amaral, Mona Mansour, and Su-
san Russell Walters. 2004. “School-Based Health Centers and Academic Per-
formance: Research, Challenges, and Recommendations.” Journal of School
Health 74(9): 347-352.
[55] Geronimus, Arlene T. and Sanders Korenman. 1992. “The Socioeconomic
Consequences of Teen Childbearing Reconsidered.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 107(4): 1187–1214.
[56] Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz. 2002. “The Power of the Pill: Oral
Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions.” Journal of Po-
litical Economy 110(4): 730–770.
[57] Hanushek, E. A. (2002). Publicly provided education. Handbook of public
economics, 4, 2045-2141.
[58] Harris, Kathleen Mullan, Penny Gordon-Larsen, Kim Chantala, and J.
Richard Udry. 2006. “Longitudinal Trends in Race/Ethnic Disparities in
Leading Health Indicators From Adolescence to Young Adulthood.” Archives
of Pediatric Adolescent Medicine 160: 74–81.
[59] Heckman, James J. and Paul A. LaFontaine. 2010. “The American High
School Graduation Rate: Trends and Levels.” Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 92(2): 244–262.
[60] Heckman, James J. and Paul A. LaFontaine. 2006. “Bias-corrected Estimates
of GED Returns.” Journal of Labor Economics 24(3): 661–700.
[61] Heckman, J.J., Stixrud, J. and Urzua, S., 2006. “The Effects of Cognitive
and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior.”
Journal of Labor Economics, 24(3), pp.411-482.
195
[62] Heckman, J.J., 2006. “Skill formation and the economics of investing in dis-
advantaged children.” Science, 312(5782), pp.1900-1902.
[63] Heckman, J. J. 2000. “Policies to foster human capital.” Research in eco-
nomics, 54(1), 3-56.
[64] Hotz, Joseph V., Susan William McElroy and Seth G. Sanders. 2005.
“Teenage Childbearing and Its Life Cycle Consequences: Exploiting a Nat-
ural Experiment.” Journal of Human Resources 40(3): 683–715.
[65] Herzog, S. 2005. “Measuring determinants of student return vs.
dropout/stopout vs. transfer: A first-to-second year analysis of new fresh-
men.” Research in higher education, 46(8), 883-928.
[66] Imberman, S. A. 2011. “Achievement and behavior in charter schools:
Drawing a more complete picture.” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
93(2), 416-435.
[67] Jacob, B.A. and Lefgren, L., 2003. “Are idle hands the devil’s workshop?
Incapacitation, concentration, and juvenile crime.” The American Economic Re-
view, 93(5), pp.1560-1577.
[68] Kaestner, Robert, T. Joyce and A. Racine. 2001. “Medicaid Eligibility and
the Incidence of Ambulatory Care Sensitive Hospitalizations for Children.”
Social Science and Medicine 52(2): 305-313.
[69] Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. ”Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics.” American Economic Review, 93(5): 1449-1475.
[70] Kearney, C. A. 2008. “School absenteeism and school refusal behavior in
youth: A contemporary review.” Clinical psychology review, 28(3), 451-471.
[71] Kearney, Melissa S. and Phillip B. Levine. 2009. “Subsidized Contraception,
Fertility, and Sexual Behavior.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1):
137-151.
[72] Kearney, Melissa S. and Phillip B. Levine. 2012. “Why is the Teen Birth Rate
in the United States So High and Why Does It Matter?” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 26(2): 141-166.
[73] Kearney, Melissa S. and Phillip B. Levine. 2014. “Media Influences on So-
196
cial Outcomes: The Impact of MTV’s 16 and Pregnant on Teen Childbear-
ing.”NBER Working Paper No. 19795.
[74] Kearns, Suzanne E.U., Michael D. Pullmann, Sarah Cusworth Walker,
Aaron R. Lyons, T.J. Cosgrove, and Eric J. Bruns. 2011. “Adolescent Use of
School-Based Health Centers and High School Dropout.” Archives of Pediatrics
& Adolescent Medicine 165(7): 617-623.
[75] Kisker, Ellen E. and Randall S. Brown. 1996. “Do School-Based Health Cen-
ters Improve Adolescents’ Access to Health Care, Health Status, and Risk-
Taking Behavior?” Journal of Adolescent Health 18(5): 335-343.
[76] Klepinger, Daniel, Shelly Lundberg and Robert Plotnick. 1999. “How Does
Adolescent Fertility Affect the Human Capital and Wages of Young Women?”
Journal of Human Resources 34(3): 421-448.
[77] Krueger, Alan B. 1999. “Experimental Estimates of Education Production
Functions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (May): 497 531.
[78] Lamdin, D. J. 1996. “Evidence of student attendance as an independent
variable in education production functions.” The Journal of educational research,
89(3), 155-162.
[79] Lazear, E. P. 2001. “Educational production.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 116(3), 777-803.
[80] Leininger, Lindsey, Helen Levy and Diane Schanzenbach. 2009. “Conse-
quences of SCHIP Expansions for Household Well-Being.” Forum for Health
Economics & Policy (Frontiers in Health Policy Research) 13(1), Article 3.
[81] Levine, David I. and Gary Painter. 2003. “The Schooling Costs of Teenage
Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing: Analysis with a Within-school Propensity-
score-matching Estimator.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 85(4): 884–
900.
[82] Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., Neckermann, S., & Sadoff, S. 2016. “The behavioral-
ist goes to school: Leveraging behavioral economics to improve educational
performance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(4), 183-219.
[83] Link, Bruce G., and Jo C. Phelan. 1995. “Social Conditions as Fundamental
Causes of Disease.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, special number: 80
94.
197
[84] Lleras-Muney, A., 2005. “The relationship between education and adult
mortality in the United States.” The Review of Economic Studies, 72(1), pp.189-
221.
[85] Leos-Urbel, J., Schwartz, A.E., Weinstein, M. and Corcoran, S., 2013. “Not
just for poor kids: The impact of universal free school breakfast on meal par-
ticipation and student outcomes.” Economics of education review, 36, pp.88-107.
[86] Lochner, Lance, and Enrico Moretti. 2004. “The Effect of Education on
Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports.” American
Economic Review 94, no. 1: 155 89.
[87] Marburger, D. R. 2006. “Does mandatory attendance improve student per-
formance?.” The Journal of Economic Education, 37(2), 148-155.
[88] Martin, Joyce A., Brady E. Hamilton, Stephanie J. Ventura, Michelle JK Os-
terman, and T. J. Mathews. 2013. “Births: Final Data for 2011.” National Vital
Statistics Report 62, no. 1: 1-90.
[89] McCrary, J. and Royer, H., 2011. “The effect of female education on fertility
and infant health: Evidence from school entry policies using exact date of
birth.” The American economic review, 101(1), pp.158-195.
[90] Michelmore, Katherine. 2013. “The Effect of Income on Educational Attain-
ment: Evidence from State Earned Income Tax Credit Expansions.” Mimeo.
[91] Miguel, Edward, and Michael Kremer. 2004. “Worms: Identifying Impacts
on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities.” Econo-
metrica 72(1): 159-217.
[92] Mincer, Jacob. 1974. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
[93] Mishel, Lawrence and Joydeep Roy. 2006. Rethinking High School Graduation
Rates and Trends. Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.
[94] Murnane, Richard J. 2013. “U.S. High School Graduation Rates: Patterns
and Explanations.” Journal of Economic Literature 51(2): 370–422.
[95] Neild, R. C., Stoner-Eby, S., & Furstenberg, F. 2008. “Connecting entrance
and departure: The transition to ninth grade and high school dropout.” Edu-
cation and Urban Society, 40(5), 543-569.
198
[96] Olson, L.S. 2014. “Why September Matters: Improv-
ing Student Attendance.” Baltimore Education Research Con-
sortium Policy Brief. web: ¡http://baltimore-berc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/SeptemberAttendanceBriefJuly2014.pdf.
[97] Oreopoulos, P. 2007. “Do dropouts drop out too soon? Wealth, health and
happiness from compulsory schooling.” Journal of public Economics, 91(11),
2213-2229.
[98] Lavecchia, A. M., Liu, H., & Oreopoulos, P. 2014. “Behavioral economics
of education: Progress and possibilities” (No. w20609). National Bureau of
Economic Research.
[99] Reback, Randall and Tamara Lalovic Cox. 2016. “Where Health Policy
Meets Education Policy: School-based Health Centers in New York City.”
Mimeo.
[100] Reid, K. 2005. “The causes, views and traits of school absenteeism and
truancy: An analytical review.” Research in Education, 74(1), 59-82.
[101] Ribar, David C. 1994. “Teenage Fertility and High School Completion.”
Review of Economics and Statistics 76(3): 413–424.
[102] Ribar, David C. 1999. “The Socioeconomic Consequences of Young
Women’s Childbearing: Reconciling Disparate Evidence.” Journal of Popula-
tion Economics 12(4): 547–565.
[103] Roby, Douglas E. 2004. “Research on school attendance and student
achievement: A study of Ohio schools.” Educational Research Quarterly 28.1
[104] Rumberger, Russell. 2004. “Why Students Drop Out of School.” In
Dropouts in America, edited by Gary Orfield, pp. 243 54. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Education Press.
[105] Sanders, Seth, Jeffrey Smith and Ye Zhang. 2008. “Teenage Childbearing
and Maternal Schooling Outcomes: Evidence from Matching.” University of
Michigan Working Paper.
[106] Smedley, Brian D., Adrienne Y. Stith, and Alan R. Nelson. 2003. Unequal
Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care. Washington,
DC: National Academies Press.
199
[107] Smith, J., 2009. “Can regression discontinuity help answer an age-old
question in education?The effect of age on elementary and secondary school
achievement.” The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 9(1).
[108] Staff, J., Schulenberg, J.E. and Bachman, J.G., 2010. “Adolescent work in-
tensity, school performance, and academic engagement.” Sociology of Educa-
tion, 83(3), pp.183-200.
[109] Stratton, L. S., OToole, D. M., & Wetzel, J. N. 2008. “A multinomial logit
model of college stopout and dropout behavior.” Economics of education review,
27(3), 319-331.
[110] Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. 2003. “On the specification and estimation
of the production function for cognitive achievement.” The Economic Journal,
113(485).
[111] Todd, Petra E. and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2007. “The Production of Cognitive
Achievement in Children: Home, School, and Racial Test Score Gaps.” Journal
of Human Capital 1(1): 91–136.
[112] Utah Education Policy Center. 2012. “Chronic Ab-
senteeism.” Research Brief, University of Utah web:
¡http://www.utahdataalliance.org/downloads/ChronicAbsenteeismResearchBrief.pdf¿
[113] Wahistrom, K. 2002. “Changing times: Findings from the first longitudinal
study of later high school start times.” Nassp Bulletin, 86(633), 3-21.
[114] Walker, Sarah Cusworth, Suzanne E.U. Kerns, Aaron R. Lyon, Eric J.
Bruns, and T.J. Cosgrove. 2010. “Impact of School-Based Health Center Use
on Academic Outcomes.” Journal of Adolescent Health 46: 251-257.
[115] Wong, Mitchell, and others. 2002. “Contribution of Major Diseases to Dis-
parities in Mortality.” New England Journal of Medicine 347, no. 20: 1585 92.
[116] Yakusheva, Olga and Jason Fletcher. 2015. “Learning from Teen Child-
bearing Experiences of Close Friends: Evidence using Miscarriages as a Nat-
ural Experiment.” Review of Economics and Statistics 97(1): 29-43.
200
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Additional Figures
201






0 1 2 3 4 5
Grade 9 GPA
Grade 9 Grade 9-10
Grade 9-11 Grade 9-12










100 200 300 400 500 600
Math Score
Grade 9 Grade 9-10
Grade 9-11 Grade 9-12














200 300 400 500 600
English Score
Grade 9 Grade 9-11
Grade 9-10 Grade 9-12
Sample Attrition by English Test Score
Histograms include all students who enter 9th grade and are color coded by the part of the
9th grade distribution that remains for grade 9 only, grades 9 and 10, grades 9,10, and 11,
and all grades.
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Figures contain average daily attendance trends by grade for total absences (top), excused
absences (middle), and truant absences(bottom). Each data point is a school day.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Yearly Transition Results OLS: 9th Graders Continuing in Original School for
10th Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
Total Truancies -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0093 -0.0056 -0.0062
(0.000178) (0.000185) (0.000248) (0.0002) (0.000268)




GPA under 2.0 -0.019 -0.0205
(0.007) (0.00662)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 37229 33923 32280 32280 33923
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 9th grade are excluded from the sample.
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Table B.2: Yearly Transition Results OLS: 9th Graders Continuing in Original School for
10th Grade with Excused Absences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
Total Truancies -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0056 -0.0058
(0.000178) (0.000185) (0.000249) (0.0002) (0.000267)
Total Absences -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0062 -0.0044 -0.0050
(0.000240) (0.000240) (0.000246) (0.00024) (0.000249)




GPA under 2.0 -0.0215 -0.0240
(0.0097) (0.00658)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 37229 33923 32280 32280 33923
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 9th grade are excluded from the sample.
Total absences are the total excused absences that a student has in addition to truancies.
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Table B.3: Yearly Transition Results OLS: 11th Graders Continuing in Original School for
12th Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
Total Truancies -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0129 -0.00620 -0.00753
(0.0002) (0.000216) (0.00032) (0.00217) (0.00032)




GPA under 2.0 -0.174 -0.169
(0.006) (0.00592)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 25703 25661 24912 25661 24912
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 11th grade are excluded from the sample.
Table B.4: Yearly Transition Results OLS: 11th Graders Continuing in Original School for
12th Grade with Excused Absences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continues Continues Continues Continues Continues
Total Truancies -0.0103 -0.0101 -0.0125 -0.00614 -0.00742
(0.0002) (0.000216) (0.00032) (0.00217) (0.00032)
Total Absences -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0014 -0.001
(0.00023) (0.000229) (0.000227) (0.00220) (0.000219)




GPA under 2.0 -0.175 -0.170
(0.0061) (0.00592)
Demographics X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 25703 25661 24912 25661 24912
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort (school by entrance year) level. Demographic
variables include race, ethnicity, gender, ELL status, and high school entrance age. Students
who transfer outside the district before the end of 9th grade are excluded from the sample.
Total absences are the total excused absences that a student has in addition to truancies.
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B.2 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: 9th to 10th Grade Transition
Chronic Truant
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9th Grade Truancies
Any School
Each circle is weighted by the number of students in the sample with that number of tru-
ancies, the line is a median spline also weighted by number of students with each level of
truancy. Vertical lines indicate the level at which students are considered chronic truants
and the median spline estimate of the number of truancies when a student has an equal
probability of returning or leaving her school. The top panel is the return to the original
school, the bottom panel is the return to any school.
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Figure B.2: 11th to 12th Grade Transition
Chronic Truant
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11th Grade Truancies
Any School
Each circle is weighted by the number of students in the sample with that number of tru-
ancies, the line is a median spline also weighted by number of students with each level of
truancy. Vertical lines indicate the level at which students are considered chronic truants
and the median spline estimate of the number of truancies when a student has an equal
probability of returning or leaving her school. The top panel is the return to the original
school, the bottom panel is the return to any school.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Additional Tables
Table C.1: 1990 Census Characteristics of Counties and School Districts by Treatment Sta-
tus
Counties School Districts
Variable Ever Never Ever Never
Treated Treated Treated Treated
Median Rent 466.49 429.43 401.09 370.35
Median Home Price 102146 79490 78517 69882
Median HH Income 31454 30946 26342 28363
Median Family Income 37057 36196 30950 32879
% Housing Occupied 90.64 91.30 87.70 87.23
% Urban 81.38 72.00 62.83 37.39
% Below Poverty 12.71 11.31 17.23 13.93
% w/ Public Assistance 7.39 6.07 9.67 7.13
% Inc. from Public Assistance 1.39 0.77 1.41 1.00
% w/ Wage Income 78.13 78.87 78.07 79.36
% Unemployed 4.10 3.60 5.18 4.05
% Not in Labor Force 34.07 33.86 37.34 36.93
% Male 48.58 48.91 48.78 49.21
% Black 11.79 8.85 11.93 4.71
% Hispanic 9.23 4.05 11.52 4.42
% Asian 2.55 1.36 1.81 0.80
% Other Race 1.06 0.63 1.90 1.74
% Under 6 Years Old 8.84 8.83 7.52 7.08
% 6-19 Years Old 19.54 20.26 22.18 22.55
% 20-34 Years Old 25.34 24.94 24.20 21.42
% 35-64 Years Old 33.96 33.88 33.28 34.65
% Institutionalized 1.32 1.32 1.24 1.07
% No HS Degree 22.90 22.31 28.55 25.98
% Some College 27.95 28.03 24.33 24.10
% BA+ 19.81 17.84 15.31 14.42
% Married w/ Kids 25.94 28.50
% Single w/ Kids 8.12 7.14
Sources: 1990 Census Summary File 3 (counties) and School District Tabulation data. All
tabulations use only the counties and school districts in the respective analysis sample.
209
Table C.2: The Effect of SBHC Services on Teen Birth and HS Dropout Rates Using Alter-
native Service Measures
Panel A: Births per 1,000
Aged 15-18
Treatment Measure (i)
Days Open per Week -1.256
∗
(0.742)
Hours Open per Week -0.529
∗∗
(0.167 )
Panel B: High School Dropout Rate
10th 11th 12th
Grade Grade Grade
Treatment Measure (i) (ii) (iii)
Days Open per Week -0.038 -0.219
∗ -0.142
(0.084) (0.127) (0.103)
Hours Open per Week -0.003 -0.033 -0.011(0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
Average Days per Week 0.553
Average Hours per Week 3.596
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equations (1) and (4) as described in the text. Each cell comes
from a separate regression. All estimates in Panel A include county and state-by-year fixed
effects and all estimates in Panel B include school district and state-by-year fixed effects. The
10th grade dropout rate is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and
the 10th grade enrollment in year t− 2. The 11th grade dropout rate equals 1 minus the ratio
of diplomas awarded in year t and the 11th grade enrollment in year t−1, and the 12th grade
dropout rate is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the 12th
grade enrollment in year t. Regressions are weighted by the high school aged population
in the county (Panel A) or school district (Panel B). Standard errors clustered at the county
(Panel A) or school district (Panel B) level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the
5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.3: The Effect of SBHC Services on High School Dropout Rates (in Percent) –
Diploma Data, by Birth Control Services
Primary Care Medical
Staff Hours Staff Hours
Grade: 10th 11th 12th 10th 11th 12th
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Birth Control Services
Hormones Prescribed On Site -0.014 -0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.002 0.001(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Hormones Referred, No Condoms -0.0001 -0.050 -0.015 -0.001 -0.019 -0.008(0.001) (0.041) (0.025) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
Hormones Referred & 0.079 0.089 0.034 0.027 -0.029 -0.043
Condoms Dispensed (0.063) (0.064) (0.057) (0.021) (0.064) (0.047)
No Birth Control Services -0.001 -0.024 0.018 -0.014 -0.014 0.007(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (4) as described in the text. Each column comes from a
separate regression. The birth control service measures include the number of service hours
of each type in centers with the given birth control policy. The birth control policy groups
are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The 10th grade dropout rate is calculated as 1 minus
the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the 10th grade enrollment in year t− 2. The 11th
grade dropout rate equals 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the 11th grade
enrollment in year t − 1, and the 12th grade dropout rate is calculated as 1 minus the ratio
of diplomas awarded in year t and the 12th grade enrollment in year t. All estimates include
school district and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high
school aged population in the school district. Standard errors clustered at the school district
level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance
at the 10% level.
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Table C.4: The Effect of SBHC Services on High School Dropout Rates (in Percent) –
Diploma Data Using Large Counties
Grade: 10th 11th 12th
(i) (ii) (iii)
Treatment Measure
Center Indicator 0.546 0.153 0.642(0.492) (0.483) (0.392)
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.004 -0.032 -0.010(0.011) (0.021) (0.013)
Medical Staff Hours -0.004 -0.012
∗ -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equation (4) using NCES CCD high school diploma data from
1998-2010. The sample is comprised of the large counties that constitute the birth rate anal-
ysis sample. Each cell comes from a separate regression. The 10th grade dropout rate is
calculated as 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the 10th grade enrollment
in year t − 2. The 11th grade dropout rate equals 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in
year t and the 11th grade enrollment in year t − 1, and the 12th grade dropout rate is calcu-
lated as 1 minus the ratio of diplomas awarded in year t and the 12th grade enrollment in
year t. All estimates include school district and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regres-
sions are weighted by the high school aged population in the school district. Standard errors
clustered at the school district level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5%
level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.5: The Effect of SBHC Services on STD Rates per 1000 15-19 Year Olds
Panel A: Baseline Estimates
STDs Chlamydia Gonorrhea
Treatment Measure (i) (ii) (iii)
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.187 -0.102 -0.102(0.135) (0.111) (0.046)
Medical Staff Hours -0.048 -0.021 -0.080(0.044) (0.039) (0.067)
Panel B: Controlling for Chlamydia and Gonorrhea
Rates Among 25-29 Year Olds
STDs Chlamydia Gonorrhea
Treatment Measure (i) (ii) (iii)
Primary Care Staff Hours -0.187 -0.105 -0.077
∗∗
(0.179) (0.147) (0.034)
Medical Staff Hours -0.047 -0.019 -0.026
∗∗
(0.052) (0.043) (0.010)
Notes: Authors’ estimates of a version of equation (1) aggregated to the state-year level. Each
cell comes from a separate regression. All estimates include state and year fixed effects. STD
data are for years 1998-2011 and include chlamydia, gonorrhea and syphilis in column (i).
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the
5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
Table C.6: First-Stage Estimates from Instrumental Variables Models
Birth Rates Dropout Rates
Service Primary Medical Primary Medical
Measure: Care Staff Care Staff
Center Indicator 2.657
∗∗ 5.843∗∗ 4.919∗∗ 10.684∗∗
(0.221) (0.474) (0.441) (0.933)
Time Since First Entry 0.033 -0.026 0.253
∗∗ 0.289∗∗
(0.034) (0.083) (0.066) (0.120)
(Time Since First Entry)2 -0.0003 0.004 -0.002 -0.001(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Notes: Authors’ estimates of equations (1) and (4) as described in the text. All estimates in-
clude county/school district and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted
by the high school aged population in the county/school district. Standard errors clustered
at the county/school district level are in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level
and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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C.2 Additional Figures
Figure C.1: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SBHC Services on Teen
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Panel D: Total Medical Hours in First Center at Opening
Authors’ estimates of equation (3) as described in the text. The dependent variable in each
panel is 15-18 year old birth rates per 1000. Each point shows the coefficient estimate on the
service measure interacted with the relative time to the first center opening in the county. All
estimates include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and the regressions are weighted
by the high school aged population in the county. The lines extending from each point
show the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals that are calculated using standard errors
clustered at the county level. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are relative to this
year.
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Figure C.2: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SBHC Primary Care
and Medical Staff Services on 10th Grade High School Dropout
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Panel D: Medical Staff Hours in First Center at Opening
Authors’ estimates of equation (6) as described in the text. Each point shows the coefficient
estimate on the service hours measure interacted with the relative time to the first center
opening in the school district. All estimates include school district and state-by-year fixed
effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in the school
district. The lines extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence inter-
vals that are calculated using standard errors clustered at the school district level. Relative
year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are relative to this year.
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Figure C.3: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SBHC Primary Care
and Medical Staff Services on 11th Grade High School Dropout
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Panel D: Medical Staff Hours in First Center at Opening
Authors’ estimates of equation (6) as described in the text. Each point shows the coefficient
estimate on the service hours measure interacted with the relative time to the first center
opening in the school district. All estimates include school district and state-by-year fixed
effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in the school
district. The lines extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence inter-
vals that are calculated using standard errors clustered at the school district level. Relative
year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are relative to this year.
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Figure C.4: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SBHC Primary Care
and Medical Staff Services on 12th Grade High School Dropout






















0<−5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
Years Relative to First Center Opening




















0<−5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
Years Relative to First Center Opening
























0<−5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
Years Relative to First Center Opening





















0<−5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
Years Relative to First Center Opening
Panel D: Medical Staff Hours in First Center at Opening
Authors’ estimates of equation (6) as described in the text. Each point shows the coefficient
estimate on the service hours measure interacted with the relative time to the first center
opening in the school district. All estimates include school district and state-by-year fixed
effects, and the regressions are weighted by the high school aged population in the school
district. The lines extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence inter-
vals that are calculated using standard errors clustered at the school district level. Relative
year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are relative to this year.
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